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ABSTRACT

As the English and French grappled for North American hegemony in the first
half of the eighteenth century, trade with the Indian groups of the Great Lakes and
Ohio Valley transcended mere financial calculations and assumed a broader imperial
significance. To the native peoples who exchanged their peltry for European
manufactured goods, trade was the material manifestation of mutual obligation,
political dialogue, and military alliance. If the contest for empire inevitably became a
battle for the hearts and minds of potential Indian allies, the spoils of victory were
most visibly reckoned in furs and skins.
Yet, despite the outspoken criticism of William J. Eccles, historians of AngloFrench trade rivalry continue to embrace the dubious claims of Cadwallader Colden
and other eighteenth-century American imperialists that Canadian traders could not
compete on level economic ground with their New York and Pennsylvania
counteiparts. Allegedly beset with shoddy and costly French goods, a jealous
monopoly company that greedily fixed the price of fiirs and skins, and the levies and
restrictions of a militaristic state, Canadians were deemed unable to match the
successes of their Anglo-American competitors, who conversely reaped the benefits of
cheap and superior trade merchandise in a commerce largely free of meddling
monopolists and obtrusive officials.
A rigorous cross-border comparison of trade-good costs, transportation
charges, and peltry prices deflates the hoary myth of Anglo-American economic
superiority. With few exceptions, French-Canadian fur traders appear to have
supplied goods of equal or better quality at rates of exchange competitive with their
New York and Pennsylvania rivals. Purely economic considerations, however, never
determined success in the trade. As frustrated Anglo-American officials readily
admitted, the cohesive and scrupulously-managed French-Canadian trade network
proved aptly suited to winning and maintaining Indian friendship and alliance, while
unregulated and unscrupulous American traders perennially poisoned Anglo-Indian
relations. The persistence of characteristically Canadian commercial practices and
Indian trade loyalties despite the 1760 conquest of New France is, perhaps, the most
compelling measure of French-Canadian preeminence in the eighteenth-century contest
for North American trade and empire.
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THE PRICE OF EMPIRE
ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY FOR THE GREAT LAKES FUR TRADES
1700-1760

INTRODUCTION
RECEIPTED WISDOM

What the Trade was in the time of the French, no two persons can
agree about.
William Johnson, 8 October 1764*

In the summer of 1712, Colonel Peter Schuyler returned to Onondaga to meet
with the sachems of the Iroquois. Two years earlier, Schuyler had been sent by New
York’s anxious Commissioners of Indian Affairs to destroy a blockhouse that a
French party had recently erected at the village. Now he came to assure the Five
Nations that, contrary to the "notorious falsehoods" circulated by the French, the
English were not planning to sever the "Covenant Chain" uniting them in friendship.
The sachems listened politely as the New Yorker denied the rumors and
promised the delivery of gunpowder and various other items as a token of his
government’s sincerity. But before they addressed the content of his speech, the
Iroquois leaders reaffirmed their belief in the fundamental unity of trade and alliance.

1 William Johnson, "A Scheme for Meeting Expenses of Trade," WJP, 4: 556.
2

"It is well known," they declared, "the original Foundation of their alliance with the
Christians were the Advantages they received by Trading with them." Before the
arrival of the Europeans, "they made use of Earthen Pots, Stone Knives & Hatchets &
Bows & Arrows," but after securing "Good Arms" from the English they had "rooted
out" and conquered their enemies. "Our first entering into a Covenant with you,"
they recalled, "was Chiefly grounded upon Trade. We then bought for a Bever a
Stroud Water Blanket or Two Duffel Blankets, but since these have always been
growing dearer & dearer the Pouder we now buy for a Bever is scarce worth
naming." Their pleas for cheaper European goods, however, had lately fallen upon
deaf ears. "We now tell you," they cautioned, "this Affair may be the occasion of
breaking that Chain of Peace & Friendship which hath subsisted between us & you."
Only if goods were sold cheaper, they concluded, would the Covenant Chain be
preserved and the Iroquois and English "live in peace forever.1,2

New France, New York, and Pennsylvania were founded on fur, a commodity
readily obtained from Indian hunters that found a lucrative market in Europe. The
compact Canadian colony never outgrew its initial dependence on the export of beaver
and a variety of other peltry; while the economies of New York and Pennsylvania
eventually burgeoned into broader pursuits of pecuniary happiness, colonial AngloAmericans continued to reap considerable economic benefits from the exchange of
European manufactured goods for furs and skins. But after 1700, as the French and

2 AIA, 94-95.

English vied more vigorously for North American hegemony, trade relations with the
Indian peoples of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley transcended the realm of private
profits and emerged as a matter of imperial importance.
Though increasingly enmeshed in a world of commodities and markets, the
Indians who supplied the craving for fur refused to be reduced to mere ciphers in a
transatlantic economic equation. The Iroquois sachems who censured Schuyler in
1712 spoke more broadly for every native group that was eventually drawn into trade
with the rival European powers: if they were collectively reluctant to embrace the
ruthless pursuit of profits with the fervor of their new commercial partners, the
Indians were hardly averse to exploiting the curious European appetite for peltry to
their own material and diplomatic advantage. To the Algonquians and Iroquoians
who accommodated the eighteenth-century fur trades, exchange connoted more than
an impersonal transaction between two parties intent on exploiting the other for
maximum gain. Rather, trade was the material manifestation of mutual obligation,
political dialogue, and military alliance. It was in this context that virtually every
Indian group attempted-with varying degrees of success-to link the exchange of furs
to the exigencies of European-Indian diplomatic relations.
If the contest for North American empire inevitably became a battle for the
hearts and minds of potential Indian allies, the spoils of victory were ultimately
reckoned in furs and skins. At its height, the Anglo-French commercial rivalry
centered on two distinct theaters: along the shores of Lake Ontario, where the pursuit
of beaver and other furs pitted the French at forts Frontenac, Toronto, and Niagara

against the New Yorkers at Oswego, the only Anglo-American stronghold on the
Great Lakes; and in the western Great Lakes and Ohio Valley, where garrisoned
French posts jealously guarded against the increasing incursions of Pennsylvania
deerskin traders who drove their pack trains into the vast mart of the trans-Allegheny
West.
Because General Montcalm was obliging enough to fall mortally wounded on
the Plains of Abraham, leaving Canada open to defeat at the hands of AngloAmerican invaders, it is tempting to assume--with a chauvinism worthy of Francis
Parkman-that somehow New France was ripe for the plucking. After all, what was
Canada if not a stunted colony, its tiny peasant population huddled in feudal fashion
along the St. Lawrence and its staple economy equally subservient to the vagaries of
an unpredictable European fur market? But if the British victory at Quebec owed
more to inept French leadership than to the brilliance of British stratagems, it is
equally evident that the conquest of Canada emphatically did not signal the triumph of
vigorous American enterprise over phlegmatic French authoritarianism.3 It is rare, in
the smugly skeptical Iate-twentieth century, to stumble across a historiographical issue
that is still framed by the self-serving rhetoric of centuries-dead participants. Yet this
remains true of the scholarship surrounding the Anglo-French rivalry for the Great
Lakes fur trades.

3 For the significance of the Conquest, as well as Parkman’s influence on the
historiography of French North America, see: W. J. Eccies, "The Battle of Quebec:
A Reappraisal," reprinted in Eccies, Essays on New France (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1987), 125-133; Eccies, "The History of New France According to
Francis Parkman," Ibid. , 16-25.

Two fundamental assumptions shaped the thinking of eighteenth-century
American imperialists concerning the contest for the commercial allegiance of the
Iroquoian and Algonquian peoples of the Great Lakes and Ohio country. The first
dictated that, for a variety of reasons, Canadian traders could not compete on level
economic ground with their New York and Pennsylvania counterparts. Beset with
shoddy and costly French goods, a jealous monopoly company that greedily fixed the
price of furs and skins, the levies and restrictions of a militaristic state, not to
mention a river that was navigable only a few months a year, it was simply
impossible for Canadians to match the success of Anglo-American traders who
conversely reaped the benefits of cheap and superior trade merchandise in a
commerce largely free of meddling monopolists and obtrusive officials.
Paradoxically, the second assumption granted that the French had encompassed
the Indian trade of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley--and reaped the concomitant
diplomatic rewards~for the very reasons that had allegedly inhibited their economic
success. Detailing a deplorable record of fraud and abuses committed by their own
traders, disheartened Anglo-American commentators conceded that any inherent
advantages they had wielded over their northern rivals were obliterated by the absence
of an effective regulatory structure. Stubbornly independent New York and
Pennsylvania traders, they feared, ran dangerously amuck in the resulting vacuum of
authority, drowning their hapless Indian customers in cheap rum before pilfering their
peltry at egregious rates of exchange. Having enshrined the inseparability of trade
and alliance in their imperial policy, however, the French had enjoyed far greater

success in monitoring the behavior of their traders, addressing native grievances, and
ensuring that the pecuniary interests of merchants never overshadowed the careful
conduct of diplomacy on the Canadian frontier.
Though both assumptions had widespread currency in Anglo-American
imperialist circles well into the 1760s, it was the first—decreeing the dismal economic
circumstances of the Canadian trade-that has proved most persistent, having been
reproduced in countless incestuous variations over several historiographical
generations. In fact, the only scholar to have challenged the shibboleth of an afflicted
Canadian trade has been William J. Eccies. But, as Eccies himself was the first to
admit, his revisions were rooted more in common sense than quantitative rigor.
Peruse the dusty ledgers of rival fur merchants, he proposed, and it should become
apparent that a gun, kettle, or knife cost roughly as much in Montreal as it did in
Albany or Philadelphia. Under such scrutiny, the hoary myth of Anglo-American
economic advantage would disintegrate like a tattered trading blanket.
Scholars have universally eschewed a comparison of the routine operations of
English and French traders and so have uncritically accepted the dubious assertions of
eighteenth-century polemicists-with all their bulging political baggage-that the
Canadians were at a profound disadvantage in the pursuit of the Great Lakes fur
trades. A careful examination of English and French trade-good prices at every nexus
of exchange, however, deflates the overblown rhetoric of interested colonial agents;
it is evident that Canadian merchants and traders consistently matched their AngloAmerican rivals day-to-day, pound-to-livre, at their own economic game. Despite

occasional wartime disruptions to transatlantic shipping, the French-Canadian fur
trade survived, and even flourished, in the decades before the Conquest for the
patently non-economic reasons that Anglo-American imperialists had so shrewdly
perceived. Trade-good prices mattered, but Indian loyalties ultimately ran deeper
than lucre- a lesson the British and Americans stubbornly refused to learn. Now,
after nearly three centuries, the tired myths of Anglo-American supremacy in the
Great Lakes fur trades should, deservedly, be laid to rest.

CHAPTER I
THE FRENCH-CANADIAN TRADE

The scrape of heavily-laden birchbark canoes on sand marked the end of a
journey of thousands of miles, from the teeming quays of La Rochelle into the heart
of North America. Tearing open the carefully stitched packs of goods which for
months they had alternately paddled, shouldered, and hauled into the wilderness from
Montreal, weary voyageurs completed a cycle of manufacture, transportation, and
marketing that linked the artisans, merchants, and consumers of France to the
residents of its small Canadian colony on the St. Lawrence. Yet even as brandy kegs
were tapped, bolts of cloth unrolled, and tobacco smoked, a parallel process was
already underway. Beaver pelts, deerskins, and other furs that had been hunted,
trapped, scraped, and toted by Ottawas, Potawotamis, and Crees had already begun
an equally arduous passage from the forests and marshes of the western Great Lakes
across the Atlantic to the busy hat-making manufactories of Paris and the genteel
markets of Europe.
Only Canadians, in the elongated continuum of exchange between Europeans
and the native peoples of North America, owed their fortunes overwhelmingly to the
fruits of Indian-European trade. The vainest courtiers at Versailles might have

9

10
endured being stripped of their beaver hats and fur-trimmed garments, just as the
great merchant houses of La Rochelle, Bordeaux, and Rouen would have sweetly
prospered from their lucrative Caribbean trade alone.1 In a pinch, Parisian hatters
might turn to European sources of furs, and they endlessly experimented with cheaper
and more readily available materials for their chapeaux. Astute Indian consumers of
the western Great Lakes and Ohio Valley had eagerly adapted and adopted those
European goods which best met their own specific needs, but they had lived without
cloth, brass, and glass for centuries, and might easily do so again.
With a tiny settler population and an abbreviated agricultural season, New
France came to depend on fur as the only exportable commodity that could attract
specie to the otherwise cash-strapped colony. French hopes of discovering oriental
wealth at the source of the St. Lawrence may soon have been dashed, but beaver
swiftly supplanted gold and spices in the schemes of those seeking a Canadian
fortune. Because of the unique binding properties of its barbed under hairs, beaver
fur was valued by French hatters as the best material for "felting" in the process of
hat manufacture. Smaller luxury furs, or menues pelleteries, as well as deerskins and
moose hides, also had their markets, but as long as European fashion and social ritual
dictated the wearing of ostentatious, broad-brimmed hats, beaver’s dominance of the

1 The highest recorded annual value of Canadian furs imported at La Rochelle
was 3,828,424 livres in 1754. Between 1718 and 1761 fur imports averaged one
million livres annually, while imports from all French colonies totalled 140 million.
A. Jean E. Lunn, "Economic Development in New France, 1713-1760" (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, McGill University, 1942), 464-65; W. J.
Eccies, "A Belated Review of Harold Adams Innis’s, The Fur Trade in Canada,"
Canadian Historical Review, 60:4 (1979): 420-21.

fur market remained assured.2
In keeping with its status as the most prized of Canadian furs, beaver was
classified into a Linnaean array of grades according to its perceived quality and the
season in which it was harvested. Most valuable for its self-adhesive qualities was
castor gras, literally "greasy beaver." These pelts had already been scraped and
greased, then sewn together and worn by Indians as winter clothing, absorbing bodily
oils and, to French noses, a distinctive aroma. Untreated beaver was known as castor
sec, or "dry beaver," and was less valuable because it required labor-intensive
treatment before it could be transformed into felt. Pelts worn as coat beaver but less
slick from bodily contact were deemed castor demi-gras, while discriminating
merchants and hatters paid least for poorer quality pelts such as the artificially-oiled
castor fa lsifii and the thick-skinned gros cuir.3
Until the 1660s, the majority of furs traded in New France were carried to the
colony by Indian middlemen and traded at Montreal’s boisterous trade fairs. Whether
to avoid the impositions of the Compagnie de VOccident, which from 1665 retained a
royal monopoly on the marketing of beaver, or the watchful eye of churchmen and
seigneurs, each year an unknown number of young men slipped away in canoes to
trade directly with the tribes of the Great Lakes. The freebooting life of these

2 Michael Sonenscher, The Hatters o f Eighteenth-Century France (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1987), 12-17, 20-25; J. F. Crean, "Hats and the
Colonial Fur Trade," Canadian Journal o f Economics and Political Science, 28:3
(1962): 378-86.
3 Lunn, "Economic Development," 113-15.

12
coureurs de bois, or "runners of the woods," was ritually condemned in sermons and
royal proclamations, but to little avail. In 1672 it was estimated that some three or
four hundred Canadians were living and trading in the pays d ’en haut, or up-country,
and a decade later as many as 800 had fled—in the words of alarmed administrators—
"into the depths of the woods."4 Fearing the depopulation of the settlements as much
as the inevitable debauching of Canadians and Indians alike through mutual
intercourse, religious and secular officials agreed on a licensing system in which
twenty-five permits, or congas, were granted either to needy institutions or
trustworthy traders, allowing them to transport one canoe-load of trade merchandise
west. The combined efforts of both licensed and unlicensed Canadian traders at the
end of the seventeenth century produced a prodigious amount of beaver for the
monopoly company, so much so, in fact, that by 1695 the French fur market was
glutted, leaving the company on the brink of bankruptcy with a surplus of 3,500,00
livres of beaver sitting unsold in its warehouse.5
In the grip of a growing economic crisis, the reflexive reaction of anxious
French officials was to strangle the export of Canadian beaver by arbitrarily cutting
off direct trade with the tribes of the western Great Lakes. The lease on the Canadian
beaver monopoly was conveniently due to expire in 1697, and the colonial authorities
dictated that no trading permits would be issued after that date. The western posts

4 W. J. Eccies, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760 (Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1969), 110.
5 Eccies, Canadian Frontier, 124-25. For the sake of clarity, livres (weight) will
be italicized to differentiate it from livres (currency).

13
were to be boarded up and abandoned while all Frenchmen in the pays d ’en haut were
ordered to return home. While cobwebbed Canadian canoes rotted in storage,
however, it soon became apparent that the western Indians were unwilling to resume
their past practice of transporting furs to Montreal as French officials had hoped.
Canadian leaders, however, fully fathomed the profound diplomatic advantages that
would accrue to the English from the complete severance of French trade
relationships with the tribes of the western Great Lakes, and they lobbied vigorously
for the resumption of at least a limited trade. Faced with a crippling oversupply of
beaver, yet now aware of the potential for English encroachment in the Great Lakes
region, the French government ultimately fell back on a compromise position. A
handful of Illinois-Michigan posts were allowed to reopen in 1701, including
Michilimackinac, St. Joseph des Miamis, and St. Louis des Illinois, as well as Fort
Frontenac on the shores of Lake Ontario. This year would prove to be a watershed in
the history of French expansion in North America as Louis XIV embarked on a
flamboyant bid to halt the westward expansion of the English by literally encircling
the seaboard colonies. With the founding of a trading settlement at Detroit designed
to dominate the western Great Lakes, and the Louisiana colony to restrict the southern
access to the Mississippi watershed, a new era of vigorous competition with the
English for trade and empire had begun.6
Assuming that with a closer knowledge of Canadian trading conditions they
would meet with greater success in controlling and marketing the beaver supply, a

6 Eccles, Canadian Frontier, 126-31.

14
coalition of colonial merchants took control of the company in 1700. The Canadians
may have been more attuned to the peculiar economic and political circumstances of
their colony, but they had no more influence than their predecessors over the vagaries
of demand for beaver in Europe. By 1705, they too found themselves overstocked
and deeply in debt. Once again the monopoly privileges of the floundering beaver
company were transferred, this time to the French partnership of Aubert, Neret, and
Guyot, who paid the company’s debts and set about reorganizing the ailing beaver
business. For the next five years no castor gras was to be received by the company
in the hope that eventually the supply of prime Canadian beaver would be brought in
line with the demand of the French hat industry. From 1712 until 1717 gras would
once again be accepted at the price of 40 sols per pound. The less desirable castor
sec, it was agreed, would be bought during the entire period of their lease at 30 sols
per pound.7
Long before the lease of Aubert, Neret, and Guyot had expired, however, the
condition of the beaver market was abruptly altered. In 1712 company officials
discovered that the 400 bales of excess castor gras that had been sitting for years in
their warehouse had been ruined by vermin. With the entire supply of Canadian
beaver lost virtually overnight, Parisian hatters soon found themselves in the midst of
a materials shortage so acute that they were compelled to import large amounts of fur
from England and the Netherlands. In response, the beaver company immediately
began buying Canadian castor gras, three years earlier than originally planned. In the

7 Lunn, "Economic Development," 136-37.

interim, however, Canadian sources of gras had virtually disappeared since Indian
hunters had turned to gathering other, more lucrative peltry.8
Constant changes in ownership of the monopoly company inevitably created a
highly unstable commercial environment for Canadian traders. Frustrated with
irregular payments for their furs, Canadian merchants and exporters clamored
continually for the reform of the beaver trade until Louis XV finally authorized the
formation of the Compagnie des Indes in 1717. After several years of controversial
experimentation with import duties, the newly-formed company settled into a stable
pattern of operation which endured from 1722 to the Conquest. The company
reserved the exclusive right to export all beaver traded in New France, and on the
return voyages brought shipments primarily of textiles and gunpowder to supply the
Indian trade. The company maintained a comptroller, an inspector, and three
receivers to supervise the collection of peltry at eachof the largest Canadian towns of
Montreal, Quebec, and Trois-Rivifcres, as well as a host of

lesserofficials,clerks,and

guards. Though all beaver arriving in New France from the pays d ’en haut was in
theory to be brought to a company office within 48 hours, in practice it tended to
circulate within the colony as currency. The company also issued receipts to
Canadian sellers which could later be converted into bills of exchange redeemable
through its Paris treasury. These receipts, like the pelts themselves, were also
commonly traded in lieu of scarce specie.9

8 Lunn, "Economic Development," 137-38.
9 Lunn, "Economic Development," 148-50.
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Though it has often been suggested that close regulation o f the Canadian trade
was a drag on the eighteenth-century commerce in furs, the beaver monopoly more
likely had a benign, if not a salutary, role in the economic life of New France.10 In
no sense did the Compagnie des Indes regulate the export of all furs from Canada: its
monopoly extended solely to beaver, and since the disastrous years of oversupply and
unstable markets at the turn of the eighteenth century, an increasing proportion of
Canadian fur exports to La Rochelle and other French ports consisted of deerskins
and menues pelleteries, all of which were sold on the open market. In fact, during
the years between 1713 and 1761 for which La Rochelle shipping records are
available, it is clear that in any given year beaver comprised only about half of
Canadian fur exports.11 Though the company retained ultimate control over how
much would be paid for the various grades of beaver brought to its offices, the
Governor-General and Intendant of New France (the resident military and civil
administrators, respectively), as well as Canadian exporters, had at least some voice
in determining beaver prices. Despite the robust lobbying of the Parisian hatter’s
guild, on several occasions the company did in fact raise the price paid for beaver in
Canada on the recommendation of colonial merchants and officials. It is also unlikely

10 The harshest assessment of the beaver monopoly is offered by Harold Adams
Innis in The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930),
11 E. R. Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry in the Fur Trade During the 18th
Century," Culture, 8 (1947), 434-55, reprinted in Canadian History Before
Confederation: Essays and Interpretation, edited by J. M. Bumsted (Georgetown:
Irwin-Dorsey, 1972), 145; Lunn, "Economic Development," 464-65.
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that beaver prices would have been significantly higher had the trade gone
unregulated. The combination of demands by French manufacturers and the need for
middlemen to handle the importing and marketing of furs at La Rochelle and other
French ports of entry would have acted as a continual brake on beaver prices. Under
monopoly control, however, the Canadians were guaranteed a stable market for all the
beaver they had to offer, as well as insurance against price fluctuations. The
company was further able to dispel the old specter of oversupply through more
efficient marketing of the commodity in France and the penetration of broader
European markets. Though it has been suggested that the company was perhaps
reaping more than its fair share of profits from the sale of Canadian beaver, it seems
unlikely that the market would have performed much differently had it operated free
of company influence. Considering the unpredictable nature of the European fur
market, not to mention the tremendous economic and diplomatic importance of the fur
trade to the survival of New France, the "limited monopoly" of the Compagnie des
Indes was, perhaps, ultimately more necessary than evil.12
If a unique blend of free enterprise and mercantilist doctrine characterized the
merchandising of furs in the eighteenth century, a similar fusion of government
regulation and private enterprise shaped the exchange of furs for European
manufactures on the periphery of French North America. The sale of congis, or

12 12 Lunn, "Economic Development," 151-56; Adair, "Anglo-French
Rivalry," 144-49. For a more critical assessment of the Compagnie des Indes, see
Thomas Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720-1760: The
Uses of Fur-Trade Imperialism," Journal o f the Canadian Historical Association, 1
(1990): 300-01.

trading licenses, had been a means for the Canadian government both to regulate
those who headed west to trade with the Indians as well an effective method of
financing the garrisoned posts of the pays d ’en haut where the trade was conducted.
Before the western trade was restricted in the mid-1690s, congas had been sold
primarily to highly-placed individuals or institutions who in turn might sell them to
others who actually conducted the trade. After the revitalization of the fur trade in
the early years of the eighteenth century, however, three distinct types of trading
posts came to characterize the trade. The "King’s Posts" of Frontenac (1673),
Niagara (1720), and Rouilte/Toronto (1720) were administered by government
officials and the trade was conducted with goods supplied from the royal stores.
These posts were of particular strategic value to the French since they were located in
the regions of most intense competition with English fur traders. Close government
regulation ensured that goods were sold to Indian customers at prices which were
competitive with those offered by the English, even if that meant occasionally
operating at a loss. In contrast, the bustling posts of Michilimackinac and Detroit
were open to all traders who could pay the post commandant a fee of 500 livres. By
the 1720s, a third form had evolved in which trade was conducted on the basis of
permis, or permits, granted by the governor-general, the vast majority of which were
sold to officers of the Troupes de la Marine, the colonial regulars. From this time
on, much of the Canadian fur trade was conducted through a complex relationship
that linked merchant capital, political influence, and government direction in what has
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been described as a "military-commercial complex."13
In a typical arrangement, a commandant with access to a monopoly on trade at
a given post struck a three-way commercial partnership with one or more Montreal
marchands iquipeurs, or merchant-outfitters, who supplied the goods required for
trade and hired the necessary paddlers, and a marchand voyageur, the professional
trader who oversaw the delivery of the goods and their sale to Indian consumers in
the pays d ’en haut. Furs obtained from trading with the Indians were subsequently
shipped back to Montreal and sold by the merchants either to the beaver company or
on the open market. For his part, the commandant was responsible for ensuring the
support of the post’s military garrison and buildings, while overseeing the daily
conduct of the trade and dispensing gifts to Indian allies on behalf of the Canadian
government for diplomatic purposes. By farming out these fur-trading posts to
coalitions of individuals which linked merchant capital to agents of military and
diplomatic authority, the French government was able to assert its sovereignty, at
least nominally, over the vast interior of North America at very little cost in
manpower or materials while simultaneously ensuring the stability of Canada’s staple
economy.14

13 Dale Miquelon, New France, 1701-1744: "A Supplement to Europe" (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1987), 160.
14 W. I. Eccles, "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century Imperialism," William
and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 40:3 (1983): 346, 355-56; Miquelon, New France,
155, 157; "1747: Lease for the Post at Green Bay," and "1747: Partnership to
Exploit La Baye," Collections o f the State Historical Society o f Wisconsin, edited by
Lyman C. Draper and Reuben Gold Thwaites (Madison: The Society, 1906-08), 17:
451-55, 18: 7-10; Gratien Allaire, "Officiers et marchands: les societds de commerce
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For all its overarching diplomatic, political, and economic importance,
however, the fur trade was at root a commerce founded on the physical transfer of
material goods. European manufactured goods were exchanged for beaver fur,
deerskins, and other peltry, which in turn were transformed into felt hats, leather, and
fur-trimmed garments in a continuous cycle of production and consumption. By the
eighteenth century, the material exchange between Europeans and Indians had settled
into a pattern as regular and predictable as the neatly itemized lists of trade items
ordered annually by Canadian officials from the royal warehouses at the port of
Rochefort, or the meticulously-kept account books of Montreal merchant-outfitters.
From papers of sewing needles to bulky kegs of brandy, the various items which
made their way across the Atlantic and into the Great Lakes region reveal as much
about those who created them as those who used them. Some were wholly functional,
others decorative or seemingly frivolous, but in every case the context and conditions
of their exchange forged links between individuals and peoples in ways that both
transformed and transcended their everyday use.15

des fourrures, 1715-1760," Revue d ’Histoire de VAmirique Frangaise, 40:3 (1987):
409-428.
15 One of the most exhaustive sources of information on the manufacture, trade,
and use of French trade items is Marie Gerin-Lajoie’s unpublished Montreal
Merchants Records Project Research Files, 1971-1975, microfilm edition (M496), in
the collections of the Minnesota Historical Society. The Museum o f the Fur Trade
Quarterly of Chadron, Nebraska, is another mine of material on the material culture
of the fur trade. See also Carolyn Gilman, Where Two Worlds Meet: The Great Lakes
Fur Trade (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1982); Patricia Miquelon, "Fur
Trade Goods of the Montreal Traders, 1760-1821," National Historic Sites Service
[Canada], Unpublished in-house report, 1970; Robert C. Wheeler, A Toast to the Fur
Trade: A Picture Essay on its Material Culture (St. Paul: Wheeler Productions, 1985);

awls (alines):
Identical to those used by French shoemakers, iron trade awls were short, straight,
and triangular in cross-section. Shipped by the gross without handles, these awls
were hafted with wood or horn by the Indian consumer. They were used for a variety
of purposes that included punching holes in leather to sew clothing and in birch bark
to stitch canoes. English trade awls were almost identical, but by the eighteenth
century they had introduced offset, or crooked, awl blades designed so that the user’s
hand would be protected should the handle split from excessive pressure. A number
of other small iron implements were also commonly traded, including chisels,
scrapers, scissors, and projectile points.

axes (Itaches):
Many sizes and styles of French axes made their way into the pays d ’en haut, from
the broad and sturdy haches de service, or service axes, to small hatchets (hachettes)
with hammer heads on the opposite end. Most were iron, but some were steel-tipped
(aciri) for added strength and durability. One of the most popular styles was the
hache biscayenne, or "Biscayan" axe named after the Spanish region in which they

Bruce M. White, "Montreal Canoes and Their Cargoes," in ”Le Castor Fait Tout":
Selected Papers o f the Fifth North American Fur Trade Conference, (1985), edited by
Bruce Trigger, Toby Morantz and Louise Dechene (Montreal: Lake St. Louis
Historical Society, 1987), 164-92; Louise DechSne, Habitants and Merchants in
Seventeenth-Century Montreal, translated by Liana Vardi (Montreal and Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992), 78-84; Miquelon, New France, 150-53;
Peter Kalm, Travels Into North America, translated by John Reinhold Forster (Barre,
Mass.: The Imprint Society, 1972), 489-92.
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were originally produced. By the eighteenth century, however, "Biscayan" most
likely referred to the characteristic shape of the blade. By the 1720s a variety of
haches du pays were made in Canada by colonial blacksmiths to supply the trade.

beads (mssades):
Glass beads in a variety of shapes, sizes, and colors, including black, white, green,
red, and especially blue, were produced specifically for the Indian trade in Venice and
Rouen. They were sold by the pound and used for jewelry as well as for decorating
clothing and even canoes. Black and white beads were frequently sold as cheap
imitation wampum.

blankets (couvertes):
Perhaps the most enduring symbol of the material culture of the fur trade was the
ubiquitous woollen trade blanket, sold in a wide variety of standardized sizes, often
designated by the number of "points," or stripes on the edge. The smallest blankets
included the d la capuchine and d berceau (cradle) styles, while point blankets ranged
in size from one to eight points and upward, with two and two-and-a-half points the
most common. Many trade blankets, especially a characteristic green variety, came
from Toulouse, while a variety of others were woven in Montpellier, Bordeaux, and
Rouen (which produced a version made of dogs’ hair). On the insistence of
demanding Indian customers, government officials ensured that the quality and size of
trade blankets remained consistent. Two-point blankets measured 4 ’11" long by 4’2"
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wide, three-points 5*7" by 4*10", and four-points 5*9" by 5*5". They were shipped
to Canada in bales of 150 wrapped with straw, packing linen, and cord.

capotes:
Heavy, hooded coats made of a woollen blanket material such as dourgne, molton,
mazamet, or cadis cloth, capotes were often decorated with trim, braid, or decorative
tape. They were made almost exclusively in Canada in a number of different sizes
and colors, and were described in terms of the number of aunes of material that went
into their construction (e.g. une capote de trois aunes).

cod-line (ligne du banc):
A heavy, untarred hempen or cotton cord used in the Atlantic fisheries, cod-line was
sold by the pound and had a variety of uses in the trade, including tying up bales of
goods and furs.

combs (peignes):
Combs were used for grooming as well as for hair decoration. The cheapest and
most common varieties were made of boxwood, but more expensive horn and ivory
combs were also traded. Different sizes were available, with varying spaces between
the teeth. The manufacture of combs centered in Paris and Rouen, while ivory combs
were exclusively the product of Dieppe, the center of the French ivory craft.
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dourgnei
A relatively inexpensive twilled woollen fabric with a flannel finish, this cloth from
the town of Dourgne in southern France was most commonly dyed blue or violet.

drap:
Drop was the generic name for a costly woollen cloth dyed in bright hues of red,
blue, and black and used primarily for making blankets and outerwear. Designed to
compete with the renowned English stroud cloth, it was imported in large amounts by
the Compagnie des Indes and was a staple of the Canadian trade.

eau de vie:
Despite the persistent opposition of Canadian clerics, eau de vie (loosely translated as
"brandy," though it could be many things, including armanac, cognac, marc, poireau,
or calvados) from Charente and Aunis remained an essential, and lucrative,
component of the fur-trader’s assortment of goods. Since 1679 the sale of brandy to
the Indians had been strictly prohibited on the grounds that alcoholism was insidiously
weakening the fabric of native society. On the urging of Canadian administrators, its
sale at Fort Frontenac was legalized in 1716 so that French traders might more
effectively compete with rival New Yorkers who did not share Jesuit scruples about
plying Indian customers with liquor. Flagrant abuses of the trade led to its
prohibition once again in 1718, but with the establishment of the English trading post
of Oswego on the southern shore of Lake Ontario it became clear to secular officials
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that unless French traders could supply brandy they would rapidly lose their Indian
customers, and allies, to the English. The trade was officially reinstated in 1727 over
the dissent of the clergy. In an act of protest in 1730, the bishop of Canada, PierreHerman Dosquet, reserved to himself the right to absolve penitents guilty of selling or
otherwise providing alcohol to Indians. Though he returned the power of absolution
to the priests several years later, clerical and secular authorities remained bitterly
divided over the issue until the end of the French regime.
Realizing the fantastic profits possible from the sale of brandy, the majority of
traders most likely ignored the official wrangling over the legality and morality of the
trade. And so, in spite of the potential spiritual penalties, brandy continued to flow
freely into the pays d ’en haut. Costs were high, since brandy was heavily taxed on
entry into Canada, and in its bulky wooden casks it was difficult and expensive to
transport by canoe. But it never failed to find thirsty consumers. In fact, it was one
of the only goods which had an almost bottomless market among native peoples
whose demand for most other European goods was notoriously inelastic.

firesteels (battefeux):
In the eighteenth century the most common implement for lighting fires was the
firesteel, a small, variously shaped hand-held steel implement which produced sparks
when struck against flint. These cheap, ubiquitous trade items were produced in
Rouen, Amsterdam, Touraine, Brittany, and St.-Eti&nne en Forest, and were
shipped to Canada by the thousands.
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gunflints (pierres h fusil):
With the flintlock the standard military and hunting weapon, there was a constant
demand for the small, wedge-shaped flints necessary for their firing. The best French
flints were manufactured in the old province of Berry at Meunes, Couffi, and other
small towns surrounding Saint-Aignan.

gunpowder (poudre h mousquet)'.
This crucial trade item was manufactured in various locations in France, including
Rouen, Brest, Limoges, Bordeaux, Toulouse, and Marseille, under strict government
regulation. By law, French gunpowder consisted of 75 percent saltpetre, 12.5 percent
sulphur, and 12.5 percent charcoal. Its price fixed by state decree, it was supplied to
the King’s powder magazines at Rochefort for export to Canada. All batches of
powder were rigorously tested before shipment to guarantee its quality.

gunworms (tirebours):
An array of implements was necessary for the maintenance and effective firing of
flintlock weapons, including the gunworm, a small, spring-like piece of wire that fit
on the end of a ramrod. Often a hunter would find it necessary to change from
smaller shot to a ball-or vice versa-in mid-hunt, depending on the type of quarry he
encountered. The gunworm allowed him to quickly remove the unused charge from
the barrel and reload the necessary shot. The gunworm also came in handy for
cleaning the bore after repeated firings.
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handkerchiefs (mouchoirs):
Perhaps the only thing truly "Indian" about the native peoples of eighteenth-century
North America were the costly handkerchiefs they prized. Exotic Bemagor and
Romal silks were imported by the French from India specifically for the North
American trade. Though the predominant color was blue, some were checkered and
others had colored borders. Inexpensive cotton handkerchiefs were also available for
less discriminating noses.

hawkbells (grelots):
Small copper or brass bells, usually a half-inch in diameter, sometimes larger, were
traded as novelties to be sewn onto shoes and clothing.

hats (chapeaux):
A small number of beaver hats made the long return journey to the forests of the New
World from which they had originated, but many other hats, from blends of vicuna,
camel, and rabbit hair to woollen felts, were cheaper and more popular in the pays
d ‘en haut. Warm cloth caps better suited to the Canadian climate such as the
deerstalker-style tapabord, with ear-flaps and turn-down brim, were assembled in
Montreal before shipment west.

kettles (chaudi&res):
Brass, copper, and occasionally iron kettles were manufactured in a wide range of
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"nesting" sizes for easy transportation. Kettles were an extremely valuable
commodity in the pays d ’en haut since they replaced the much less efficient wood,
bark, and pottery vessels previously used for cooking. They were sold by weight and
the iron handle, or bail, was attached after shipping.

knives (couteaux):
A bewildering assortment of cutlery, including razors, hunting knives, folding knives,
pen knives, butcher knives, spring knives, and scalping knives, found an enthusiastic
market among Indian consumers who quickly adopted European steel implements over
their stone counterparts. The major center of cutlery production in France was St.Etifcnne de Forest, south-west of Lyon. By the eighteenth century, knife
manufacturing was a highly specialized industry characterized by a complex and
efficient division of labor that could turn out high quality knives at low prices. Knife
handles were crafted by hand in Paris from boxwood and beech, a cheap, easily
workable wood which took a good polish. Occasionally cow or bull horn was used,
but ram’s horn was the finest and most expensive material available and it was used
primarily for mounting razors.

lead/lead shot (plomb/balles):
France had few lead mines in the eighteenth century, and most of the lead exported to
Canada originated in England, Germany, and Poland. Roughly half of the lead
shipped to New France arrived in bar form; the rest came pre-cast in a wide range of
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gauges and types of shot, from balls to pellets and hunting shot,

leggings (mitasses):
Different sizes of leggings in various sturdy fabrics such as molten and mazamet were
made up by Montreal seamstresses for shipment west. They were worn both for
warmth and protection against thick undergrowth.

linen (toile):
Numerous weaves and styles of linen cloth, from tough hempen sail-cloth to finer and
more expensive bleached weaves for shirts, were a staple of trade textiles. The finest
linens were manufactured in Roux, Morlaix, Rouen, Paris, Beaufort, Laval, and
Holland.

mazamet:
This heavy woollen cloth, similar to molton, originated in the town of Mazamet, near
Dourgne in the south of France.

m irrors (miroirs):
Mirrors of many shapes, styles and sizes were traded in great numbers in the pays
d'en haut. The popular miroirs de chagrin were covered with rough-surfaced
shagreen leather from horse, mule, or ass hide. Other popular trade mirrors were
made of tin or had leather wallets for storage, while others had japanned or tortoise
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shell frames, or were covered in studded and decorated leather. Mirrors were
reportedly most popular among native men who used them for hair-dressing, facepainting, and other preparations for war or ceremonial occasions.

moUon:
Like its English equivalent from Melton, molton was a heavily fulled, short napped,
plain cloth. Woven either entirely from wool or with a cotton warp and woollen
weft, molton was a completely smooth fabric that had a tight construction and a finish
that concealed all trace of the warp and weft. Like its equivalent from Mazamet,
molton was generally dyed a deep blue, red, or violet.

muskets (fusils):
Relatively few muskets were traded by the French because most were given as gifts
by the Canadian government to Indian allies. The majority of military muskets were
made in Tulle, the center of French armaments production, but the fusil de traite
(trade gun) or fusil de chasse (hunting/fowling piece) was fashioned in St.-Etienne.
Fusils de chasse were popular with Indian hunters because their shorter and lighter
barrels were ideally suited to wooded conditions. Trade guns came in a number of
barrel lengths, the most popular being from three-and-a-half to
four-and-a-half feet long. Caliber was measured by the number of ball shot per
pound of lead; the standard military musket had a caliber of 18 balls per pound, the
hunting piece 28.
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needles 0aiguilles):
Needles were sold in paper packets in a variety of sizes. Smaller ones were used
with thimbles, another small but common item of trade, to sew clothing, to string
beads, and even for tattooing. Larger sizes were used to stitch birch bark for canoes
and the heavy toile d ’embalhge, or canvas cloth, used to wrap bales of trade goods
and pelts for shipment.

rings (bagues h cachet):
A relatively inexpensive yet ubiquitous trade item were brass finger rings, often
known as "Jesuit rings" after the seventeenth-century missionary practice of
distributing rings bearing religious symbols to new Indian converts. By the eighteenth
century, however, these mass-produced rings had lost their spiritual significance and
thousands of them were carried to the pays d ’en haut in trade-good assortments.
Typical French rings had a thin brass band with a flat bezel in oval, heart-shaped,
round, or octagonal form, and were often engraved with designs of crosses, bleeding
hearts, priests, or initials, most commonly "IHS." French trade rings were fairly
ornate compared to their English equivalents, which tended to be plain brass bands.

shirts (chemises):
Not all items used in the Indian trade necessarily came from France. Seamstresses in
Montreal were often contracted by merchant-outfitters to sew various items of
clothing such as shirts on a piecework basis. Shirts came in a variety of sizes,

including three for men, two for women, and the smallest for children, their price
depending on the size, material, and design.

sleeves (manches):
Like shirts, woollen sleeves of molton, mazamet, or dourgne cloth were pieced
together in Montreal for merchant-outfitters. Sold in pairs, the different sized sleeves
allowed for a custom fit. Like leggings, sleeves offered both warmth and protection
against mosquitoes and underbrush. They were generally not sewn onto the garment,
but were tied by a string at the nape of the neck.

stockings (bas):
During the eighteenth century, Canada was a major consumer of Orleans hosiery.
Much of it was worn by the colonists themselves, but some stockings found their way
to Indian customers in the pays d ’en haut. The most common types were the cheaper
bas de Poitou and the more elegant bas de Saint-Maixent.

thread (Jil):
Hempen threads from Poitou and Rennes, flaxen from Flanders, and other varieties
from Holland were traded by the pound. Small amounts of false gold and silver
thread were used for decorative sewing, while more durable types were used for
sewing canoe sails, shoes, clothing, and fishing nets.
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tobacco (tabac):
Many different varieties of tobacco had a market among Indian consumers, from the
locally-grown white, to the highly prized black Brazilian imported from La Rochelle.

tomahawks (casse-tites):
Many iron tomahawks, often with "dagger" ends, were fashioned by colonial
blacksmiths for the trade. Like axes, the Indian consumer fashioned and fitted the
wooden handle after purchase. The term casse-tite, literally "head-breaker," also
referred to traditional round-headed war clubs.

vermilion (vermilion):
This bright, high quality scarlet pigment made of a compound of mercury and sulphur
was a crucial element of any trade-good assortment. It was sold by weight in
powdered form, and transported in small wooden boxes, leather bags, and papers.
Most vermilion sent to Canada was purchased from Dutch suppliers, who in turn
imported it from China. Vermilion could be rubbed into buckskin or human skin, and
was usually mixed with water or grease for use as face and body paint. If blended
with a bonding agent such as mucilage from boiled beaver tail, it could also serve as
an effective dye for robes or wooden objects.

wampum (porcetaine):
It is often assumed that the French had no independent source of wampum, the small
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black and white cylindrical shells used in strings and belts as currency and for
ceremonial and diplomatic exchange. But just as much of the English wampum was
not the original "quahog" variety from coastal New England, the French exported
various equivalents known as porcelaine. French "wampum” included cowries,
burgaus, periwinkle, sea-snail, Venus mercenaria, and purslain shells. Cowries, in
particular, were purchased by French exporters from the Dutch who controlled the
European market. The individual beads, which were carefully drilled with awls for
stringing, were known as grains. There was also a market for imitation wampum
manufactured from porcelain, but this artificial type was always distinguished from its
shell counterpart and was sold by weight, while the "real" item was traded by unit.

wine (vin):
Though twice as much wine as brandy was shipped to Canada during the eighteenth
century, it never rivalled the popularity of eau de vie in the fur trade. Most imported
French wines were reds from Bordeaux, but a smaller amount of Spanish wine was
also available.

Archaeologists of the North American fur trade have long assumed that metal
implements and beads were the most important components of the trading assortments
brought into the pays d ’en haut. This misinterpretation of the relative importance of
certain categories of items in the overall context of the trade is largely the result of
the frequency at which only certain durable objects are recovered in the
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archaeological record. The work of Dean Anderson, however, has shown that
without considering "preservation bias," or the tendency of perishable goods such as
cloth, wood, and other biodegradable materials to disappear almost entirely from the
archaeological record, it is impossible to form a complete picture of the variety of
material objects which ultimately wound up in the hands of Indian consumers.
Anderson tackled this problem by juxtaposing the documentary record of goods
intended for trade as itemized in the account books of eighteenth-century Montreal
merchants with inventories of archaeologically-recovered trade items. He determined
that certain functional categories-especially metalwares and decorative items-that
were overrepresented in the archaeological record comprised a relatively small
proportion of the total trade assortment based on total merchant expenditure.
Similarly, clothing and textiles, which rarely appear archaeologically, comprised a
significantly greater proportion of the value of trade outfits supplied by Montreal
merchants to voyageurs.16
Anderson’s conclusions are important in that they emphasize the degree to
which the documentary record must be integrated into any analysis of the relative
proportions and importance of various categories of trade items. His method of
determining the relative percentage of any given item or category of goods, however,

16 Dean Lloyd Anderson, "Documentary and Archaeological Perspectives on
European Trade Goods in the Western Great Lakes Region" (Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University, 1992).
DechSne came to a similar conclusion for the period 1650-1720 based on inventories
of Montreal merchants found in notarial records. Dechene, Habitants and Merchants,
79.
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unfortunately does not reflect the complexities of exchange in the pays d ’en haut.
Despite his clearly-stated concern with patterns of native consumption, he relies solely
on calculations based on Montreal merchant expenditure as the gauge of how native
societies integrated, and were influenced by, European goods. This approach is
understandable given the paucity of records detailing the rates at which French goods
were exchanged for furs. Since the only logical method for comparing the relative
value of aunes of textiles, pots of brandy , and livres of lead shot is to divide their
individual cost by the total value of the trade assortment, in examining only merchant
invoices Anderson is measuring the relative value of these items to the Canadian
supplier, not the Indian consumer. The fragmentary price evidence that does exist
suggests that different types of trade items were sold in the pays d ’en haut at widely
varying rates of retail mark-up (Table 1.2, column VI). The usual price inflation for
blankets, for example, might have been in the range of 25 percent of their Montreal
value, while the cost of brandy typically shot up by almost 300 percent once it
reached the western Great Lakes. Depending on the amount traded, then, the relative
value of blankets and brandy to the merchant wholesaler might have been something
quite different to the Indian purchaser.
A detailed account of trade goods exchanged at the King’s Post of Niagara
between 1729 and 1738 is preserved in the official correspondence of Canadian
officials to the French Ministry of Marine.17 A breakdown of the Niagara items into

17 "Etat des effets vendfls a Niagara depuis le deux May 1729 jusqu’au dernier
Juin 1738," AN, 0 % 73: 310-12.
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the same functional categories established by Anderson and the calculation of Indian
expenditure on these items suggests that Anderson’s model does not adequately
represent native purchasing patterns (Figure 1.1). The category of clothing, including
bulk textiles and blankets, finished apparel such as shirts, sleeves, leggings and
stockings, as well as needles, thread, and decorative ribbon, made up the largest part
of the value of goods traded at Niagara, but was relatively less important on the
whole than Anderson’s figures would suggest. Considering the high rates of mark-up
on alcohol in the pays d ’en haut, it comes as no surprise that eau de vie would
comprise a significantly larger proportion of Indian expenditure in trade than its
wholesale value would indicate. The same holds true for tobacco, another item with a
relatively elastic demand among Indian consumers. The large discrepancy in the
category of cooking and eating can be attributed to the sale of large amounts of bread
at Niagara, a commodity which rarely figured in the accounts of Montreal merchants.
While Anderson’s ranking of items by functional category generally holds true for the
Niagara data, the relative proportions of merchant and Indian expenditure differ
considerably as a function of varying rates of price inflation in the pays d ’en haut.
As the icy St. Lawrence began to buckle and heave, and the cobblestones and
slate roofs of Montreal and Quebec emerged from a heavy blanket of snow, the gears
of the complex transatlantic cycle of shipping, buying, and selling began to move
once again. Keepers of the King’s storehouses took stock of the merchandise that
remained in their stores after a year of liberal gift-giving to local and visiting Indians.
Quebec factors of large French trading houses braced themselves for another frantic
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summer of sales to Montreal merchant-outfitters, while they in turn were busy
contracting with marchatids voyageurs, hiring crews, and provisioning canoes for the
long westward journey to trade at the distant posts of the pays d ’en haut.
The Canadian trading season was short and frenzied after a long, idle winter.
Since the St. Lawrence River, the essential artery of commerce, communication, and
transportation in New France, was generally only navigable between July and
October, all the essential operations of the Canadian fur trade were crammed into the
space of a few short months. Six or eight weeks after leaving France, merchantmen
laden with European merchandise arrived at the port of Quebec and were unloaded
either into the warehouses of large importers or the King’s stores. A journey of four
to six days in smaller sloops, barks, or bateaux brought the goods 150 miles upriver
from Quebec to the shores of the island of Montreal, where the Ottawa River meets
the St. Lawrence in a series of lakes and rapids, and sailing vessels gave way to
birchbark canoes. Here the goods lay in the dank basements of Montreal merchant
outfitters before being hauled by cart to Sault-Saint-Louis, or Lachine. Finally, the
sturdy packs of trade items destined for the posts of the Great Lakes were loaded into
thirty-to-forty-foot canoes capable of carrying cargoes of up to three tons. After
celebrating the customary farewell mass at Ste-Anne de Bellevue at the western end of
the island, the crew of four or five paddlers pushed off on an arduous two-month
journey to the Great Lakes country, either by the northern route along the Ottawa and
Mattawa rivers to Lakes Nipissing and Huron, or the southern passage along the St.

39
Lawrence and into Lake Ontario.18
As French manufactured goods intended for the western trade passed through
the hands of merchants and traders from La Rochelle to Montreal, their selling price
rose at every point of exchange to meet the various costs of shipping, handling,
insurance, storage, and--invariably--the seller’s commission. In this respect, the
unique geography of the colony dictated the nature of its commerce: with Quebec the
primary entrepot and break-bulk point for transatlantic commerce, and Montreal more
directly involved in provisioning and organizing the westward shipment of trade
goods, the fur trade supported two distinct levels of Canadian "middlemen." Thus,
by the time trade goods reached the voyageur’s canoe, their value could easily have
doubled.19
A substantial amount of documentary evidence remains that, if carefully
examined, details the movement of trade goods through this transatlantic system of
exchange in the first half of the eighteenth century. The correspondence of colonial
officials with the French ministry (AN, C*!A), as well as the day-books, ledgers, and
accounts of Montreal merchant-outfitters, contain enough price information to allow a
reconstruction of the cost of a wide variety of trade goods at each stage of their
journey from the shops and manufactories of France to the posts of the pays d ’ett
haut. Each year the Canadian government gave away thousands of livres’ worth of

18 DechSne, Habitants and Merchants, 65-67; Dale Miquelon, Dugard o f Rouen:
French Trade to Canada and the West Indies, 1729-1770 (Montreal and Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1978), 73.
19 Dechene, Habitants and Merchants, 84-89.
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gifts from the King’s storehouses at Quebec, Trois-Rivifcres, and Montreal to secure
the friendship and alliance of western tribes, as well as to feed and clothe the resident
sauvages domiciles, or Christian Indians, of neighboring mission towns such as
Sillery. In the final weeks before the first French sails appeared before Quebec, royal
officials were kept busy drawing up long lists of the goods that had been disbursed
from the royal stores and preparing itemized invoice orders for goods from the King’s
warehouses at Rochefort to replenish the Canadian stores for yet another year of giftgiving and treaty-making.20 For the period roughly between 1730 and 1750, it is
possible to reconstruct the average price of the most common trade items as they were
supplied to the French government at Rochefort to be shipped to New France (Table
1.1, column I). By determining the mean price of each item at Rochefort and
comparing it with the price at which comparable goods were delivered to the King’s
storekeepers at Quebec (Table 1.1, column II), it appears that the average rate of
mark-up on trade items imported from France for official use was in the range of 3334% over this period (Table 1.2, column I).
In an age in which the division between official business and private interest
was less distinct, and the central government simply lacked the resources and the
bureaucracy required to supply every aspect of its colonial needs, the same large

20 A typical list of merchandise taken from the King’s store at Quebec and
distributed as Indian gifts is the "Estat de Munitions, vivres et autres Effets qui ont
6td delivrd des magazins du Roy h Quebec aux sauvages domiciliers et autres qui sont
venus en cette ville pendant l’annde 1730," AN, ^ A , 57: 105-20. For an example of
an annual invoiced order, see "Estat des Munitions et Marchandises qu’il est
necessaire d’Envoyer du port de Rochefort 1’annde mil sept cent trente et un pour
Gamir les Magasins du Roy k Quebec," AN, C lA, 53: 281-83.
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merchants houses in La Rochelle, Rouen, and Bordeaux that privately shipped the
bulk of goods destined for the Canadian fur trade also vied for the lucrative business
of supplying the King’s stores in New France. These substantial trading firms, such
as Rouen’s Dugard and Company, handled the bulk of the colonial trade, only part of
which involved Canada, for the real money was always to be made in supplying the
great sugar plantations of the Caribbean. Still, there were comfortable profits to be
made in Canadian furs, and these merchant houses unfailingly sent agents to represent
their commercial interests in New France.
Of the roughly one hundred Quebec shopkeepers who jockeyed for their share
of the town’s retail trade, only a handful could be deemed "principal traders," and
nearly all of these were "metropolitans," or factors representing influential French
trading companies.21 While a few of these colonial agents, including Frangois Havy
and Jean Lefebvre of the Dugard company, were salaried employees of the "home
office," the majority of their associates worked as commission agents, earning a profit
of 5 percent on each incoming cargo they handled and 2.5 percent on the fur
shipments they sent back in return. These resident factors enjoyed a great deal of
prestige within the Quebec mercantile community and they frequently shuttled back
and forth between France and the colony on business. Few factors put down
permanent roots in the colony; most were merely serving time in a small, dreary
colonial outpost until they had accumulated enough experience and capital to return
home to further advance their careers in metropolitan society.

21 Miquelon, Dugard o f Rouen, 70-71.
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While posted to New France, however, they were constantly occupied with the
countless tasks that filled the lengthy day of the eighteenth-century merchant. When
the trading ships began to arrive in the colony in mid-summer, the Quebec merchant
was responsible for overseeing the unloading and storage of specially-marked bales of
trade goods sent by French exporters. Before long, Montreal merchant-outfitters
began to arrive in Quebec to buy up the goods they required to assemble the trading
outfits to be sent to the pays d ’en haut. Sales continued at a frenetic pace until the
late summer and early fall when furs from the west began arriving in town via
Montreal. The Quebec factor then donned the hat of a fur merchant, inspecting the
pelts that arrived for damage and assessing their quality, delivering all beaver to the
Compagnie des Indes, and determining the price to be paid for the remaining skins
and menues pelleteries. He then arranged for shipment of the furs to the company in
France and, based on his analysis of local market conditions, drew up and forwarded
an invoice of goods necessary for the next year’s trade. With the short trading season
over, entries in day-books had to be transferred to ledgers, accounts balanced, and
various other mundane tasks completed before the merchant could relax briefly during
the quiet winter season and prepare for the coming of spring when the cycle would
begin anew.22
Quebec importers sold trade goods to Montreal merchant-outfitters in an
idiosyncratic commercial relationship which changed little over the course of the
eighteenth century. When a Quebec factor received a shipment from France, the

22 Miquelon, Dugard o f Rouen, 73-82.
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invoiced price of the goods was automatically inflated 5 or 6 percent over wholesale,
a practice which went unremarked by purchasers. In addition to this hidden invoice
inflation, the Quebec merchant charged an additional mark-up, known in the trade as
the binifice, which covered all the charges of shipping, handling, as well as the
factor’s commission. The binifice rate was flexible, varying considerably from year
to year, and even month to month, depending on the state of the market and shipping
conditions. At the start of each new trading season, the Quebec binifice quickly
found its level. According to Intendant Gilles Hocquart, the invoice prices of the La
Rochelle firm of Pascaud Fr sires were generally accepted as the standard by all local
importers.
The average binifice set by Quebec merchants during the 1730s and 1740s can
be determined by comparing the mean prices of various trade goods as purchased by
Montreal merchant outfitters (Table 1.1, column III) with the French wholesale prices
as listed on government invoices for replenishing the King’s stores in Quebec (Table
1.1, column I). This calculation produces an average binifice over the period of just
over 32 percent, almost identical to the rate of mark-up on goods shipped to Canada
to be used as gifts. Thus, it appears that the same cadre of French merchants who
supplied goods for both the private trade and the King’s stores were charging virtually
the same mark-up to the government as to private purchasers.23 Of course, the rate of
32 percent is only a measure of central tendency; in reality, binifice levels ranged

23 This figure of 32.389 percent is consistent with that suggested by Miquelon,
who estimates that the binifice charged by Quebec merchants typically ranged
between 26 and 36 percent. Miquelon, New France, 132, 158.
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from as low as 18 or 20 percent in peacetime, to upwards of 200 percent during
periods of severe disruptions in shipping occasioned by the unwanted attentions of the
British Navy.24 Though most goods were marked up by Quebec merchants at the
same fixed rate, certain special items, particularly brandy, wine, and tobacco were
subject to significantly higher rates of price inflation. Brandy and wine, in particular,
were generally sold at prices as high as the local market would bear, and there is
evidence to suggest that it was the sale of alcohol, above all else, that allowed French
exporters to reap a healthy profit from an otherwise unspectacular Canadian trade.25
Certain other goods, including foodstuffs and other local Canadian products, were
generally not subject to the binifice, but were sold to Montreal merchant-outfitters at
pre-arranged prices (d prix fait).26
The brief shipping season on the St. Lawrence not only shaped the pattern of
commercial exchange within Canada, but also dictated the elaborate structure of
colonial debt and credit that supported the fur trade. French merchantmen rarely
arrived in the St. Lawrence before July but, in order to reach the distant inland posts
before winter, the voyageurs were forced to leave Montreal by May or June. This
meant that in order to buy sufficient goods from a Quebec importer to support a

24 Miquelon, Dugard o f Rouen,, 75.
25 Miquelon, New France, 132; Miquelon, Dugard o f Rouen, 75-76; Lunn,
"Economic Development," 364; Dechene, Habitants and Merchants, 82-83.
26 Miquelon, Dugard o f Rouen, 75. DechSne estimates that during the last quarter
of the seventeenth century, Quebec importers earned a net profit of 15 percent on the
value of the goods sold to Montreal merchants after deducting for the costs of freight,
import duties, handling, and storage. Dechene, Habitants and Merchants, 86-87.
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trading expedition, the typical Montreal merchant-outfitter needed to obtain credit
from his supplier, conventionally advanced at the standard French interest rate of 6
percent per annum, payable the following year once the canoes had returned with
western furs. Thus, goods arriving from France often sat in Quebec warehouses for
the greater part of the year, while Quebec importers waited to be reimbursed by
Montreal merchants for the advance of last year’s goods.
Alexis Lemoine, or Monifcre, as he was familiarly known to his Montreal
colleagues, was a typical eighteenth-century marchand iquipeur. As a youth he had
paddled west as an engagi, or hired canoeman, but through a combination of family
connections and thrifty saving had accumulated enough capital and credit to establish
himself as a merchant-outfitter, supplying trade goods to his voyageur associates. At
his death in 1754, Monifere passed on to his son an estate worth 50,000 livres, a
respectable sum for a merchant who had worked his entire life in a saturated and
highly competitive Montreal trading market.27
Twenty years younger than his colleague, Pierre Guy was unique among his
fellow marchands iquipeurs because he had emigrated from France, while the
majority of Montreal traders were native-born.28 Otherwise, Guy’s career from his
arrival in Montreal to his early death in a comfortable, two-story stone house in the
Rue Saint-Joseph followed a common trajectory. Guy was a military man as well as a

27 Louise Dechdne, "Alexis (Jean-AIexis) Lemoine, dit Monfere," Dictionary o f
Canadian Biography/Dictiormaire biographique du Canada, edited by George W.
Brown et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 3: 379.
28 Miquelon, New France, 157.
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merchant, serving in the local militia and eventually rising to the rank of captain.
With eight children from his first marriage and another five from his second, Guy
certainly had a material incentive to commercial success. By the 1740s, he presided
over a successful trading business and owned several pieces of property in Montreal.
Like Monifere, Guy assembled and sold trading outfits to voyageurs for transportation
to the pays d ’en haut, but he also imported general merchandise-especially wine and
spirits-for sale to his Montreal neighbors. Guy had a long connection with the
French factors Havy and Lefebvre who represented the substantial Dugard company
in Quebec and it was through them that he shipped the bulk of the furs he collected as
payment from his voyageur customers. Occasionally he dealt with other Montreal
merchants, and sometimes directly with France, but most often he relied on his
Quebec contacts for credit, trade goods, and the latest business news.29
If in many ways the Canadian colony mirrored the social hierarchies of
France, albeit on a smaller scale, then family connections, astute marriage, and access
to credit necessarily played an essential role in ascending to the rank of a powerful
Montreal businessman. Louis-Frangois Hervieux rose to prominence as much for
who he knew as what he knew: through his mother, brothers and sisters he was
related to several important Montreal merchant families, including the Magnans,
Marins de la Malgue, Pothiers, Le Contes Duprd, and La Comes. In 1742, Hervieux
married Louise Quesnel, the daughter of a local merchant, and not long after she died
he wed the daughter of prominent trader Joseph-Jacques Gamelin. The fact that his

29 Josd Igartua, "Pierre Guy," Dictionary o f Canadian Biography, 3: 271-72.
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daughter would later marry the son of Pierre Guy illustrates how closely-knit the
Montreal merchant community was in the mid-eighteenth century. Hervieux
conducted the majority of his business with his brother Jacques, as well as his two
fathers-in-law. As with most Montreal merchant-outfitters, Hervieux sold dry goods
on a small scale to the general public; but the real profits always came in supplying
bulk trade goods to voyageurs.30
These three prominent Montreal merchant-outfitters had more in common than
their mutual jostling for commerce in a tough, aggressive Montreal market, and
occasionally the ties of marriage and family.31 What links them most powerfully in
the present is the historical accident that their business accounts survived for two
hundred years, to be discovered in musty boxes in the basement of Montreal’s
Chateau de Ramezay Museum. These records offer a rare glimpse at the day-to-day
business practices of eighteenth-century Montreal merchants, containing detailed
invoices of some 70 trade outfits sent between 1715 and 1758 to a number of posts in
the western Great Lakes region, including Green Bay, Rainy Lake, Detroit, Sioux
Post, Michilimackinac, Ouiatanon, Nipigon, and Michipicoten.32
30 Jos6 Igartua, "Louis-Frangois Hervieux," Dictionary o f Canadian Biography, 3;
290.
31 For a detailed account of the demographic peculiarities of the Montreal
merchant community in the mid-eighteenth century, see Jos6 Igartua, "The Merchants
of Montreal at the Conquest: Socio-Economic Profile," Histoire Sociale/Social
History, 8:16 (1975): 275-293.
32 This collection, which includes 36 separate volumes, is generally referred to as
the "Montreal Merchants’ Records," though microfilm copies of these documents are
cataloged under a variety of different titles. The original documents are owned by the
Antiquarian and Numismatic Society of Montreal and are on permanent loan to the
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With the arrival of spring, Monifere, Guy, Hervieux and their colleagues could
inevitably be found assembling large outfits of trade goods, extending credit to the
marchands voyageurs who would oversee trade in the pays d ’en haut, purchasing
canoes and provisions for the trip, as well as hiring the canoemen and paying for the
congi or trading license required to send goods to the western posts.33 Like their
Quebec counterparts, Montreal merchants tended to supply complete trading
assortments to their customers, although occasionally they sold smaller amounts of
goods to supplement the outfits sold by fellow traders. Like their Quebec
counterparts, Montreal merchants also tended to fix on a common binifice early in
the trading season. On each bulk sale, goods were individually invoiced at the
Quebec cost with the Montreal binifice tacked on only at the bottom. For the years

Public Archives of Canada where they are cataloged as M847-M853, M869, and
M1005. The microfilm copy of the master negative in the holdings of Michigan State
University was used in this study; at MSU the collection is cataloged as "Account
Books of Eighteenth Century Merchants of Montreal." For a more detailed
discussion of the MMR see Anderson, "Documentary and Archaeological
Perspectives," 45-68, and Gerin-Lajoie, "MMR Project Research Files."
33 Bruce M. White’s analysis of the account books of the Lake Superior trader
Jean-Baptiste Cadot from the 1780s suggests that the various expenses of providing
these services for the traders could amount to more than 40 percent of the value of
the merchandise sold. Packaging, storage, and land transportation of the outfit
amounted to almost 7 percent, equipment purchases and repairs accounted for more
than 9 percent, and the purchase of the trading permit approximately 15 percent. By
far the largest expense shouldered by the Montreal merchant, however, was the
payment of the canoemen’s wages and the purchase of their equipment and
provisions, which came to almost 69 percent of the value of the merchandise. Bruce
M. White, "Montreal Canoes and Their Cargoes," in ”Le Castor Fait Tout”: Selected
Papers o f the Fifth North American Fur Trade Conference, (1985), edited by Bruce
Trigger, Toby Morantz, and Louise Dechfine (Montreal: Lake St. Louis Historical
Society, 1987), 180.
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between 1735 and 1747, the average annual Montreal mark-up on goods was in the
neighborhood of 50 percent (Figure 1.2; Table 1.2, column III).34 Certain locallycrafted goods, such as tomahawks, axes, leggings, and capotes were exempt from the
binifice, as was the perennial trade essential, bulk woollen cloth. Foodstuffs such as
com, flour, and bacon, as well as the ever-popular eau de vie and wine were sold at
specially determined rates (compare columns III and IV of Table l .l ) .35
Besides the critical task of supplying and organizing the annual trade
expeditions to the pays d ‘en haut, Montreal merchants formed a crucial link in the
second phase of the fur trade cycle: the collection, marketing, and shipment of furs
and skins once the voyageurs’ canoes returned in late summer. The merchants
carefully inspected all furs, assessed their fair market value, and credited them to the
voyageur’s account. All beaver received in the colony was eventually sold to the
local bureau defermier of the Compagnie des Indes, but the Montreal merchant was
personally responsible for determining the value of all other skins and menues
pelleteries. As a result, the seller had virtually no control over the price paid for
peltry. Each fall, the marchands iquipeurs met to determine the standard prices,
known as the "tarifde Vautomne," or the "prix des marchands-iquipeurs," for each

34 Miquelon estimates that Montreal merchants marked up their goods by 25 to 33
percent. This may well have been true for the peace-time years of the 1720s and
1730s when goods were readily available, but rates skyrocketed during periods of
shortage, or during wartime when French shipping was interrupted. See Figure 1.2,
35 According to DechSne, Montreal merchants in the latter part of the seventeenth
century could expect a net profit of approximately 18 percent of the value of the
goods they advanced, factoring in the costs of transporting goods upriver from
Quebec, wastage, handling, and storage. DechSne, Habitants and Merchants, 86-87.
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type of pelt. The sum ultimately credited to the voyageur’s account would be
assessed on the basis of quality, with inferior grades of furs fetching a fraction of the
standard price. In determining these annual prices, the Montreal merchants tended to
offer a "cautious, delayed reading of La Rochelle market rates," while also
considering the average quality of the year’s "crop," the amount of each type on the
market, and the current freight and insurance rates,36 Montreal merchants made little
or no profit in the purchase of furs, however, as Montreal prices appear to have
matched those offered by the Quebec exporters who in turn purchased them for
export.37
For as much as can be ascertained with any certainty about fur-trade
operations in the pays d ’en haut, one might as well be standing on the banks of the
St. Lawrence at Lachine, watching as the heavily laden voyageurs’ canoes slowly
disappeared over the western horizon. So little of what transpired between voyageurs
and Indians as they exchanged European merchandise for peltry was ever recorded
that it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions concerning the everyday conduct
o f the trade in the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley. Though it is commonly assumed
that voyageurs sold goods in the pays d ’en haut at 100 percent profit, it is nearly
impossible to determine with any certainty the exact rates at which European items

36 Thomas Wien, "Exchange Patterns in the European Market for North American
Furs and Skins, 1720-1760," in The Fur Trade Revisited: Selected Papers o f the Sixth
North American Fur Trade Conference, Mackinac Island, Michigan, 1991, edited by
Jennifer S. H. Brown, W. J. Eccles and Donald P. Heldman (East Lansing, 1994),
28.
37 Dechene, Habitants and Merchants, 86-87, 89; Miquelon, New France, 158.
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were exchanged for peltry.38 Fortunately, two previously unmined sources detailing
frontier exchange offer a unique insight into this question. The CnA records contains
occasional accounts of trade goods sold at the King’s posts of Frontenac, Toronto,
and Niagara, complete with itemized prices.39 Buried in this correspondence, as well,
are numerous small bills from private traders for the goods they had supplied to
commandants of posts in the pays d ’en haut for official use as Indian gifts.40 In the
latter case, the prices demanded by the traders were so inflated that they clearly
represented the conventional rates for various goods in the pays d ’en haut, with the
addition of transportation charges and the voyageur’s profit. Frequently, a frugal
French official would make a correction to these bills, pencilling in a revised, and
inevitably lower, price in the margin, implying that the going rates of exchange for
goods in the West were somewhat standardized.41
38 Miquelon and Dechene both suggest a voyageur’s mark-up of 100 percent.
Dechene, Habitants and Merchants, 86-87; Miquelon, New France, 158.
39 See, for instance, the "Etat des effets vendfls h Niagara depuis le deux May
1729 jusqu’au dernier Juin 1738," AN, CUA, 73: 310-312. This account of goods
sold over a ten-year period at Niagara is unique in that the prices of goods are
denoted primarily in "chats" (raccoons), worth 15 sols each. It also appears that
brandy was sold to Frenchmen at Niagara at double the price paid by Indian
customers. This distinction is important because it suggests the extent to which the
trade at the King’s posts was geared toward providing the lowest possible prices to
Indians in order to sustain their business and alliance.
40 A characteristic bill of this kind is the "Memoire des foumitures fait pour le
Roy par ordre de M. Linctot commandant pour le Roy au poste des ou8atenons par
nous gauche chateauvieux et Compie au quicapous revenant de guerre des chicachias,"
AN, <?lA, 73: 220.
41 Buried within the reams of paper sent by Canadian administrators to France is a
fascinating document which amounts to no less than a "Rosetta Stone" in the analysis
of trade good prices in the pays d ’en haut. Drawn up by Intendant Gilles Hocquart in
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Not surprisingly, the final selling prices of trade goods at the King’s posts
were consistently lower than those exchanged at the privately-leased posts in the pays
d ’en haut. The raison d’etre of these forts was to ensure that the cost of goods could
be closely monitored and adjusted in response to competition from nearby English
traders at Oswego on the southern shore of Lake Ontario.

Prices culled from the

0 1A correspondence make this point clearly (Table 1.1, column V). When compared
with the cost of comparable goods at Quebec, the prices of items at the posts of
Niagara, Toronto, and Frontenac appear to have been marked up at an average rate of
around 100 percent (Table 1.2, column IV).42 This markup covered the cost of
transporting the goods along the shores of Lake Ontario either by canoe or in one of
the King’s barques, as well as the wages and provisions of the garrison troops and
employees. After 1742, the French government authorized the leasing of the King’s
posts to merchants, who soon claimed that it was impossible to turn a profit while
maintaining prices at artificially low levels. After only two trading seasons, the

October 1729, it consists of a detailed list of trade goods sent to the posts of
Frontenac and Niagara, indicating both the prices at which they were obtained by the
crown in France and Quebec, as well as the prices ultimately paid by the Indian
consumer. The rate of
price inflation varies greatly among items, from no mark-up at all on trade guns to a
staggering 700 percent on signet rings. On the basis of this information, it was
possible to determine whether subsequent lists likely referred to prices current in
France, Canada, or the West. Hocquart k ministre, 25 October 1729, "Estat des
marchandises et munitions qui ont est envoydes au forts Frontenac et Niagara pour y
faire le traitte pendant l ’annde 1730 avec le prix qu’elles coutes au Roy et celuy
qu’elles doivent y etre traittdes." AN, 0 lA, 51: 286.
42 This figure corresponds with Hocquart’s 1729 calculation of the gross profits
expected from the trade at Frontenac and Niagara. AN, 0 lA, 51: 286.
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discouraged lessee at Frontenac griped that if he was allowed to mark up goods only
by 15 percent to cover the costs of transportation and wages he was bound to lose his
chemise.**
If the sale of trade goods at the King’s posts was closely regulated, often to
the detriment of profits, the private traders and post commandants operating in the
western Great Lakes and Ohio Valley were constrained only by their consciences, as
tempered by the demands of their scrupulous Indian customers. Merchandise arriving
in the pays d ’en haut saw price hikes, on average, in excess of 170 percent (Table
1.2, column VI; Figure 1.3), though diverse goods were marked up at vastly
different rates. Brandy, for example, garnered considerable profits, often trading
hands at a price around 300 percent over Montreal cost. The same also held true for
wine, tobacco, and a variety of foodstuffs and metalwares. The high frontier price of
tobacco and alcohol was due in part to considerable import duties, and in the case of
brandy, the sheer difficulty of transporting large quantities of liquid stocks to the
interior.44 The relatively elastic demand for these rapidly consumable goods, of
course, further encouraged traders to sell for as much as the market would bear.
Other sundry items such as soap, axes, oil for cooking and burning, firesteels,

43 Frangois Chalet & Gilles Hocquart, 20 October 1744, AN, (?lA t 81: 425-26.
44 The import duties on alcohol and tobacco were supposed to be 10 percent of
their assessed value, but were fixed by custom at 9 livres per barrique for wine, 22
livres, 10 sols per barrique on brandy, and 5 sols per pound on tobacco.
Based on the average French wholesale prices of these items (Table 1, column I), the
duty in reality amounted to approximately 35 percent on brandy, 20 percent on wine,
and as much as 45 percent on tobacco. Lunn, "Economic Development," 364-65.
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needles, and kettles could be exchanged at even steeper rates because their initial cost
was relatively low. Profits on textiles, however, appear to have significantly more
moderate, in accordance with their status as an essential component of the trading
assortment. If Indians could not find a bargain on the blankets and bulk cloth that
comprised the single largest category of their expenditure, it was likely that they
would take their pelts elsewhere, perhaps to another post or, more ominously, to the
English.
As voyageurs pushed off and paddled eastward to the shelter of their homes
and hearths on the St. Lawrence, and Indians settled back into their winter routine of
hunting and trapping, another trading season in the life of the French transatlantic
commercial world came to an end. Furs from the depths of North American forests
passed through the bustling markets of Montreal, Quebec, La Rochelle, and Paris;
Indians, meanwhile, set about chopping wood with iron axes, boiling water in brass
kettles, and cooking the game they had hunted with guns from the armories of St.Etienne. Nearly lost among the products of European and Caribbean trade, the neat
rows of figures detailing Canadian fur imports to La Rochelle only hint at the
overwhelming importance of the French-Indian trade to Canadian society. Though he
would scarcely have realized it, the fashionable customer who bought a beaver hat in
the latest style at a Paris shop was enmeshed in a complex cycle of trade and alliance
that immeasurably shaped the history of France in North America.
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TABLES 1.1 AND 1.2
LEGEND

TABLE 1.1

COLUMN
I FR:
II QB:
III MW:
IV
V

MR:
KP:

VI

PAYS:

Cost in France.
Cost to Canadian government at Quebec
Cost to Montreal merchant-outfitters
(merchant wholesale).
Montreal retail price (merchant retail).
Sale price at king’s posts of Niagara,
Toronto, and Frontenac.
Price of goods sold by private
traders in pays d ’en haut.

TABLE 1.2

I

(QB-FR)/FR:

II (MW-FR)/FR:
III (MR-MW)/MW:
IV (KP-QB)/QB:
V

(PAYS-MR)/MR:

Mark-up on goods purchased by Canadian
government.
Mark-up on goods purchased by Quebec
importers.
Mark-up on goods sold by Montreal merchant-outfitters
Mark-up on goods sold at king’s posts of
Niagara, Toronto, and Frontenac.
Mark-up on goods sold by
private traders in pays d ’en haut.
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TABLE 1.1
PRICES OF SELECTED FRENCH TRADE GOODS, 1730-1745
(Livres)

Sources: AN, CnA; MMR.

1
FR

II
QB

III
MW

IV
MR

V
HP

VI
PAYS

ITEM
AIGUILLES/NEEDLES {100)
AIGUILLES A COUDRE/SEWING NEEDLES (100)
ALENES/AWLS (GROSS)
BAGUES A CACHET/SIGNET RINGS (DOZ.)
BAS/STOCKINGS (PAIR)
8ATTEFEUX/FIRESTEELS (DOZ.)
BAYONETTES (EA.)
BISCUIT (100#)
BLE D'INDE/INOIAN CORN (MINOT)
CANOTS/CANOES (EA.)
CAPOTES (EA.)
CARISE (AUNE)
CASSETETES/TOMAHAWKS (EA.)
CHAPEAUX/HATS (EA.)
CHAUDIERES/KETTLES (#)
CHEMISES/SHIRTS (EA.)
COUTEAUX/KNJVES (DOZ.)
COUVERTES/BLANKETS (EA.)
DARDS/DARTS (EA.)
DOURGNE (AUNE)
DRAP (AUNE)
ECARLATINE/STROUD (AUNE)
EAU DE VIE/BRANDY (POT)
FARINE/FLOUR (100#)
FIL/THREAD (#)
FUSILS/MUSKETS (EA.)
GRAISSE/FAT (#)

0.4862
0.4257
3.1076
0.2034
2.4807
0.8767
2.0000

1.2450

1.7155
1.8135
6.7365
1.7272
5.7500

1.0259
0.3000
2.6218
0.2692
3.0390
0.9456
1.3300
15.2042
3.4741
129.0000
8.8649

1.8919
2.4783
3.7584
2.3565
5.1669

1.3122
1.8333
3.8505
1.7208
1.6093

1.9755
6.7954
0.5000
2.0290
7.1912
7.5000
1.2496
9.1910

1.2184
5.6036
1.2000
1.8763
8.5328

2.5263
1.8333
5.2651
3.1259
2.5793
2.3877
9.6694
1.2000
3.0209
8.5328

2.2917
23.7343
0.4773
0.4413
3.5500
0.9813
0.371 B

1.4818
13.3228
0.5512
2.0000

0.8473
2.0000

0,4725

0.5207

0.7564
3.7429

0.6304
1.5267

0.4725
1.3390
2.6388

2.0944
9.5857

2.8173
11.8195
3.0000

2.4637

2.9754
0.6074

1.9390
5.8889
2.8000
2.5180
0.5750

PEIGNES/COMBS (DOZ.)
PIERRES A FUSILVGUNFLINTS (100)
PLOMB ET BALLES/LEAD AND SHOT (#)
POIS/PEASE (MINOT)

2.2143
0.7055
0.2214

POIVRE/PEPPER (#)
PORCELAINE/WAMPUM (1000)
POUDRE A MOUSQUET/GUNPOWDER (#)
RASSADES/GLASS BEADS (#)

1.3814

2.5007
0.7613
0.2868
2.7603
1.7808
42.4394
0.7761
1.1363
1.3293
1.3911
1.6019

MANCHES/SLEEVES (PAIR)
MAZAMET (AUNE)
MIROIRS/MIRRORS (DOZ.)
MITASSES/LEGGINGS (PAIR)
MOLTON (AUNE)
MOUCHOIRS/HANDKERCHIEFS (EA.)

SAVON/SDAP (#)
SEL/SALT (MINOT)
SOULIERS/SHOES (PAIR)
TABAC/TOBACCO (#)
TIREBOURS/GUNWORMS (DOZ.)
TOILE/LINEN (AUNE)
VERMILLON/VERMILION (#)
VIN/WINE (POT)
VINAIGRE/VINEGAR (POT)

1.6021
18.1722
0.4500
1.4050
0.4904
0.2849

0.6331
1.3437
0.7202
1.5000

0.7972
0.9359

0.5523
0.5588
1.4998

5.8187
0.4197
0.2326

6.4424
0.7962
0.3508

2.6253
13.1376

1,3348
0.5763
4.7735
0.4521
5.9261
1.8505
1.6225
15.2042
3.4741
129.0000
9.4900

2.6253
13.1376
2.7210
21.9454

GRELOTS/HAWKBELLS (DOZ.)
HACHES/AXES (EA.)
HUILE/OIL (POT)
LARD/BACON (#)
LIGNE DU BANC/COD LINE (#)

0.6032

0.7899
0.8344
3.0204
0.1917
2.4208
1.3703
1.0000
11.8848
2.6687
81.2297
25.0873

2.2722
0.3148
0.3838
3.7955
1.5571
1.4382
1.0214
1.1359
4.7778
3.7500
0.5925
0.2277
0.9611
5.2985
1.6128

3.8340
7.5423
2.8000
4.4142
1.4030
3.4173
0.7658
0.4945
3.7955

16.3450
0.7976
2.7548
2.7156
9.0000
17.4286
116.0000

6.8544
3.7500
18.1231
19.2751
180.0455

18.7167
2.0151
2.0000

58.6364
6.0000
2.4750

3.0000
3.3400
3.4609
4.0164
10.3433

6.2000
6.0205
8.3328
5.6218

3.9991
9.0000
9.2000
4.5366
3.5997
21.3361
0.6630
0.8872
2.4559
0.3497
0.8315

12.1896
1.5000
15.5340
36.0000
10.3871
35,7073
11.8109
37.6150
0.9637
4.0494
2.0000
0.8889
3.0000

4.8517
3.9725
20.3812
4.7944
4.6838

14.2564
15.0000
27.0000

5.2795
5.0000
0.7249
3.9801

13.5224
3.2257
0.9096
6.4231

3.0344
37.0000
1.4382
1.9143
1.1359
4.7778

3.0000

6.5357
0.5925
0.9649
1.7197

3.8214
1.0018
2.0506

9.4939
1.6128
1.2500

3.0000
3.0000
20.5687
0.6667

1.7399
1.9104
1.4836

3.0087
12.5493
2.8725

7.7515
5.9325

50.2966
2.0143
2.7767
3.7500
29.1667
4.2500
1.8827
2.7941
5.5867
15.4234
5.6922
2.5875
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TABLE 1.2
PERCENTAGE MARK-UP ON SELECTED FRENCH TRADE GOODS, 1730-1745

Sources: AN,

4; MMR.

I
(QB-FR)/FR

II
(MW-FR)/FR

62.464
96.0066
22.6045
-5.7522
-2.7674
56.302
-50

111.0037
-29.5276
-16.0073
32.3500
22.0629
7.8618
-33.5000

III
IV
(MR-MWJ/MW (KP-QB)/QB

VI
(PAYS-MR)ZMR

ITEM
AIQUIU.ES/NEEDLES (100)
AIGUILLES A COUDRE/SEWING NEEDLES (100)
ALENES/AWLS (GROSS)
BAGUES A CACHET/SIGNET RINGS (DOZ.)
BAS/STOCKINGS (PAIR)
BATTEFEUX/FIRESTEELS (DOZ.)
BAYONETTES (EA.)
BISCUIT (100#)
BLE D’INDE/INDIAN CORN (MINOT)
CANOTS/CANOES (EA.)
CAPOTES (EA.)
CARISE (AUNE)
CASSETETES/TOMAHAWKS (EA.)
CHAPEAUX/HATS (EA.)
CHAUDIERES/KETTLES (#)
CHEMlSES/SHtRTS (EA.)
COUTEAUX/KNIVES (DOZ.)
COUVERTES/BLANKETS (EA.)
DARDS/DARTS (EA.)
DOURGNE (AUNE)
DRAP (AUNE)
ECARLATINE/STROUD (AUNE)
EAU DE VIE/BRANDY (POT)
FARINE/FLOUR (100#)
FIL/THREAD (#)
FUSILS/MUSKETS (EA.)
GRAISSE/FAT (#)
GRELOTS/HAWKBELLS (DOZ.)
HACHES/AXES (EA.)
HUILE/OIL (POT)
LARD/BACON (#)
LIGNE DU BANC (#)
MANCHES/SLEEVES (PAIR)
MAZAMET (AUNE)
MIROIRS/MIRRORS (DOZ.)
MITASSES/LEGGINGS (PAIR)
MOLTON (AUNE)
MOUCHOIRS/HANDKERCHIEFS (EA.)
PEIGNES/COMBS (DOZ.)
PIERRES A FUSIL/GUNFLINTS (100)
PLOMB ET BALLES/LEAD AND SHOT (#)
POIS/PEASE (MINOT)
POIVRE/PEPPER (#)
PORCELAINE/WAMPUM (1000)
POUDRE A MOUSQUET/GUNPOWDER (#)
RASSADES/GLASS BEADS (#)
SAVON/SOAP (#)
SEL/SALT (MINOT)
SOULIERS/SHOES (PAIR)
TABAC/TOBACCO (#)
TIREBOURS/GUNWORMS (DOZ.)
T01LE/LINEN (AUNE)
VERMILLON/VERMILION (#)
VIN/WINE (POT)
VINAIGRE/VINEGAR (POT)

30.1101
62.1000
82.0696
67.9421
95.0016
95.6545
21.9925
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
7.0514
92.5240
0.0000
44.2296
81.6539
60.2747
95.9701
72.5569
0.0000
61.0030
0.0000

51.8501

5.3215

37.3652

0.3089

6.933
0.87434

-32.8150
-16.8173

17.4734
25.0643

8.6325
48.3965

107.162

335.2288

43.0435
30.6077

-7.5089
-28.8858

0.0000
0.0000
83.6280
64.7206

-1.9333
152.669
100.102
30.4317
45.266

22.4889
42.3488

53.7192
0.0000

65.8477
21.0678

34.5159
23.3035

-7.4198
-38.5658

20.7696

2.2040

12.6341
7.90926
29.5393

2.6148
-55.3792
73.3514

28.9127

12.7190

0.0000
112.4046
72.8434
97.7308
28.0786
0.0000
75.3058
144.0000
50.3961
143.2656
28.8431
0.0000
94.8751

22.5873
-15.435
84,5737
■7.26

127.1679
-23.9660
57.7201
216.5200

•29.905
60.2522
10.7189
69.7069
50.8169

-71.4375
2.6926
-8.9401
284.2745

0.0000
87.4192
0.0000
0.0000
74,2853
0.0000
323.7593
78.9304
79.1809
0.0000

MEAN 33.6299

32.3690

33.6704

316.9217
318.0668
13.7971
98.1756
-24.2730
553.0745
42.8049
-25.3937
6.5120
-19.2995
-20.1383
41.7356
•33.0179
103.3106
52.2103
97,0971
25.1530
22.6667
263.0442
57.0755

124.7528
420.5622
330.8935
47.4674
270.4080
131.1248
19.1980
454.6228
39.5702
517.8757
137.5015
35.0025
17.7565
92.6005
223.0644
143.8246
26.0657
25.0000
82.0504
295.6538
171.7947
334.0647
71.4027

38.9063
101.0424
102.4700
-5.8934
9.9286
29.6241
41.0038
72.4371
59.8133
57.4175

88.1270
124.0478
440.2607
291.2363
257.9810
176.8393
34.3958

111.1209
556.7713
152.7545
44,1908
68.4636

295.7042
321.2196
83.9434
69.2294

124.1850
68.1246
11.6078
138.5542
81.3869
266.9649
100.6067
94.7923
260.7762

101.6768

35.9388
40.0570
45.0504
230,1347
510.4630
-34.9725
217,7553
189.5740
224.8648
62.4559
252.9390
107.0000

174.0249
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FIGURE 1.1
RELATIVE EXPENDITURE ON TRADE MERCHANDISE OF MONTREAL
MERCHANTS AND INDIAN CONSUMERS BY FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY
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Sources: Anderson, "Documentary and Archaeological Perspectives," 116, 144; AN,
C lA, 73: 310-12.
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FIGURE 1.2
BENEFICE RATES CHARGED BY MONIERE, 1735-1747
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Sources: "Journal #3, Monifcre, 1731-1737, Ventes: credit et d6bit,"
M848, reel 2, vol. 4,; "Journal No. #4, Monifere, 1737-1748, Ventes:
Credit et ddbit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR.

FIGURE 1.3
ESTIMATED MARK-UP ON GOODS SOLD AT LEASED POSTS
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CHAPTER n
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADES

With a strong, steady wind at his back and a favorable tide on the mighty
Hudson River, the captain of a 50-ton sloop cast off from New York’s "Albany
wharf." In the local grog shops he had often boasted of completing the 150-mile
journey up to Albany in less than 24 hours; on this trip, he could expect to drop
anchor at the walled Dutch town in about three days, perhaps even a week if the
weather worsened. When he reached Albany, the local fur merchants would be
waiting, eager to inspect the bales of stroud cloth, kegs of rum and gunpowder, and
the array of other items they had ordered the previous year from their commercial
agents in London and Amsterdam. Would the woolens be of a sturdy weave, the
colors the dark hues of scarlet and blue their Indian customers preferred? What was
the latest price of beaver on the London market? Would there be war with France?
While the merchants chatted in Dutch with the captain, animatedly exchanging the
latest news and gossip from New York, licensed cartmen rowed the merchandise
ashore in canoes and skiffs, hauling it up from the riverside to the scrubbed and tidy
merchants’ homes, which also served as warehouses and stores.1

1 David Arthur Armour, "The Merchants of Albany, New York, 1686-1760,"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Northwestern University,
1965), 200.
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From its charter by the English in the 1680s until the fall of New France,
Albany was a focal point of trade and diplomacy in the northern colonies. Facing
competition from the French to the north, the Pennsylvanians to the south, and the
traders of Schenectady and Oswego to the west, the town’s fur fortunes fluctuated
through the eighteenth century. Yet, as long as New York dominated the trade in
furs with Great Britain and the French remained poised a mere two hundred miles
from the gates of the town, Albany endured as a critical link with the powerful
Iroquois nations and the citadel of Anglo-American empire in the rivalry with France
for North America.2
If the Canadian fur trade of the late seventeenth and eighteenth century was
characterized by an alliance of public and private interest in many significant aspects
of the trade, New York’s colonial fur trade was marked by bitter, ethnically tinged
factionalism, and a chronically strained relationship between private interest and
public purpose. The underlying diplomatic disposition of European-Indian exchange
was thus frequently ignored in the political maelstrom of a notoriously factious
people. Britain’s Board of Trade, its gaze unflinchingly fixed on the bottom line of

2 No other Anglo-American colony ever rivalled New York’s beaver exports to
London. Pennsylvania generally outproduced New York in the deerskin trade as the
eighteenth century progressed, but in terms of total fur and skin exports, New York
went unrivalled until the 1740s. Stephen H. Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy as a
Measure of Rising Imperialism: New York and Pennsylvania, 1700-1755," Western
Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 64:3 (1981): 240-44; Murray G. Lawson, Fur; A
Study in English Mercantilism, 1700-1775, University of Toronto Studies, History and
Economic Series, Vol. 9 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1943), Appendix E,
108; Thomas Elliot Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686-1776
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 92-93.
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import ledgers, offered little imperial support to the colony during peacetime. Safely
beyond the reach of skulking French and Indian raiders, the settlers of the lower
Hudson valley and Long Island were also reluctant to open their purses to provide for
the defense of a distant frontier. And when the neighboring New England colonies
griped that Albany’s Dutch merchants callously betrayed the British cause by
continuing to trade with Canada during wartime, their censure was certainly
understandable. Despite the meddling efforts of imperial-minded governors and their
eminent cadre of supporters, the business of Albany remained business throughout the
eighteenth century, a reality rooted as much in the peculiarities of the town’s fur
economy as in the disposition of its leading citizens.
Chartered by the English in 1686, Albany was home to some 1,000
predominantly Dutch-speaking inhabitants, many of whose ancestors had arrived in
the earliest days of settlement at the beginning of the century,3 The handlaers or fur
merchants of Albany had long thrived from the exchange of manufactured European
goods for the beaver, skins, and peltry of the Iroquois nations and other skins, and
the arrival of the English did little to alter generations of trade and tradition. Too
intent on their ledgers to pay much heed to the transition of authority, the handlaers
nonetheless had little reason to resent the new governing class. Explicit in the town’s
new charter was a provision that ensured Albany’s monopoly over the colony’s fur
trade. In practical terms, the monopoly forbade anyone from bartering with Indians—
or storing peltry—beyond the city walls. The new regulations also imposed strict

3 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 1.
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limits on the routine practices of local merchants. Though still permitted to offer
credit to Indian customers, fur merchants could no longer accept pawns as collateral
or lure unwary patrons into their shops with offers of gifts or a tot of rum. Finally,
the handlaers were barred from dispatching brokers or agents with trade merchandise
to the settlements of the Five Nations, and from contracting with Indians to sell
Albany goods in their own villages. Trade was to be conducted only during daylight
hours, and no commerce was permitted on the Sabbath. In the absence of an effective
local constabulary, enforcement of these provisions would be carried out, it was
conceived, through the aid of informants. Concerned citizens were encouraged to
report illicit activities to the Albany authorities, if not for the sake of altruism, then
for the one-third to one-half share of the resulting fine they would collect for their
trouble.4
The New York beaver business was weathering a downturn in the 1680s, and
the new English legislators trusted that the fur monopoly, combined with the more
vigilant regulation of commerce in and around the town, would boost the ailing local
economy. Every citizen of Albany was dependent in some measure on the Indian
trade, from the most powerful merchant-importer to the humblest indentured servant.
The new administrators quickly grasped the financial and diplomatic importance of the
exchange in furs, and the 1686 ordinances were intended more to validate the town's
existing commercial structure than to fundamentally reshape the trade. The new

4 The Annals o f Albany, edited by J. Munsell (Albany: J. Munsell, 1857), 8: 20514.
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regulations, for example, recognized the three existing classes of fur merchants. Only
a handful of wealthy wholesalers were permitted to import goods directly from
England or the Netherlands, and they were required by law to sell their merchandise
exclusively to Albany traders, not directly to the Indians.5 The Navigation Acts
stipulated that all foreign goods were to be transshipped through an English port,
though this did not prevent Albany’s Dutch merchants from preserving their trade ties
with suppliers in the Netherlands, even if this meant their ships occasionally neglected
to make the obligatory call at London or Bristol.6
When goods arrived at the port of New York, they were unloaded under the
supervision of an agent, then transferred to the smaller river-going sloops for the final
leg of the journey up the Hudson. Having reached Albany, the merchant-importers
sold the same trade merchandise at an average markup of 100 percent.7 Despite their
legal status, many Albany importers in the early years of the eighteenth century still
did not possess sufficient credit to purchase goods directly from European merchants,
so instead acted as resident factors for overseas trading houses. In such instances, a
European exporter shipped a cargo of merchandise at his own risk and expense; the
Albany merchant then oversaw its sale in the colony, collecting a 5 percent
commission for his efforts. The Albany merchant invariably paid the freight charges,

5 Annals o f Albany, 8: 212.
6 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 51-52.
7 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 52. Norton suggests that importers reaped net
profits in the range of 20 to 40 percent after deducting for costs. Fur Trade in
Colonial New York, 113-14.
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customs duties, and insurance premiums on the return shipment of peltry. The
London correspondent completed the commercial cycle by selling the furs and skins at
the current market price, in turn skimming off a 5 percent share of the gross profits.8
The Albany ordinances further distinguished between two lesser classes of
handlaers: those who dealt primarily in relatively expensive goods, such as bulk
duffel and stroud cloth, blankets, and other "big ticket" items, and merchants who
traded in supplementary "smallwares," such as knives, mirrors, vermilion, awls,
tobacco, flints, firesteels, brass wire, ribbon, thread, bells, beads, combs and
needles.9 Operating out of their homes, the handlaers exchanged manufactured goods
for furs with the Iroquois and western Indians who travelled to Albany to trade.
There were ample profits to be had in this trade, particularly when it involved
dispensing rum to thirsty Indian customers. But, with the free flow of alcohol
invariably came increased allegations of cheating and fraud. Albany’s merchants
were routinely derided by their English-speaking neighbors, who characterized them
as money-grubbing, unprincipled boors who would stop at nothing to separate Indian
customers from their pelts. "It is hardly possible to keep ones Pen within the Bounds
of Moderation, when these Vermin come in ones way," seethed Peter Wraxall, New
York’s Secretary for Indian Affairs in the 1750s. "The People of Albany," he
claimed, "are extremely Ignorant & Illiterate & so enslaved to the love of Money that

8 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 51-52. For the importance of maintaining
sound commercial relationships with London factors, see Norton, Fur Trade in
Colonial New York, 118-20.
9 Annals o f Albany, 8: 212.
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they have no other Principle of Action."10 The Swedish naturalist, Peter Kalm, paid a
brief visit to Albany while touring the colonies in 1749, during which he deduced that
the character of the Dutch populace was tainted by their "vagabond" ancestry. Kalm
deplored their alleged trickery and false-dealing, noting that "the merchants of Albany
glory in these tricks, and are highly pleased when they have given a poor Indian a
greater portion of brandy than he can bear, and when they can after that get all his
goods for mere trifles." Since Kalm was hosted during his New York sojourn by
Wraxall and his ilk, it was inevitable, perhaps, that the visitor was persuaded that
"the avarice and selfishness of the inhabitants of Albany are very well known
throughout all North America."n
Though the most rabid attacks on the Albany Dutch were characterized by
ethnic slurs, the invective heaped upon them was primarily the byproduct of broader
political antagonisms brewing within the colony. Without doubt, a certain amount of
sharp dealing, perhaps even flagrant cheating, characterized the relationship between
Albany traders and their Indian customers. The exaggerated allegations of critics
such as Wraxall and Kalm should not be accepted uncritically, however, particularly
since no Dutch rebuttals to such allegations have survived, if they were ever offered.
What is apparent is that local Dutch merchants were content to conduct their business
as usual, leaving others of a more imperial-minded bent to fret about the broader

10AIA, 135n., 132n.
11 Peter Kalm, Travels Into North America, translated by John Reinhold Forster
(Barre, Mass.: The Imprint Society, 1972), 332-34.
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diplomatic implications of the fur trade in challenging the French presence in the
West.12
The French diplomatic and commercial hegemony over the western Great
Lakes was indeed hampering the Albany fur trade by the end of the seventeenth
century. The economic sluggishness of the 1680s was precipitated largely by the
Canadians’ ability to intercept virtually all the best western furs before they reached
the Iroquois middlemen who traditionally carried the peltry to Albany. The furbearing animal populations south of Lake Ontario were already depleted by the time
the English arrived in Albany, and it was obvious to the more percipient colonial
officials that unless English traders penetrated the western markets, and the western
Indians were encouraged to deal through Iroquois middlemen or bring their peltry
directly to Albany, the prospects for continued profits in the New York fur trade were
bleak.13
One of the earliest proponents of expansion in the Great Lakes region was
Governor Thomas Dongan, who drew criticism from supporters of a strict Albany
monopoly in the mid-1680s by sponsoring a dual trade and diplomatic mission to the
western tribes. The purpose of this expedition was as much to promote New York
trade interests among the Indians as to send a clear signal to Quebec that the English
were now prepared to intercede in what had previously been an uncontested sphere of

12 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 7-8.
13 For an early expression of this position, see "Mr. Robert Livingston’s Report
of his Journey to Onondaga (April 1700)," NYCD, 4: 648-52; Norton, Fur Trade in
Colonial New York, 155-56.
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French influence. Dongan issued licenses to Jacob Lockerman and thirty others, who
ultimately journeyed as far west as Michilimackinac. Based on the success of
Lockerman’s expedition, which had been warmly received by Indians relieved to see a
challenge to the French commercial monopoly, additional trading parties were
dispatched the following year in hope of permanently extending the range of New
York’s influence. By 1687, Governor Dongan was confidently considering the
establishment of an English fort at Niagara, while encouraging the Iroquois to make
peace with their former enemies, the Hurons, and other western tribes with access to
ample fur resources. Despite the early success of Dongan’s imperial initiatives, the
dream of extending New York’s trade into the interior was soon shattered. That same
year, a trading party under the command of Major Patrick Macgregory was set upon
by a party of French and Indians. Their valuable stock of trade merchandise was
plundered and the men sent to labor in the construction of Fort Frontenac on the north
shore of Lake Ontario. In the wake of the Macgregory debacle, no comparable trade
missions would be attempted for the next twenty years.14
Despite the failure of these early efforts at gaining a foothold in the western
fur trade, New Yorkers never forgot the critical importance of Indian alliances to the
economic stability and military preparedness of the colony. The Commissioners of
Indian Affairs, a body of influential Albany merchants reporting directly to the
governor, met frequently with representatives of the Five Nations at Albany,

14 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 11-21; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New
York, 153-54.
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discussing matters ranging from the cost of strouds to the necessity of curtailing
French activities in the pays d ’en haut. As fur merchants themselves, the
Commissioners may occasionally have turned a blind eye to the transgressions of their
colleagues. But in their speeches at least, the agents of Indian affairs generally
appeared willing to address the sources of Indian complaints.15
The expressed interest of the Commissioners in maintaining good relations
with their Iroquois neighbors generally coincided with the expansionist program of the
budding "imperialist" faction spearheaded by the powerful Scots merchant-proprietor,
Robert Livingston, and subsequently promoted by governors Dongan, Hunter, and
Burnet. These "imperialists" preached active intervention through commercial,
military, and diplomatic channels, to eradicate the threat of French expansion in the
western Great Lakes. From their perspective, the greatest obstacle to wiping out
French influence in North America was the commerce of the traitorous, rapacious
Albany handlaers, who neglected the greater interests of the Anglo-American colonies
by brazenly trading with the Canadians in peace and war alike.16

15 AlA, passim.; Armour, "Merchants of Albany, 218-35; Norton, Fur Trade in
Colonial New York, 73-82.
16 "As Trade with the Indians is the only Method of securing and extending an
Influence over them," Wraxall reflected, "how pernicious this Trade from Albany to
Canada must have been at this time when the French were laying the Foundation of
that extensive Influence they have since obtained over the Indians . . . . I say the
pemiciousness of this Trade must have been no less obvious to those who helped it
forwards at Albany than to every Body who in the least considered it. But those
Albany men got money by it to which they would sacrifice every other
consideration." AlA, 119n.
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As early as the 1670s, a number of Albany merchants had established regular
business contacts with fellow traders in Montreal, supplying them with a narrow
range of goods not easily available in New France in exchange for Canadian beaver.17
With the two fur-trading towns a mere 220 miles apart by way of the Richelieu RiverLake Champlain route, the temptation to bypass the Compagnie des Indes and dispose
of at least part of their fur stocks by sending them southward was irresistible to many
Canadian merchants, Albany merchants could frequently offer higher prices for
Canadian beaver than the monopoly company, and the New Yorkers-unlike the
discriminating French agents—paid equally for all passable grades of peltry.
Montrealers could also expect to be reimbursed by their Albany contacts in a matter
of weeks, while they could rarely expect returns on their bills of exchange from the
Company in under a year.18
The bulk of the furs smuggled to Albany was carried by parties of converted
Mohawks, whose Jesuit-founded settlement at Caughnawaga lay on the south shore of

17 The most complete record of the Albany-Montreal trade is preserved in the
Letterbook of Robert Sanders, 1752-1758, in the collection of the New-York
Historical Society. The Montreal merchants were far too scrupulous to leave any
record of their illicit activities, but Sanders’s letters to his Montreal correspondents
offer a unique insight into the Anglo-French trade during the 1750s. Rarely
addressing his contacts by name (he used coded symbols to identify each of them),
Sanders arranged for the purchase of Canadian beaver, paying primarily in wampum,
supplemented occasionally by small amounts of woolens. Norton also recognized the
limited range of items traded between Montreal and Albany, noting that wampum and
stroud cloth made up the bulk of northward-bound cargoes. Rum and gunpowder
were rarely purchased by the Canadians. Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York,
89-91, 126.
18 Jean Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France, 1713-1760," Canadian
Historical Association, Report o f the Annual Meeting, 18 (1939): 67-68.
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the St. Lawrence, just upriver from Montreal. Caughnawaga had a long tradition of
smuggling. The most notorious of the contraband traders were the doughty
Desaulnier sisters-Marie Magdelaine, Marie Anne, and Margu6rite~who facilitated
much of the exchange of Canadian beaver for English goods through the Indian town
between 1727 and 1752. Canadian officials perennially suspected the sisters of illicit
dealings, noting that they grew noticeably wealthier each year without bringing a
single beaver pelt to the Company’s offices. Despite this official scrutiny, however,
the Desaulniers and others continued to reap healthy profits from their illegal dealings
until the Conquest.19
The hazards involved in such smuggling operations were always substantial,
and the Montreal merchants customarily bore all the risks and losses associated with
the trade on both treacherous legs of the journey. Armed French patrols operating
out of Fort Chambly and later the fort at Crown Point policed the Montreal-Albany
route throughout the spring and summer months, seizing the contents of all suspicious
southward-bound canoes. It was also essential for the Canadians to employ reliable
Indian carriers, due to the potential for theft along the route. Intendant Hocquart
estimated that traders could expect to lose upward of 10 percent of the value of their
furs over the course of a season, whether through the pilfering of Indian paddlers or
confiscations at the hands of the authorities. The advantages of commerce with
Albany clearly must certainly have outweighed the risks, however, for each year
dozens of canoes boldly set off from Caughnawaga for Albany, loaded with the

19 Lunn, "Illegal Fur Trade," 61, 73-75.

73
coveted spoils of the pays d ’en haut.20
Though the Canada trade was not illegal in New York, the imperialists were
infuriated that Albany merchants continued their trade with the French, even during
the bitter hostilities of Queen Anne’s War. While no decisive action could be taken
to restrict the trade while the conflict raged, support for strangling the AlbanyMontreal commerce grew stronger after the Treaty of Utrecht. The simmering antiAlbany sentiment was fueled by two distinct sets of interests: those of the virulently
anti-French imperialists and the jealous Schenectady merchant community. The
imperial faction opposed any intercourse with the French during peace or wartime.
Alleging that the French could not supply the Canadians with sufficient merchandise
to support the Great Lakes trade, the imperialists concluded that the Albany merchants
dealing with Montreal were, in effect, furnishing the Canadians with the means to
maintain their stranglehold on the western trade. The only way New Yorkers could
hope to rival the French in the Great Lakes was to disrupt the Canadian fur trade, and
that could be accomplished only by stifling the flow of English goods to Montreal.
Similarly, the merchants of Schenectady, on the Mohawk River sixteen miles
northwest of Albany, were in a better position geographically to deal with the western
tribes, but since the arrival of the English in 1664 had been barred from the trade.21
Anticipating the potential collapse of Albany’s monopoly in the New York fur trade,

20 Lunn, "Illegal Fur Trade," 69-70, 62-63.
21 Thomas E. Burke, Mohawk Frontier: The Dutch Community o f Schenectady,
New York, 1661-1710 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 31-32.
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the Schenectady merchants were only too eager to throw their support behind the
imperialist cause.22
During the tenure of Governor Robert Hunter, an ardent proponent of
westward trade and expansion, the ambitions of the imperialists were wedded to the
frustrations of the Schenectady merchants. The result of this pragmatic alliance was a
powerful anti-Albany coalition which spared no invective in condemning the Dutch
merchants for endangering the security of New York by their collusion with the
French, not to mention their alleged mistreatment of Indian trading partners.23 When
his tenure as governor ended and he returned to England in 1719, Hunter immediately
lobbied the Board of Trade for the immediate restriction of the Canada trade. The
greatest achievement of the early anti-Albany campaign was Hunter’s success in
having William Burnet, his ideological alter-ego, named as his successor. Long
before Burnet sailed for the colony, he had been convinced by the former governor

22 The most forceful expression of the argument that the Canadian trade was
insupportable without supplies from Albany was offered by Cadwallader Colden.
See, for example, "Report of a Committee of the Council held at New-York,
November 6, 1724," and "A Memorial concerning the Furr-Trade of the Province of
New York," HFIN, 2: 21, 44. For Schenectady resentment of the Albany monopoly,
see Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 145; Armour, "Merchants of Albany,"
137, 161; Burke, Mohawk Frontier, passim.
23 Wraxall peppered his Abridgment with editorial condemnations of the Albany
Dutch, alleging that they ignored the diplomatic repercussions of the trade in lieu of
self-enrichment. "I suppose Pouder was sold by the Bag and the Albany People
according to their general and usual Principle of Action had cheated the Indians and
made their Bags less," he surmised. "It was by such Mean and dishonest Methods
that they became Odious and Contemptible to the Indians, lost their Esteem and
Confidence, and that great improvement of their Trade with the Western and farr
Indians wch might have fallen into their hands and by that means secured those Indians
to our Interest." AlA, 61n.
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that it was imperative that he terminate the Albany-Montreal commerce, a cause upon
which he would remain fixated throughout his controversial administration. Shortly
after his arrival in New York in 1720, Burnet launched a whirlwind campaign to
persuade the assembly to outlaw the Canada trade. By the end of the year he had
succeeded in convincing the legislators to accede to an act banning New Yorkers from
selling what were deemed "Indian goods" to Canadians. Even those in possession of
trade merchandise north of the town would be considered guilty of trading with the
French. Albany's sheriff was given the authority to search all property and
conveyances north of the town limits, and those convicted of participating in the
forbidden trade were subject to a steep fine of £100. Their merchandise was also
liable to seizure, to be handed over-along with half the fine-to any informer aiding
in their apprehension.24
Albany was in no danger of becoming a second city of brotherly love in the
wake of the 1720 act. Though the merchants involved in the Canada trade voiced no
public opposition to the new measures, neither did they go out of their way to obey
them. Within a year, in fact, it was obvious to all concerned that the act was a

24 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 135-38. The fine of £100 New York
currency would be equivalent to nearly $7,000 U.S. in 1995. Calculation based on
John J. McCusker, How Much Is That in Real Money? A Historical Price Index fo r
Use as a Deflator o f Money Values in the Economy o f the United States (Worcester:
American Antiquarian Society, 1992), and Money and Exchange in Europe and
America, 1600-1775; A Handbook (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1978).
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failure.25 Unwilling to sit idly by while his cherished law was flagrantly ignored,
Burnet once again turned to the New York assembly for support. In 1722, he
rammed through a new, harsher law that allowed Albany officials to administer an
oath to suspected smugglers. Accused lawbreakers who refused to take the oath were
automatically declared guilty and slapped with the £100 fine. Though the Act of 1722
admittedly made business more difficult for the Albanians still deeply involved in the
Canada trade, it was still not enough to deter them from buying Canadian furs. A
few of the most hardened traders simply absorbed the steep fines as part of their
operating expenses, while others risked a potentially greater penalty by perjuring
themselves before frustrated officials.26
After several years of official persecution and harassment, the typically
apolitical Albany merchants were finally driven to take action in opposition to the
restrictive acts, asking their London contacts to petition the Board of Trade on their
behalf. In July, 1724, twenty London merchants, including some of the most
powerful and influential players in the English fur trade-Samuel Baker and Samuel
Storke among them--drafted a memorandum to the Board of Trade, laying out their
rationale for the repeal of the New York acts. With the bulk of the furs arriving on
London docks coming from Canada via Albany, the British fur merchants undeniably

25 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 138-40.
26 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 141-42. "The Penalty of £ 100 -upon being convicted of sending Strouds to Canada did not deter some," Wraxall
remarked, "who paid it and yet found it a profitable Trade. Others swore themselves
off, much to the astonishment of the Commiss” . . . . They seem to suspect some of
Perjury and I am of their Opinion." AlA, 159n.
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had a vested interest in the decriminalization of the Canada trade. The London
petitioners nonetheless mustered a convincing geopolitical argument against Burnet’s
laws. Cutting to the heart of the matter, the merchants attacked what they grasped to
be the fallacious premise upon which the restrictive legislation was based: that the
Canadians could maintain their economic and diplomatic ties with the western Indians
only because they were supplied with the necessary trade merchandise by Albany
merchants. This was simply not the case, they asserted, pointing to the fact that the
Compagnie des Indes had only recently stepped up imports of imported English stroud
cloth, as well as equivalent French woollens, to meet the demand generated by the
severance of the Albany trade. Furthermore, they claimed, it was dangerously
irresponsible to cut off the supply of Canadian furs without adequately ensuring for
continued exports by expanding trade contacts. Finally, and most bitterly, the
merchants lamented the contraction of fur imports, which had the deleterious effect of
raising prices on the London market and upsetting the delicate balance of colonial
trade.27
Whatever effect this petition may have had on a Board of Trade traditionally
sympathetic to mercantile interests, it was soon counteracted by a rival memorandum
drafted by Cadwallader Colden on the instructions of Governor Burnet. After
scoffing at the embarrassing unfamiliarity of the London merchants with North
American geography, Colden merely reiterated the imperialists’ a priori assumption
that, without English goods from Albany, the French could not sustain their presence

27 HFIN, 2: 1-5.
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in the Great Lakes region. Burnet’s trade acts were already working to New York’s
advantage, he claimed. If the Albany traders could be permanently prevented from
supplying their Montreal correspondents, it would only be a matter of time before the
Canadian regime in the Great Lakes capitulated, leaving New York free to reap ample
profits.28
Realizing that the unfamiliarity of their London representatives with the minor
details of the colonial fur trade was weakening their cause, the Albany merchants sent
a delegation to deal directly with the Board of Trade, which appeared increasingly
sympathetic to the imperialist position. In 1725, the Board finally held hearings to
address the issue. Though the Lords of Trade agreed with the Colden-Bumet
contention that the volume of trade between New York and Britain had not been
significantly affected by the prohibition of the Canada trade, they concluded that the
oath-taking provisions of the 1722 act were grounds enough for disallowing Burnet’s
legislation. Colonial policy should be directed at actively encouraging western trade,
the Board suggested, rather than merely stifling the commerce with Canada.29
Though the Privy Council never acted on the recommendations of the Board of
Trade, a politically beleaguered Burnet soon began to re-think his position on the
Canada issue. Even staunch imperialists such as Robert Livingston’s son, Philip,
were beginning to appreciate that the trade restrictions were penalizing only those
who obeyed the law, while others who flouted the authorities continued to profit from

28 HFIN, 13-32.
29 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 143-44.
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Canadian beaver. Some worried that, in the absence of Albany merchandise, the
French would be encouraged to supply comparable merchandise thus precluding any
opportunity for New York to gain a foothold in the western trade. With support for
his restrictive regulations dwindling, Burnet was forced to employ more subtle means
when he once more attempted to resolve the thorny problem of the Canada trade in
1726. The resulting act imposed duties on all fur-trade merchandise, but the rate on
goods carried north of Albany was twice that on those destined for the western trade.
Strouds, for example, were taxed at either 15 or 30 shillings per piece, depending on
their destination. Similarly, traders paid an additional duty of 1 or 2 shillings per
gallon on rum.30
Burnet’s final legislative effort aimed at stamping out the Canada trade met
with little more success than its antecedents. The tax farmers who had contracted to
collect the duties quickly antagonized and alienated the Albany merchant community
by their overzealous collection of the duties. By this time, both sides were exhausted
by years of wrangling, and when Burnet was finally transferred to Massachusetts, it
became clear that the Albany merchants were on the brink of victory. The new
governor, John Montgomerie, did not share his predecessor’s obsession with
eradicating the Canada trade, and, in 1729, the Board of Trade recommended that all

30 A "piece" of stroud generally measured 24 yards long, though strouds
purchased by Croghan in Philadelphia varied in length, with some as short as 22
yards. Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 146; George Croghan Section,
Cadwallader Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. On duties, see Norton,
Ibid. , 109, 146, 170; Johnson Gaylord Cooper, "Oswego in the French-English
Struggle in North America, 1720-1760," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department
of History, Syracuse University, 1961), 76.
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Burnet’s trade legislation be disallowed. This time the Privy Council agreed. New
York’s brief attempt to strangle Canada by its purse strings sputtered* io an end.31
Yet, not all of Burnet’s legislative efforts were brushed aside by a British
government weary of the relentless internecine bickering in New York. The most
significant and enduring success of the governor’s imperialist program was the
establishment of the fortified trading post of Oswego, at the mouth of the Onondaga
(later the Oswego) River, on the southeastern shore of Lake Ontario. From its
establishment in 1727 until the end of the French regime, Oswego was the only
English post on the Great Lakes and thus played a critical role in the Anglo-French
rivalry for control of the region’s Indian trade. Despite the criticism of his political
opponents, Burnet had always recognized that the severance of commercial ties
between Albany and Montreal would not benefit the colony unless trade with the
western tribes was simultaneously encouraged. Plans for a trading post at the Oswego
site had been proposed as early as 1700, but not until the end of Queen Anne’s War
did New York officials seriously consider the project. In the end, it was their fear
that the French would soon establish a foothold on the southern shore of Lake Ontario
that spurred colonial administrators to implement the long-awaited plans for imperial
action.32
After a New York expedition thwarted a French attempt to construct a
blockhouse at Onondaga in 1710, Governor Hunter responded by encouraging trade

31 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 147-48.
32 Cooper, "Oswego," 1-5; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 152.
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and diplomatic missions to the Senecas, the westernmost of the Five Nations, in order
to woo them away from the French and to encourage them to renew their trading
alliances with the "Far Indians" of the western Great Lakes. When the French
completed a stone trading post at Niagara in 1720, it became clear to New York
imperialists that the colony would lose all possiblity of competing in the western
trade unless they took immediate and decisive action to challenge the French.
Already suffering from the prohibition of the Canadian trade, the Albany merchants
opposed the program of western expansion. Fearing that a post on the Great Lakes
would discourage the Iroquois and other western Indians from coming to trade at
Albany, they were also suspicious of any belligerent action that might antagonize the
French and jeopardize their longstanding commercial ties with Montreal. Initially, the
Albany merchants would support only the idea of a military, not a commercial, post
on Lake Ontario, but they finally acquiesced in a permanent English trading presence
on the Great Lakes as their forty-year-old monopoly crumbled around them.33
Governor Burnet issued licenses to young traders and encouraged them to head
west into Onondaga and Seneca country to trade in 1724, while he met with the
Iroquois sachems later that year to gain their approval for a post at Oswego. The
governor spent £150 on improvements to the waterway between Schenectady and
Oswego and built a road on the major overland portion of the route, between the

33 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 162-63. The Albany monopoly was
finally overturned by the Supreme Court of New York in 1727 after nearly a decade
of legal challenges by neighboring Schenectady traders. Armour, "Merchants of
Albany," 137, 161; Norton, Ibid., 57-59.
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Mohawk River and Wood Creek, to facilitate the movement of trade goods and furs
between Albany and Lake Ontario. By 1725, Burnet was convinced that his
encouragement of the western trade was already vindicated in the fur export ledgers
and set to work convincing the New York Assembly to vote the necessary funds for
construction o f a trading post at Oswego. The Assembly was far from unanimous,
however, on the need for building a post and maintaining a garrison on Lake Ontario
at public expense. The Albany merchants were never enthusiastic about supporting a
trade that would inevitably rival their commerce with Canada, and the representatives
from the southern counties, who had little to fear from the French, were even less
convinced of the need to fund New York’s imperial pretensions on the distant
northern frontier. Nevertheless, Burnet’s strident lobbying convinced the Assembly to
vote £300 for the construction of Fort Oswego. Though this sum was not nearly
sufficient to cover all the building costs-which ultimately ran to almost £1700--the
governor lent his personal funds to assure that his brainchild saw completion. Fort
Oswego was completed in August 1727. Built of masonry and clay, the main
structure was a rectangular building, 60 feet long and 28 feet high, with a sloping
roof and galleries with loopholes projecting on all sides. The entrance to the fort
faced east onto the river, and with four foot-thick stone walls it could only be takenits architects boasted--by a siege party with cannon.34
New York trade goods faced a tortuous journey of more than 160 miles from
Albany storehouses to the shores of Lake Ontario. The merchandise was first loaded

34 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 162-66; Cooper, "Oswego," 38-40.
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on carts, and hauled overland sixteen miles from Albany to Schenectady. Here the
bales of goods were stowed on wooden bateaux capable of carrying four to five tons
of cargo and crewed by three or four men. Proceeding up the Mohawk River against
the current, the bateau-men alternately used poles and ropes to propel their craft
through a series of rifts and rapids until they reached Little Falls, just over 50 miles
from Schenectady. At the falls, the goods were removed from the boats and heaped
on wagons for carriage around the rapids. The bateaux were then carefully reloaded
and the crews continued until the river turned northward. Here they faced the longest
portage, at what was known as the "Great Carrying Place." The bateau-men
customarily contracted with local Palatine German settlers to haul the goods and boats
the mile and a half over a small ridge to Wood Creek. After re-launching their craft
for a third time, the passage became increasingly difficult, with numerous obstructions
in the narrow creek. Though Oneida Lake was only ten miles away, the meanderings
of Wood Creek made the actual distance traveled closer to thirty miles. Once they
reached Oneida Lake, the bateaux had easy sailing, but stayed close to the shore to
avoid capsizing in sudden squalls. The Oswego River flowed out of the western end
of the lake and into Lake Ontario, so the final run down to the fort was swift, with
only one remaining obstacle, the Oswego falls, to overcome. At the fall line, the
merchandise was once again laboriously unloaded, carried to the base of the rapids,
then reloaded before the final twelve-mile stretch to Fort Oswego.35

35 Francois de Marbois, "Mdmoire sur le commerce des fourrures et pelleteries
avec les nations sauvages par la rivfere du nord dans 1’dtat de New York," American
Historical Review, 29:4 (1924): 731-40; Philip Schuyler, Goldsbrow Banyar, and
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Before the construction of a canal and lock system in the nineteenth century,
the journey between Schenectady and Lake Ontario was lengthy and hazardous. The
waterways were frequently blocked by fallen trees and brush and some became almost
impassibly shallow during the dry summer months. There was continual danger of
grounding on sand bars and hidden rifts, not to mention the arduous task of loading
and reloading the bateaux countless times to bypass the series of rapids and waterfalls
along the route. In the journal of their 1770 expedition to Toronto, New York traders
Ferrall Wade and C. Keiuser reported that it took them nearly two weeks to reach
Oswego from Schenectady by bateaux.36 The upshot of these transportation woes was
a corresponding increase in the expense of shipping goods from the Albany area to
the lakeside post, and costs were only compounded by the threat of Indian harassment
and looting along the major portage route between the Mohawk River and Wood
Creek. In the summer of 1755, Sir William Johnson, the newly appointed
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, arranged to send an assortment of Indian gifts to
Oswego. The cargo included stroud cloth, blankets, duffels, gunpowder, lead and
shot, hose, caps, knives, tankards, tea pots, basins, porringers, brass wire, kettles,

Elkanah Watson, "The Report of a Committee Appointed to Explore the Western
Waters in the State of New-York for the Purpose of Prosecuting the Inland Lock
Navigation," in Documentary History o f the State ofNew-York, edited by E. B.
O’Callaghan (Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1850), 3: 1087-1103; Robert E. Hager,
Mohawk River Boats and Navigation Before 1820 (Syracuse: Canal Society of New
York State, 1987); Milton W. Hamilton, Sir William Johnson: Colonial American,
1715-1763 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press/National University Publications,
1976), 20-21; Cooper, "Oswego," 77.
36 "Journal of Wade and Keiuser’s Trading Expedition from Fonda to Toronto"
[May 13-June 10, 1770], WJP, 7: 723-730.
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and frying pans, together worth about £295 New York currency. Wages for the
bateau-men on the trip between Mount Johnson in the Mohawk valley and Oswego
amounted to £10, with another £9.10s. for the hire of the bateau and the purchase of
the necessary tools and provisions. Based on Johnson’s expenses it is reasonable to
assume that the cost of shipping goods to Oswego generally fell in the range of 6 to 7
percent of the value of the merchandise for each leg of the trip. Considering the
additional cost of overland carriage between Albany and Schenectady, merchant
expenditure for transportation might easily have reached 15 percent for a round-trip
trading expedition.37
The English trade on Lake Ontario developed rapidly, diverting furs from the
French at Niagara. By mid-century, in fact, it is likely that the Oswego trade was
producing as much peltry as the Albany commerce with Canada.38 Each spring,
Albany and Schenectady merchants sent assortments of trade goods to their factors at
Oswego, but since no comprehensive trading records survive to detail the nature of
transactions between Oswego traders and Indian customers, it is difficult to draw any
certain conclusions about the rate of mark-up charged by New Yorkers on Lake
Ontario. The Iroquois constantly complained to the Commissioners of Indian Affairs
that they were not getting "good pennysworth" at the post and that the Oswego traders
"do cheat them very much in the Sale of Rum instead of which they sell them their

37 "Johnson’s Account of Indian Expenses, 27 July 1755," WJP, 1: 586-88.
38 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 172.
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own Water wch in a Day or two stinks & is noisome."39 Wraxall could barely restrain
himself when recording the diplomatic strains exacerbated by such disreputable
dealings. "The Indians hold the Traders in great Contempt as a Set of Mean Dishonest
Mercenary Fellows & wch Characters they have drawn from Dear Experience," he
charged. Peter Kalm similarly remarked that he himself had been witness to various
shady dealings on the banks of the Oswego.40
Apart from whatever cheating and gouging may have occurred at the post, the
normal rate of markup on goods sold by Oswego traders was likely in excess of 100
percent over the cost of the merchandise in Albany and Schenectady, factoring in the
expense of transportation. At the end o f the Seven Years’ War, Johnson determined
that a 100 percent gross profit was acceptable for trade at the posts of the Great Lakes
and Ohio Valley now under his aegis. The few remaining records of goods purchased
by Johnson at Oswego for Indian gifts suggest that this figure is reliable as an
average, with certain items such as rum and tobacco absorbing much higher rates of
markup (Figure 2 .1).41 The temptation for Oswego traders to shortchange their Indian
customers was supposed to be held in check, at least in theory, by the post
commissary appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the Commissioners
of Indian Affairs. But, as Wraxall cynically noted, the commissary himself would

39 A1A, 166,
40 Kalm, Travels Into North America, 331-32.
41 "A Scheme for Meeting Expenses of Trade," WJP, 4: 556-563; Norton, Fur
Trade in Colonial New York, 113. Markups in excess o f 300 percent for rum and
tobacco were not unusual. WJP, passim.
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often bring a large quantity of goods to Oswego, despite the prohibition barring the
post superintendent from trade. Implying that the the post superintendent routinely
paid kick-backs to the Commissioners of Indian Affairs from the profits made in
illegal trading, Wraxall suggested that "neither their Reports or Behaviour is to be
depended on."42
The New York Assembly, on the other hand, was far more concerned with
how they were going to pay the commissary’s salary and provide for the maintenance
of a military garrison at Oswego than with allegations that the traders were watering
rum or jacking up prices to outrageous levels. The legislature wrestled continually
with the problem of supporting the new post at Oswego and its twenty-man garrison.
The Board of Trade, always wary of hampering commerce and irritating the London
fur merchants, recommended that Oswego’s costs be borne by a general revenue
rather than a direct tax on trade. Many assemblymen disagreed, charging that it was
the responsibility of the British government to provide for the colony’s defense. An
early effort to raise revenue through a 2 percent import duty was disallowed by the
Crown, so the Assembly responded by levying a direct tax on the Oswego trade.43
As one of his first acts in office in 1729, Governor Montgomerie attempted to
bypass the legislative gridlock by appointing one private supplier to provision the
garrison at an annually contracted rate, yet it was still unclear who was ultimately
responsible for maintaining the post in a defensible state. The Assembly was divided

42 AIA, 188.
43 Cooper, "Oswego," 62-66.
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into three opposing factions on this issue: those with an interest in the western trade
suggested that Oswego be supported by a general land tax spread over the entire
colony; Albany merchants, who still had substantial interests in Canadian beaver,
proposed that the problem could be solved by a direct tax on the Oswego trade; a
third group of assemblymen, drawn primarily from the "lower counties," remained
unconvinced that New York should be meddling with imperial affairs and balked at
any levies for the dubious purpose of challenging the French in the West. With the
failure of a short-lived, if imaginative, tax on wig-wearers in 1731, Montgomerie
admitted that a direct tariff on the western trade was the only workable solution to the
problem of support. From this point, all Oswego traders were required to purchase a
license, the revenue from which was to applied to the post’s operating expenses. A
direct tax on certain trade goods was also imposed, including 10 shillings on each
piece of stroud cloth, and 1 shilling on every gallon of rum.44
Despite the efforts of the governor, assembly, and British authorities to agree
on an efficient and equitable means of maintaining the post at Oswego, the
commissary and traders constantly complained of a shortage of funds for the upkeep
of the fort. In fact, the irregularly-paid and poorly-equipped garrison troops were
perennially on the verge of mutiny. Oswego was unquestionably effective in offering
at least some direct commercial competition to the Canadian fur trade, though it is
likely that had the French decided to attack the fort before 1756-when it Finally fell
to Montcalm’s assault—they would have found the fortifications crumbling and its

44 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 109, 170; Cooper, "Oswego," 76.
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miserable defenders only too willing to wend their way home.45
In the wake of the debate over how the western trade was to be conducted and
the sweeping disallowance of Burnet’s restrictive trade laws, the Albany merchants
settled back into their comfortable old business with Montreal. Yet, ironically, the
victory of the Dutch merchantss rang hollow, for it signalled the beginning of the end
of the Albany-Montreal trade. By the 1730s, the French were stepping up their
patrols along the Lake Champlain route and enjoying increasing success in stemming
the northward flow of contraband. As well, many of the great New York shippers
were losing interest in the fur trade, turning instead to the more lucrative business of
supplying provisions to the sugar plantations of the West Indies.4* Now
supplemented by the flow of western furs through Oswego, the value of New York’s
fur exports to London remained constant until the beginning of the Seven Years’ War,
though the relative value of furs and skins as a proportion of the colony’s total
exports began to drop during the 1740s and 1750s.47 The "golden age" of New
York’s fur trade was rapidly drawing to a close.

Though New York’s Indian trade was in eclipse by the 1740s, the fortunes of
the more aggressive Pennsylvanians were manifestly on the ascendant (Figure 2.2).
Though it has habitually been referred to as a fitr trade, the commercial relations

45 Cooper, "Oswego," 77-88; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 173.
46 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 171.
47 Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," Tables 1 and 2, 240-44.

between Pennsylvania traders and Indians in the eighteenth century came to be
characterized primarily by the exchange of European goods for deerskins, not peltry/8
Perpetually in pursuit of a quick "buck," enterprising Pennsylvania traders supplied
the raw material for a thriving transatlantic leather industry. Long before fashionable
English gentlemen developed a taste for them, deerskin breeches were worn by
artisans and laborers as daily working attire. The English leather trade, centered in
London and Westminster, craved North American deerskin, and in these bustling
manufactories the quarry of the skilled Indian hunters of the southern Great Lakes and
Ohio Valley was transformed into fine gloves, jackets, vests, breeches, shoes, and
boots. Patterns of Indian hunting and the demands of the European market happened
to coincide neatly in the context of the deerskin trade. Fall was the prime season for
deer hunting, when bucks were fatter and easier to take in their less cautious rutting
period. The Anglo-American deerskin market also favored autumn, because the
deer’s winter "blue" coat tends to be thicker than the summer "red” coat, making it
easier to strip the unwanted hair from the valuable hide. The greater part of the
deerskins amassed through the Indian trade was ultimately exported to England and
Europe, but a certain amount remained in the colony, where it was consumed by the

48 Much of the historiographical confusion clouding this issue, James McClure
argues, can be attributed both to the paucity of data on the scale of the Ohio Valley
deerskin trade, as well as the problem of nomenclature. In the eighteenth century, he
notes, "peltry" referred to any animal skins with fur still attached, while today the
term is generally taken to be a synonym for "fur." McClure suggests that "skins"
would be a more accurate eighteenth-century synonym for "peltry." James P.
McClure, "The Ohio Valley’s Deerskin Trade: Topics for Consideration," The Old
Northwest, 15:3 (1990): 115-16.
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renowned leatherworkers of Philadelphia, Germantown, and Lancaster to supply the
intercolonial market.49
Though the value of Pennsylvania’s deerskin exports did not even begin to
rival that of New York’s beaver and peltry until the 1730s, the mid-Atlantic region
already had a long history of Indian-European trade by the eighteenth century.50
Before the first Quaker set foot in Pennsylvania, the game animals of the Delaware
Valley had already been severely overhunted by the Susquehannocks in pursuing their
trade with the Swedes and the Dutch.51 From the outset, William Penn believed that
the Indian trade would be essential to the economic stability of the new colony, but he
initially found it difficult to establish commercial contacts with the Indian nations of
the area, who were already in alliance with the governments of either Maryland or
New York. The Susquehanna Valley, nominally under the authority of the Iroquois,
appeared the most promising arena for trade, but through the final years of the
seventeenth century, New York successfully managed to restrain the Iroquois from
slipping southward to deal with the upstart Pennsylvanians.52
49 McClure, "Deerskin Trade," 118-22.
50 Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," Tables 1 and 2, 240-44.
51 Francis Jennings, "The Indian Trade of the Susquehanna Valley," Proceedings
o f the American Philosophical Society, 110:6 (1966): 406-424.
52 Penn craved access to the Susquehanna Valley not only to establish a
Pennsylvania fur trade, but also to extend settlement. His plans were initially
frustrated by New York’s Governor Dongan, who feared that the Pennsylvanians
would upset the profitable New York trade relationship with the Iroquois. Dongan
finally ceded the Susquehanna region to Penn in 1697. Gary B. Nash, "The Quest for
the Susquehanna Valley: New York, Pennsylvania, and the Seventeenth-Century Fur
Trade," New York History, 48:1 (1967):
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The early Pennsylvania trade was boosted, in an ironic twist, by the efforts of
a handful of renegade Canadian coureurs de bois. Peter Bizaillon, Martin Chartier,
and Jacques Le Tort had abandoned the French in the 1680s and put down roots in
the Susquehanna Valley, supporting themselves through trade with bands of Shawnees
who had themselves recently settled in the area. Recognizing the value of the
relationships that these Canadian traders had already established with the Indian
hunters of the Susquehanna Valley, James Logan, Penn’s powerful secretary and
political agent, stabilized the colony’s lucrative Indian trade by safeguarding the
French traders against potential competitors. Never negligent of his own interests,
the prescient Logan used his considerable political influence-the fact that he was
Pennsylvania’s Commissioner of Property notwithstanding-to purchase 8,000 acres of
land in the Susquehanna Valley. When Penn was incapacitated by illness in 1712,
Logan assumed virtually unchallenged authority over the colony’s affairs. He was
now poised to become the single most powerful Indian trader in Pennsylvania.53
At the height of his protracted reign as importer, merchant, and speculator,
Logan boasted that he could double his investment within two or three trading
seasons. Each year he imported a vast quantity of merchandise for the Indian trade,
which he then sold on credit to more modest traders. The skins he collected in
payment were sent to his agents in England, who sold them on the London market. It
has been estimated that Logan earned a profit of roughly 80 percent on each shipment

3-27.
53 Jennings, "Susquehanna Valley," 409-14.
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of deerskins, but the most lucrative aspect of his business involved the sale of
merchandise to his trader clients, which he marked up by 150 percent, on average.54
As Logan singlehandedly propelled Pennsylvania full force into the lucrative
deerskin trade, the effect of his commercial and territorial aggrandizement on the
native population of the Susquehanna Valley was less than benign. Under Logan’s de
facto monopoly the deerskin trade became synonymous with the relentless expansion
of Anglo-American settlement. Logan plowed the profits from the trade into land
speculation, driving westward the Indians who had helped him to amass his new
fortune. Francis Jennings has gone so far as to accuse Logan of deliberately enticing
various Indian bands to the Susquehanna Valley to trade, only to later thrust them out
as it became more lucrative to sell their land to prospective settlers. Whatever
Logan’s motives, the Tumerian march of farmers in the wake of traders had the
unfortunate effect of eroding the Indians’ agricultural communities and encouraging
them to overhunt the region’s game populations.55
Despite the steady influx of English-speaking settlers into the region, the
Susquehanna Valley remained the locus of the Pennsylvania deerskin trade well into
the eighteenth century. It was not until the 1730s that traders began to venture
beyond the Alleghenies into the rich hunting territory of the Ohio Valley. The lands
west of the Ohio River had, since the Treaty of Utrecht, been considered an
exclusively French domain. But as the Delawares and Shawnees began their

54 Jennings, "Susquehanna Valley," 415-16.
55 Jennings, "Susquehanna Valley," 420.
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westward retreat in the face of Anglo-American expansion, the Pennsylvania traders
remained hot on their heels. It has been estimated that before 1755, some 300
Pennsylvania traders were operating in the Ohio Valley.56
Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of the Pennsylvania deerskin
trade was the relative freedom of the individual traders, who could count on little
intervention or support from distant Philadelphia and generally preferred it that way.
As early as 1719, Pennsylvania’s governor, William Keith, recognized that the
conduct of the trade was intrinsically linked to the success of Indian-colonial relations
and thus ultimately to the Anglo-French struggle for the continent. A close friend and
supporter of New York’s imperial-minded Governor Hunter, Keith submitted a report
to the Board of Trade outlining his proposals for restructuring the deerskin trade to
serve an imperial purpose. Keith suggested that the commerce be closely monitored
to prevent the cheating of Indian customers; demonstrated the necessity of the
westward expansion of the trade and the construction of a series of fortified posts;
endorsed the creation of formal alliances with the Indian nations of the region; and
solicited the extension of crown control over all aspects of the trade. Yet, as they
had with Burnet’s efforts to draw the New York fur trade into the orbit of imperial
policy, the Privy Council ultimately shied away from involving the crown in matters

56 Albright G. Zimmerman, "The Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania,"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Delaware,
1966), 372; Yoko Shirai, "The Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1730-1768:
Traders and Land Speculation," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
History, University of Pennsylvania, 1985), 7.
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it deemed best handled by local policy or private enterprise.57
Though Keith’s prescient proposals were not initially adopted, the colony did
see the introduction in 1722 of a licensing system formulated to regulate the
Pennsylvania Indian trade, if only indirectly. The trading licenses were not easy to
obtain and were clearly intended to exclude all but those with the right connections
and easy access to ample resources of capital or credit. A prospective trader was
required to apply for an endorsement from a county court, pay a £100 bond, and
name bondsmen before the license was finally granted by the governor himself on the
court’s recommendation. The number of men who qualified for these licenses was
deliberately limited, but this did not prevent others from participating in the
potentially lucrative business. The officially licensed traders were joined by myriad
others, with varying legal standing, in an elaborate arrangement which is still not
entirely understood. In addition to the licensed traders were those who were officially
registered as "unlicensed." Unlicensed traders were not considered illegal
participants, but rather tended to be the employees of licensed traders or merchants.
Because the permits were renewed annually, those who did not return regularly to the
East lapsed into unlicensed status. Finally, a third group of traders were not
registered at all. These men often operated as independent agents, or were hired on
by licensed traders. A handful may have even been leading traders themselves or
acted in partnership with registered traders. It has been suggested that these
unlicensed, unregistered individuals had no official legal status but were permitted to

57 Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," 250-51.
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engage in trade with the Indians as long as they were somehow associated with
established traders.58
Despite the Pennsylvania government’s genuine, if bewildering, attempt to
regulate the behavior of its Indian traders, the "free and open trade" originally
championed by Logan in the Susquehanna Valley remained the touchstone of the Ohio
Valley entrepreneurs throughout the eighteenth century. Far removed from the
seaboard settlements, both geographically and temperamentally, the predominantly
Irish and Scots-Irish traders were a hardy, independent lot, who contended with the
constant threat of depredations by hostile French and Indian competitors with no hope
of red-coated protection. Still, the allure of the deerskin trade was powerful enough
to overshadow the considerable risks involved. The deerskin market was booming in
the 1720s and early 1730s, just as the Pennsylvania traders made their way into the
prime hunting lands of the Ohio Valley. Deerskin prices rose steadily through the
1720s, reaching 20 pence per pound in 1725. Prices held through the end of the
decade, peaking at 2 shillings in 1732. After a drop in the mid-1730s, when a pound
of deerskin brought only 12 pence, the price leveled off at 20 pence by 1740, and
remained roughly at this level through the 1750s.59
The romantic image of gaily singing voyageurs hurtling past rapids in
birchbark canoes was far from the reality of the Pennsylvania deerskin traders, who
led their heavily-laden pack trains through the rugged terrain of the Alleghenies into

58 Shirai, "Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania," 7-8.
59 Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," 375.
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the heart of the Ohio country. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania traders were thick on the
ground in the upper Ohio Valley by the early 1730s, as they concentrated their efforts
on the Delaware and Shawnee villages of Kittanning, Kiskiminetas, Chartier’s Town,
Shannopin’s Town, and Verango along the Allegheny River. By the 1740s, a few
Pennsylvanians had ventured as far north as the shores of Lake Erie. Covering
perhaps thirty miles a day in the best of conditions, it could take weeks to travel the
300 or more miles from Philadelphia to the trading hubs of Logstown and
Shannopin’s Town, near the present site of Pittsburgh, where the Allegheny and
Monongahela flow into the Ohio River.60
One of the most flamboyant and influential, if not the most solvent, of
Pennsylvania’s Ohio Valley traders was the legendary George Croghan. Croghan’s
commercial ventures in the final decades of Anglo-French rivalry not only mirrored
the course of Anglo-American western expansion, but in many respects shaped and
guided it. Fleeing famine in his native Ireland in 1741, the young Croghan arrived in
Philadelphia eager for opportunity. The best prospects for fortune-making in 1740s
Pennsylvania clearly lay in the booming Indian trade. Croghan wasted no time in
associating himself with Peter Tostee, one of the principal traders in the Indian
country. Supplied with trade merchandise by the influential merchant-importer,

60 Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," 314-15; Shirai, "Indian
Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania," 35-36. On an average day, a trader might cover 30
miles by pack horse but often less. They might travel twice that distance by canoe
when water travel was possible. Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan:
Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 20-21.
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Edward Shippen, Croghan began his career by exchanging his wares for the deerskins
of Shawnee, Mingo, and Twightwee hunters of the Ohio Valley and the Wyandots and
Ottawas of the Lake Erie country.61
Within two years of his arrival in the colony, Croghan was confident enough
in his prospects to purchase a tract of land in Lancaster. By 1744 he was in business
for himself as a licensed Indian trader. That same year, he brought a shipment of
goods to a Seneca village near the mouth of the Cuyahoga River on Lake Erie,
surprising the French at Detroit by this bold incursion into what had previously been
their unchallenged sphere of trade and influence. Canadian voyageurs operating out
of Detroit had been drifting eastward into this area for some time and, getting wind of
Croghan’s presence, Detroit’s post commander, Cdleron de Blainville, immediately
dispatched a party of Ottawas to expel him from the town. The Indians were either
distracted or had second thoughts about doing the dirty work of the French, and
Croghan was spared the intended assault. The village on the Cuyahoga thus became
the center of Croghan’s early trading operations, while he also sent goods down the
Ohio and encouraged the Indians around Detroit to enter into the Anglo-American
trade network. In 1745 another hostile party of French and Indians attempted to oust
Croghan from the region, but he had already won the support of his Seneca neighbors
and they refused to hand him over to the French. After narrowly escaping this last
encounter with his scalp, he learned that Peter Tostee had also been accosted by a
band of Shawnees friendly to the French and had lost a large number of deerskins,

61 Wainwright, George Croghan, 3-5.
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along with some beaver and raccoon pelts belonging to Croghan. This was the first
of many losses that Croghan would suffer to the French and their Indian allies and
which would ultimately lead him to the brink of financial ruin.62
This reversal of fortune did not deter the resolute Croghan. Later in 1745 he
struck a partnership with William Trent, scion of a monied Philadelphia family and
former Shippen clerk. The two bought a sizable piece of property on Conegogwinet
Creek, near Harrisburg, from which they conducted their joint trading operation.
Though their association soon lapsed when Trent joined the Pennsylvania contingent
of a colonial force planning to attack Canada in 1746, Croghan continued to broaden
his trading network in the Ohio country. His successful relations with the Senecas in
time yielded more than merely financial gain; in 1746, he was appointed to the
Onondaga Council, the governing body of the Iroquois nation.63
By 1747, Croghan was once again living and trading at the mouth of the
Cuyahoga. Self-professed diplomat as well as trader, he took ample advantage of the
temporary shortage of French trade merchandise in the pays d ’en haut, precipitated by
the wartime interruption of their transatlantic shipping, to stir up Seneca resentment
against the French presence at Detroit. Between the Cuyahoga River and Detroit lay
Sandusky, site of a sizeable Indian settlement where Orontony or "Nicholas" had
brought a splinter group of Huron-Petuns beyond the range of French influence.
Orontony was only too eager to deal with the rival English and allowed Croghan the

62 Wainwright, George Croghan, 6-8.
63 Wainwright, George Croghan, 9-13.
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freedom to trade in his village.6*
Word of Croghan’s activities at Sandusky filtered back to the authorities at
Detroit, who immediately recognized the danger of American traders provoking antiFrench sentiment among the region’s Indian groups. Events on Lake Erie came to a
head in the spring of 1747, when five French traders were seized and killed at
Sandusky by the Wyandots with the conspicuous aid of some Senecas from Croghan’s
village. The Sandusky Wyandots and the neighboring Miamis subsequently launched
an uprising aimed at driving the French from the region. The revolt miscarried and
Orontony led his followers to Kuskuskies on the Mahoning River, while the
Twightwees settled at Pickawillany, on a branch of the Great Miami River.65 With
his Indian customers rapidly dispersing, and a French bounty on his scalp, Croghan
found it expedient to shift his operations to the south and to concentrate on trading
with the Miamis at "Pick’s Town."66

64 The Huron-Petun group that migrated to Sandusky adopted the distinguishing
name of "Wyandots," an earlier synonym of "Hurons" which had since fallen out of
use. For the reasons underlying this resettlement, see Richard White, The Middle
Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 193-96.
65 White, Middle Ground, 198-99.
66 In the journal of his 1752 expedition to the west, William Trent estimated the
distance from Logstown—near Pittsburgh~to Pickawillany at 326 miles along the
"Main Path." With an additional 300 miles from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh at a rate
of thirty miles per day, it would take a pack train loaded with trade goods at least
three weeks to make the arduous trek to the most distant posts of the Ohio country.
William Trent, Journal o f Captain 'William Trent from Logstown to Pickawillany,
A.D. 1752, edited by Alfred T. Goodman (New York: Amo Press, 1971), 84n. See
also Christopher Gist’s journal in The Wilderness Trail, or The Ventures and
Adventures o f the Pennsylvania Traders on the Allegheny Path, edited by Charles A.
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In the wake of the failed 1747 uprising, the Pennsylvania government came to
appreciate Croghan’s potential as an official mediator between the colony and the
various Indian tribes of the Ohio Valley. At Croghan’s suggestion, the Pennsylvania
legislature voted a present of £400 worth of merchandise for the Indians the next year
and entrusted the Irishman with its delivery and distribution. Thus began Croghan’s
long and distinguished career as diplomat. Respected by the Indians and the colonial
authorities alike, Croghan had by this time become the most powerful and influential
trader in the Ohio country. Though other prominent traders, including John Fraser,
James Young, Robert Callender, Michael Teaff, and Thomas McKee, claimed their
fair share of the deerskin market, Croghan was the unchallenged master of the
Pennsylvania Indian trade, with perhaps a third of the 300 traders and employees in
the region connected to him in some way.67
Unfortunately, the success of Croghan’s far-flung trading ventures did not
keep pace with his diplomatic accomplishments. Having gradually stretched his Ohio
Valley operations too thin, Croghan found himself on the verge of financial ruin by
1751. Plunged into debt and facing a downturn in the London deerskin market,
Croghan’s waning trading empire was finally toppled when a force of Ottawas and
Chippewas in alliance with the French attacked Pickawillany in June 1752. This
assault, in which a trader was killed and several others were captured, marked the

Hanna (New York, 1911), 2: 278-79; Wainwright, George Croghan, 20-21.
67 Wainwright, George Croghan, 16-21; Shirai, "Indian Trade in Colonial
Pennsylvania," 38.
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launch of a concerted French-Indian effort to drive the American traders from the
Ohio Valley. The attackers seized vast amounts of merchandise and skins belonging
to the Pennsylvanians and drove the fortunate survivors eastward in rout. The next
year brought an abrupt end to the Anglo-American deerskin trade in the Ohio Valley,
as Duquesne’s forces pushed eastward, reclaiming the Ohio country for the French.
The western trade had ended virtually overnight in a paroxysm of bankruptcy and
fear.68
During its brief span, the Pennsylvania trade offered a tantalizing promise of
profits to all involved, from the largest merchant-importers in Philadelphia to the
meanest unlicensed trader in the trans-Allegheny country. The wealthy Philadelphia
merchants who supplied the deerskin trade, including Edward Shippen, Thomas
Lawrence, Jeremiah Warder, Nathan Levy, and David Franks, could expect to earn
gross profits of at least 100 percent on the sale of trade goods.69 It is more difficult,
considering the paucity of records, to come to any certain conclusions regarding the
rates at which Pennsylvania traders on Lake Erie and in the Ohio country exchanged
their wares for deerskins. Taking into account the post-war trading regulations
established by Sir William Johnson for the Ohio posts, it is likely that individual
traders marked up goods by at least 100 percent, after deducting the costs of

68 For the grisly details of the attack on Pickawillany, culminating in the cooking
and consumption of the Miami leader, La Demoiselle, see White, Middle Groundf
230-31.
69 Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," 102.
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transportation.70
Shipping goods as far as 600 miles inland, much of the way by packhorse, was
a time-consuming and expensive proposition. Unlike their Canadian rivals, the
Pennsylvanians had to travel almost exclusively by land to reach the Ohio country
because the major eastern rivers (Delaware and Susquehanna) were unsafe for
navigation and there was no water passage through the Allegheny mountains. Even if
reliable riverine routes had been available, canoe birch was not native to the region
and so the traders would have had to rely on unwieldy dugouts-difficult to maneuver
and even harder to portage--to ship their goods west. This did not mean that the
Pennsylvania traders were forced to hack their way through impenetrable forests,
however, because a vast network of Indian paths already crisscrossed the province.
These paths certainly made the westward trek easier for the traders, but overland
travel posed its own unique difficulties. Slowed by flooded trails, swollen and
dangerous river fords, swamps, and windfall timber blocking the paths, the packhorse
trains had difficulty enough in the warmer months and winter conditions usually
brought travel to a standstill.71
Considering the hazardous and lengthy nature of the westward trip, the cost of
transporting trade goods to the Ohio Valley could easily mount to 30 percent of the

70 See note 41 above.
71 Paul A. W. Wallace, Indian Paths o f Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: The
Pennsyvlania Historical and Museum Commission, 1965), 2-10. Wallace offers
detailed information on dozens of Pennsylvania’s colonial Indian paths, including
those most frequently used by the deerskin traders. See, for example, "Allegheny
Path," 19-21; and "Frankstown Path," 49-54.
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value of the merchandise each way (Figure 2 .1).72 Losses to Indian and French
raiding parties were an everpresent and potentially ruinous risk of the trade and by the
1750s had reached crippling levels. In 1754, with petitions for restitution still
pouring in to Philadelphia, it was estimated that the traders had lost goods and skins
valued at more than £48,000 to the French and their Indian allies. Croghan alone
suffered damages in the amount of £8,000, and as much as £16,000--a third of all
Pennsylvania losses combined—when his many shares with trading partners were
finally accounted for.73
Though focused on different geographic regions and commodities, the Indian
trades of New York and Pennsylvania followed remarkably similar trajectories
through the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Both pre-dated English
settlement and formed the basis of the early local economy. In the 1680s, William
Penn and Thomas Dongan simultaneously grasped the intrinsic relationship between
trade and diplomatic relations with the powerful Indian nations neighboring each
colony. Both sought the westward expansion of the trade: to Dongan it represented a
desire to secure New York’s competitiveness with the French; for Penn it promised a

72 Wainwright notes that traders customarily charged 30 percent of the value of
the goods to carry shipments of Indian gifts to the Indians of the Ohio Valley on
behalf of the Pennsylvania government. Wainwright, George Croghan, 39. A
number of invoices in Croghan’s accounts corroborate this claim. Croghan Section,
Cadwallader Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
73 Shirai, "Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania," 62. The total value of the
Pennsylvania traders’ losses would have exceeded $2.5 million U.S. in 1995. See
McCusker, How Much Is That in Real Money?, and Money and Exchange in Europe
and America, 1600-1775: A Handbook.

105
firmer economic footing for the new proprietary colony and a precursor to settlement.
By the early decades of the eighteenth century, administrators in both maturing
colonies attempted-albeit unsuccessfully-to harness the trade in furs and skins to
broader imperial and diplomatic concerns. In New York, William Burnet’s lengthy
campaign to stifle the Albany-Montreal commerce and to establish and maintain Fort
Oswego on Lake Ontario was deliberately contrived to upset French hegemony in the
Great Lakes trade, Burnet’s contemporary and admirer, William Keith, similarly
sought the support of the British government in formulating a coherent imperial policy
which sought to suborn the colony’s burgeoning deerskin trade to the cause of
Pennsylvania’s Indian relations.74
But, as Stephen Cutcliffe has noted, shortsighted imperial administrators
proved stubbornly reluctant to harness private enterprise to imperial ends. Not until
the 1750s, on the eve of war with the French, did they finally fathom the need for a
unified Indian policy to replace the ramshackle, ineffectual structure of separate
colonial Indian treaties.75 By this time, the fur and skin trade of the northern colonies
was in decline, Pennsylvania's cut brutally short by French and Indian aggression in
the Ohio Valley, while New York merchants increasingly pursued more profitable
markets and commodities. After decades of a scarcely salutary neglect, the British
had finally grasped the link between trade and diplomacy in time to watch the French
dismantle their once vast and vigorous North American enterprise and descend the

74 Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," 250-53.
75 Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy,” 264-66.
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FIGURE 2.1
ESTIMATED MARK-UP ON TRADE MERCHANDISE, OSWEGO AND OHIO
VALLEY (£ STERLING)
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FIGURE 2.2
VALUE OF LONDON IMPORTS OF NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA
PELTRY (£ STERLING)
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CHAPTER III
THE ECONOMICS OF RIVALRY

But as our Indian traders not only have a double Price for their Indian goods,
but likewise buy the Goods they sell to the Indians, at half the Price the
French Indian Traders do, the French traders must be ruin’d by carrying on
this Trade, in Competition with the English of New-York,
Cadwallader Colden, 10 November 17241
Pray let me know if there be a possibility of Sending me a parcel of french
Blankets, Kersey whale & lettered, such as they Send to Canada for the use of
the Indians, also purple & white ratteen for Stocking Stuff; all wh. they have
better than ours -- & also French Guns.
William Johnson, 22 August 17522

By most accounts, the Canadian fur trade should have been a dim memory
long before Montcalm and Wolfe clashed on the Plains of Abraham. Throughout the
eighteenth century, it has been widely assumed, Anglo-American traders effortlessly
supplied their Indian customers with merchandise that was significantly cheaper and of
better quality than the overpriced, shoddy articles offered by their Canadian

1 Cadwallader Colden, "A Memorial concerning the Furr-Trade of the Province of
New-York," HFIN, 2:55-56.
2 William Johnson to John George Libenrood, WJP, 1: 376-77.
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counterparts.3 No wonder, for Britain’s burgeoning industrial and manufacturing
complex had already eclipsed that of France.4 The Indian hunters and traders of the

3 E. R. Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry in the Fur Trade during the 18th
Century," Culture, 8 (1947): 434-55, reprinted in Canadian History Before
Confederation: Essays and Interpretation, edited by J. M. Bumsted (Georgetown,
Ontario: Irwin-Dorsey, 1972), 153, 154, 155; David Arthur Armour, "The
Merchants o f Albany, New York, 1686-1760," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Department o f History, Northwestern University, 1965), 64-65; Bruce Alden Cox,
"Natives and the Development of Mercantile Capitalism: A New Look at Opposition
in the Eighteenth-Century Fur Trade," in The Political Economy o f North American
Indians, edited by John H. Moore (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993),
88; Louise DechSne, Habitants and Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Montreal
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992), 88; Harold Adams
Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), 79, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 114, 395;
Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain
Confederation o f Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its beginnings to the
Lancaster Treat o f 1744 (New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1984), 284; Jean Lunn,
"The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France, 1713-60," Canadian Historical
Association, Report o f the Annual Meeting, 18 (1939): 76; A. Jean E. Lunn,
"Economic Development in New France, 1713-1760," (Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Department of History, McGill University, 1942), 154, 157; Charles
Howard Mcllwain, AIA, xli-xlii; Thomas Elliot Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial
New York, 1686-1776 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 6, 90-91;
Francis Parkman, "A Half-Century of Conflict," France and England in North
America (New York: Library of America, 1983), 2: 346, 520; Paul Chrisler Phillips,
The Fur Trade (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 1: 314, 498, 501;
Yoko Shirai, "The Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1730-1768: Traders and
Land Speculation," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History,
University of Pennsylvania, 1985), 3; Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians,
Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 119, 120-21, 125, 127; Thomas Wien, "Selling
Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720-1760: The Uses of Fur-Trade
Imperialism," Journal o f the Canadian Historical Association (1990), 1: 296-97;
Albright G. Zimmerman, "The Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Delaware, 1966), 316.
4 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 64-65, 107; Hugh M. Grant, "One Step
Forward, Two Steps Back: Innis, Eccles, and the Canadian Fur Trade," Canadian
Historical Review, 62:3 (1981): 309-10, 316; Innis, Fur Trade in Canada, 79, 80,
85 , 389-90, 395; Innis, introduction to Murray G. Lawson, Fur— A Study in English
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pays d ’en haut-m th an eye for an obvious bargain-inevitably preferred English
merchandise, which was better suited to their "simple economy and taste."5 In fact,
had the Canadians not imported or smuggled vast amounts of English trade goods
from Great Britain or New York, they could not have sustained their vast trading
empire in the interior of the continent.6 The critical supply lines linking the French
ports of La Rochelle, Rouen, and Bordeaux with the tiny colonial entrepdt at Quebec
were severed at the whim of the Royal Navy. Dire consequences for the Canadian
economy would ensue, including acute shortages of essential trading wares and
crippling price inflation.7 Though a French merchantman might complete the Atlantic
crossing unscathed, its cargo faced a long and costly trek into the North American
wilderness before reaching the hands of Indian consumers.8 During periods of the
most benign economic conditions, Montreal merchant-outfitters were still saddled with
exorbitant official fees and levies, appropriated to support the colony’s unwieldy

Mercantilism, 1700-1775, University of Toronto Studies, History and Economics
Series, Vol. 9 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1943), xx; Lunn, "Economic
Development," 174; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 90-91.
5 Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936), 4: 63.
6 Armour, "Merchants of Albany," 107; Lunn, "Illegal Fur Trade," 76;
Mcllwain, AIA, xliin.; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 90-91, 121, 126.
7 Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry," 159.
8 Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry," 149, 156, 158-59; Grant, "One Step Forward,"
317; Mcllwain, AIA, xxxv, xliin.; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 90-91;
Phillips, The Fur Trade, 1: 501; Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins," 296.
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military establishment.9 The arbitrary oversight of the monopoly Compagnie des
Indes, moreover, prevented the chronically overtaxed and undercapitalized Canadian
traders from offering as much in exchange for the furs and skins of their Indian
partners as their irrepressibly independent Anglo-American rivals.10
Confronted with this litany of alleged disadvantages, it is incredible that
Canadian merchants and traders did not simply throw up their hands, pack their
valises, and catch the next ship sailing for France. Of course, they knew then what is
apparent now only by peeling away the accumulated layers of half-truths, rhetoric,
and misinformation obscuring the authentic nature of the Anglo-French contest for
trade and empire in the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley: that the scenario outlined
above, founded as it is upon an a priori assumption of Anglo-American superiority in
virtually every aspect of the trade, is an exaggeration dangling on the brink of
untruth.
As the lone voice raised in defense of the fundamental fact of Canadian
competitiveness in the eighteenth-century fur trade, W. J. Eccles has long labored to
deflate this myth of overwhelming American advantage and to depreciate the
Anglocentric currency of conviction which has corrupted the analysis of fur-trade

9 Mcllwain, AIA, xliin.; Reuben Gold Thwaites, France in America (New York:
Haskell House, 1969), 136; Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins," 296; Zimmerman,
"Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," 316.
10 Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry," 149, 150; Innis, Fur Trade in Canada, 84,
114; Lunn, "Illegal Fur Trade," 67-68; Lunn, "Economic Development," 171;
Mcllwain, AIA, xlii; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 91, 125-26; White,
Middle Ground, 120.
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rivalry. By challenging the assumption that Canadian traders were at a profound
commercial disadvantage wherever they were met by Anglo-American competitors,
Eccles boldly inverted the historiographical equation. With France the industrial and
manufacturing equal of Britain throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, he
proposed, it is likely that most French-made items were not only of better quality but
were often cheaper as well. The Indian groups of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley
consistently chose to deal with the Canadians and preferred a variety of French wares,
from the more mundane stocks of gunpowder, hardware, and tailored clothing to the
sublime eau de vie. If they did occasionally trade with the Anglo-American upstarts
in the pays d ’en haut, he claims, it was only to keep that option open and to ensure
that the French were careful to maintain their competitive edge. Canadians conquered
long trade-route distances by adopting the most efficient vehicle of wilderness
transport, the birchbark canoe. It is inconceivable, Eccles concludes, that the
Canadians could have captured the bulk of the furs and skins of the Great Lakes-Ohio
Valley regions, as the export records clearly demonstrate, without beating the AngloAmericans at their own economic game.11
"In treating of the fur trade down to 1763," Eccles wrote of the landmark Fur

11 Eccles first argued the revisionist case in his article, "A Belated Review of
Harold Adams Innis’s, The Fur Trade in Canada," Canadian Historical Review, 60:4
(1979): 419-441. A reply in defense of Innis was offered by Hugh M. Grant in,
"One Step Forward," which was in turn scathingly rebutted by Eccles in the same
issue: "A Response to Hugh M. Grant on Innis," 323-329. For later restatements of
Eccles’s pro-Canadian position, see "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century
Imperialism," William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd. Series, 40:3 (1983): 341-62, and
France in America (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1990), llOn.
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Trade in Canada, "Innis had a simple, albeit erroneous, theme that gave the work
some sort of cohesion -- namely, the superiority of British industry, organization,
trade goods, and routes to the interior, which not only made it impossible for the
French to compete successfully but also made the conquest of New France
inevitable."12 Yet, as misguided and influential as his conclusions may have been,
Innis was by no means the sole author of the myth of Anglo-American superiority in
the eighteenth-century fur trade. The scholarship which carelessly acknowledges the
inability of Canadian traders to compete with their English-speaking rivals is more
prolific than Eccles’s focus on Innis might suggest. These works share an incestuous
reliance on a narrowly circumscribed body of evidence which leads inexorably to the
same illegitimate conclusions. A threadbare handful of statements are proffered with
an unsettling regularity as evidence that the Canadians could not effectively compete
with their Anglo-American rivals, neither in the quality or price of trade goods nor in
the value offered in exchange for peltry. The few examples include a 1689 French
list of a handful of items and their price in beaver skins at Albany and Montreal;
occasional memoranda concerning the price of beaver set by the Compagnie des hides
and requests for improvements in the quality of merchandise; pessimistic accounts of
shortages and high prices at the height of the War of the Austrian Succession; and,
most significantly, the reports on the Canadian trade drafted by Cadwallader Colden
in aid of New York governor, William Burnet’s obsessive effort to stamp out

12 Eccles, "A Belated Review," 438.
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Albany’s customary commerce with Montreal.13
More disconcerting than the fact that such sweeping generalizations concerning
Anglo-American advantage have been offered on the basis of a mere smattering of
contemporary statements is the wholly uncritical manner in which they have been
wrenched out of context and offered as conclusive evidence. Neither the occasional
Canadian complaints of uncompetitive fur prices and costly merchandise nor Colden’s
intimations that the Albany Dutch buttressed an otherwise insupportable French
empire in North America should be accepted without a healthy measure of skepticism.
For a variety of economic and political reasons, it suited the best interests of certain
Canadian and New York factions to perpetuate the notion that the French were on the
brink of losing the battle for the Great Lakes—and later the Ohio Valley-fur trade.
This potent blend of exaggeration and misinformation, though perversely appropriate
to its particular political and economic context, has unfortunately been captured and
preserved in the amber of historiography.
Thomas Wien has proposed that the merchants of Quebec and Montreal, in
league with the colonial officials who represented their interests to the Crown,
cynically sought to convince the French Ministry of Marine that they were being

13 For example, see: NYCD, 9: 408; Pontchartrain to Denis Riverin, 3 June
1708, in Supplement to Dr. Brymner's Report on Canadian Archives, 1899, edited by
Edouard Richard (Ottawa, 1901), 414; La Galissioni&re et Bigot au ministre, AN,
C"A, 91: 67-71; Beauhamois k ministre, 19 June 1745, AN, C11/!, 83: 92-93;
Cadwallader Colden, "The Report of a Committee of the Council held at New-York,
November 6, 1724," and "A Memorial concerning the Furr-Trade," in HF1N, 2: 1357.
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battered by ruthless Anglo-American competition.14 Such complaints consistently
stressed the calamities that would result from the inability of Canadian fur traders to
match the beaver prices of their English rivals. Despite their apparent interest in the
success of French diplomacy in the pays d'en haut, Wien claims that the Canadian
merchants were never more than "lukewarm imperialists," though they were
admittedly quick studies in geo-political rhetoric when it promised to fill their
pocketbooks. The profit motive, not concern with Indian relations or grand strategy,
most concerned the Canadians, whose fortunes largely depended on the buying and
selling of beaver pelts in a highly regulated market. Canadian sellers daily faced the
reality that they exerted little control over the price the monopoly company paid for
their staple export commodity. It was clearly in the interest of the monopolists to
keep beaver prices low in Canada, not only out of a concern for their own profit
margin, but also because the powerful Parisian hat-making interest demanded
comparatively inexpensive supplies of pelts. The only recourse available to
disgruntled Canadian merchants, therefore, was to petition the French government to
intervene in the company’s pricing policy. The question that faced colonial merchants
was how to convince reluctant imperial officials that such action was necessary.15
Finding no appreciable correlation between fluctuations in the beaver prices set
by the Compagnie des hides and fur export levels, Wien suspects the Canadian

14 Eccles similarly raised this possibility in "A Belated Review," 425, and France
in America, 110n.
15 Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins," 296-312.
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merchants of exaggerating the threat of Anglo-American competition for their own
commercial advantage. If, as the merchants insisted, the amount of beaver flowing
into Canada from the pays d ’en haut was truly dependent on its assessed value in
Montreal or Quebec, then fluctuations in price should have been attended by
noticeable peaks or shortfalls in Canadian beaver exports. Clearly, they were not,
though this did nothing to prevent colonial merchants and their officials from claiming
the contrary. The most effective way to seize the sympathetic attention of the
ministry of marine, they grasped, was to phrase their pleas in the terms which
anxious imperial administrators best understood. "The Canadians were most
successful in attracting official attention," Wien notes, "when they could associate
their demands with some grave threat to the French empire in North America. The
possibility of Indians defecting to the enemy, a notion that had exercised French
officials since the seventeenth century, fit the bill nicely." If the Canadians could
draw a convincing connection between their inability to offer Indian customers "good
measure" for their beaver and the rapid infiltration of Anglo-American traders into
French zones of trade and influence, it was more likely that the government would
apply pressure on the company to pay more for Canadian peltry. Indeed, such
carefully conceived appeals bore fruit twice in the 1730s and 1740s, when beaver
prices were raised.16
Each year, the Compagnie des Indes imported a limited range of merchandise
for the Indian trade as a supplement to the bills of exchange paid for Canadian

16 Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins," 314.
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beaver. Quebec importers and Montreal merchant-outfitters were by necessity
discriminating consumers themselves, realizing that successful trade relations with
exacting Indian customer-suppliers hinged on the availability of high quality,
dependable, and reasonably priced merchandise. It is not surprising, then, that
Canadians were quick to point out when certain items did not meet their expectations.
Such complaints about the quality or price of certain articles imported by the company
have frequently been wielded to support the assumption that French trade goods were
inferior to those arriving in American ports. For example, E. R. Adair produced a
letter written by Governor La Galissonni&re and Intendant Bigot to the Minister of
Marine in October 1748, citing it as evidence that the substandard quality and high
price of French trade goods comprised a "potent disadvantage." In Adair’s telling,
the officials straightforwardly acknowledged that "the English have the better of us in
the quality of merchandise in two important articles. The first is kettles, the second is
cloth."17 To begin with, this translation is misleading. What Galissonfere and Bigot
actually wrote is more accurately rendered as "the English do not have the better of
us in the quality of trade merchandise except in two important articles."18 The shift in
emphasis is apparently slight, yet it distorts the meaning of the letter. Far from
admitting defeat at the hands of better-equipped English traders, the governor and

17 Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry," 154. In typical reflexive fashion, Adair lifted
this citation from Innis, Fur Trade in Canada, 85-86.
18 The original French version reads: "les anglois ne l'Emportens sur nous en
quality de marchandises de traitte que sur deux articles considerables." AN, ^ A , 91:
67.
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intendant believed that, except for two specific items, French goods were comparable
or superior. Besides, the few discrepancies that did exist, they insisted, could easily
be remedied in the next year’s shipment.19
The perennial complaints of Canadian officials concerning the poor quality or
high price of certain trade items imported by the monopoly company should not be
construed as an admission of a crippling disadvantage in the fur trade. The
Compagnie des Indes was never the sole supplier of French manufactures to colonial
merchants, but rather conducted only a "caricature1' of the trade. Problems with
individual company shipments would thus only have had a limited effect on Canadian
commerce.20 If anything, the fact that officials complained so frequently about
specific shoddy or overpriced goods demonstrates that immediate measures were taken
to rectify any disadvantage that might jeopardize the competitiveness of Canadian
traders. This stream of commentary on the undesirability of trade goods was equally
characteristic of the frank letters exchanged between Anglo-American merchants and
their London agents.21 William Johnson never hesitated to demand better or cheaper
goods from his trading contacts, often forwarding French merchandise worthy of
19 Ironically, only two years later, William Johnson complained to his London
contacts about the cost and quality of a recent shipment of kettles. "I have recd. from
Mr. Cromelin of Amsterdam 712 11. of Kettles," he lamented, "the Dearest, & worst
made up of any ever come to these parts." William Johnson to Samuel and William
Baker, 12 September 1751. WJP, 1: 347.
20 The company dealt almost exclusively in gunpowder, shot, and strouds. Wien,
"Selling Beaver Skins," 299.
21 The correspondence of factors at Hudson’s Bay Company posts was similarly
rife with complaints about the quality of English merchandise, from textiles to
gunpowder. Eccles, "A Belated Review," 430-31.
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imitation.22 Nor was Johnson the only dissatisfied New York customer. "The 2
pieces of red Stripped Duffils which you sent me Last Fall are Not Worth 40/ a
Piece," griped Albany trader Cornelius Cuyler to his supplier. "I believe they are
made o f Dogs hair." Of course, no historian has yet claimed that New York traders
were doomed to fail in their contention for the Indian trade simply because the
occasional shipment from London consisted of "Course Refuse," or "old musty
Strouds good for nothing."23
The assumption that Canadians were handicapped by poor quality, overpriced
goods springs largely, as Eccles has noted, from an anachronistic assessment of
French industrial and economic capacity in the first half of the eighteenth century.24
In his peculiarly teleological style, Innis claimed that the entire history of the North
American fur trade "depended on the manufactures of Europe and the more efficient
manufactures and cheaper transportation of England. Control of the fur trade was an
index of world importance from the standpoint of efficient manufactures, control of
markets, and consumption of luxuries. The shift from Paris to London of the fur
trade was significant of the industrial growth of France and England. "2S Though it is
22 William Johnson sent samples of French blankets and other textiles to his
English agents so that suitable imitations might be provided. William Johnson to
William Baker, 24 December 1752. WJP, 1: 384-85. See also William Johnson to
Governor George Clinton, 30 May 1747. WJP, 1: 95, on the necessity of supplying
the Indians with the same goods as the French.
23 Cornelius Cuyler to Samuel Baker, 10 June 1731 and 20 May 1732, as quoted
in Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 112.
24 Eccles, "A Belated Review," 430.
25 Innis, Fur Trade in Canada, 389-90.
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tempting to read Great Britain’s revolutionary industrial achievements back into the
earlier half of the eighteenth century, during the period of the most intense AngloFrench rivalry for the North American fur trade, the French economy was still
growing as rapidly as the English, showing remarkable gains in manufacturing and
trade. Until mid-century, English and French industry alike remained essentially
"medieval" in character. Growth was characterized by an increasing concentration of
workers rather than by great strides in technological efficiency. Though certain
sectors of the British economy may have begun to outpace their French counterparts
as the century progressed, it is evident that the British did not achieve the industrial
prowess necessary to trounce their trading rivals with substantially cheaper, or better
made, manufactures until long after the French had relinquished their North American
empire.26
If the Canadians had a tangible economic interest in convincing their
government that better equipped and more efficient English-speaking traders were
poised to overrun the pays d ’en haut and hasten the collapse of their North American
empire, then the parallel assertions of New York imperialists were the product of
even murkier, byzantine political calculations. The most comprehensive and

26 James C. Riley, The Seven Years’ War and the Old Regime in France: The
Economic and Financial Toll (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 18, 2223, 35; Pierre Ldon, "Structure du commerce extdrieur et dvolution industrielle de la
France k la fin du XVIII6 sidcle," in Conjunctures iconomiques, structures sociales:
Hommage it Ernest Labrousse, edited by Fernand Braudel (Paris: Mouton, 1974),
407; Roger Price, The Economic Modernisation o f France, 1730-1880 (London:
Croom Helm, 1975), 92-93; Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse (eds.), Histoire
economique et sociale de la France (Paris: Presses universitaires de france, 1970), 2:
527.

influential Anglo-American statement on the myriad handicaps endured by the
Canadian fur traders came from the pen of Cadwallader Colden. As a respected
member of the New York Council and a trusted advisor of the new governor, William
Burnet, Colden was handed the task of drafting a memorandum to the Board of Trade
in response to a recent petition organized by a group of London merchants calling for
the reinstatement of the banned Albany-Montreal trade. Tensions were high in New
York in November 1724, when Colden began work on his draft of the Council report.
Four years after the official suspension of the Canada trade, a core of Albany
merchants were still ignoring Burnet’s interdiction and stubbornly buying Canadian
beaver, even though they risked being hauled into court and forced to swear an oath
to their innocence. Panicked London fur merchants, meanwhile, were vigorously
lobbying an ambivalent Board of Trade for disallowance of the controversial acts.
Colden had to present a convincing case to persuade the Board of Trade to
uphold Burnet’s ban on the longstanding and lucrative trade between Albany and
Montreal. Ironically, he did so by framing his argument to the imperial authorities in
the same terms so effectively employed by his counterparts at Quebec. By linking the
conduct of the fur trade with the future economic and military stability of the colony,
Colden developed an impressive geopolitical rationale for severing all trade contacts
with New France, a strategy, he claimed, that would virtually guarantee the collapse
of the French empire in North America. To begin with, Colden proposed that the
only manufactured goods suitable for the Indian trade were produced in Great Britian,
particularly stroud cloth, a few other woolens, and rum. Shipping their inferior
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goods to Quebec also proved far more hazardous for the French, who had to contend
with navigating the St. Lawrence River, "well known to be the most dangerous of any
in the world," during the few months in which it was not ice-bound. The difficulties
of transportation, combined with the inability of the French to supply the colony with
adequate goods to conduct a profitable Indian trade, rendered it necessary for the
Canadians to smuggle the bulk of their trade merchandise from Albany. To make
matters worse, he added, the agents of the "French Company" arbitrarily dictated the
selling price of all Canadian furs, ensuring that the traders could never offer a
competitive rate of exchange to their Indian customers. It logically followed,
therefore, that if the Albany merchants could be prevented from supplying their
Montreal contacts with essential trade merchandise, it would only be a matter of time
before the Canadian fur trade became insupportable.27
As propaganda contrived to discount the competitiveness of the Canadian fur
trade and stigmatize the Albany-Montreal trade as detrimental to the greater interests
of the British in North America, Colden’s arguments were a rhetorical tour de force.
Without any greater knowledge of its inner workings, concerned officials at Whitehall
would doubtless have been convinced that the Canadian fur trade was teetering on the
brink o f collapse, to be toppled only by the final shove provided by Burnet’s trade
restrictions. Colden’s statements, however, were rife with inaccuracies,
exaggerations, and miscalculations. Whether deliberate or simply the result of
inaccurate information, Colden’s misleading conclusions have unduly prejudiced

27 Colden, HFIN, 13-32, 33-57.
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perceptions of the Canadian fur trade. His political opponents in the debate over the
regulation of the Albany-Montreal trade easily picked holes in his assessment, yet
Colden’s authority on the subject has nonetheless been accepted wholeheartedly by
historians.28
Colden’s most enduring contribution to the myth of Anglo-American fur-trade
superiority was his declaration that access to Gloucestershire stroud cloth, above all,
dictated success or failure in the fur trade. Colden noted that it was impossible for
the French to obtain "genuine" strouds except from England, now that the Albany
trade had been restricted. "To put this out of all Controversy," he concluded,
we need only observe to your Excellency, That Strouds (without which no
considerable Trade can be carried on with the Indians) are sold at Albany for
10/. a Piece: They were sold at Monreal before this Act took Place, at 13/.
2s. 6d. and now they are sold there for 25/.: Which is an evident Proof, that
the French have not, in these four Years Time (during the Continuance of this
Act) found out any other Way to supply themselves with Strouds, and likewise
that they cannot trade without them, seeing they buy them at so extravagant a
Price.29
It is unclear how Colden obtained this price information, but it does not accord
with what is known about the export of English strouds to Canada during the years in

28 Jennings, for example, cribs from Colden on this issue: "Albany had a
superior source of trade goods," he echoes. "Certain of the preferred trade goods-especially the woollens called shrouds-were made only in England, English-made
goods were usually cheaper than the French, and the Hudson stayed navigable through
winters when ice blocked traffic on the St. Lawrence. English manufacture and
conditions of English transportation were so greatly superior to the French that
English traders could sell their goods at half the French price and still make twice the
French profit. This was the basic English advantage that the French could never
really overcome, no matter how brilliantly they administered their colonies."
Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 284.
29 Colden, HFIN, 22.
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which Albany goods were not readily available. Colden was correct in stating that
the French sought European sources for English strouds. Even before Burnet’s
restrictive trade legislation was introduced, the French government had attempted to
interest La Rochelle merchants in purchasing strouds for export to New France. In
1722, the Compagnie des Indes began to supply the colony with English woolens and
would continue to do so for the next decade. In the first year, 100 pieces (each
between 17 and 18 aunes in length) were sold in Canada at either 11 livres, 11 livres
10 sous, or 12 livres per aune. The following year the price was lowered to 10 livres
10 sous, dropping again in 1724 to 9 livres, and finally to 7 livres 10 sous in 1725, at
which level it remained until 1731.30 Contrary to Colden’s claims, the price of
strouds imported to Canada was steadily dropping at the time he was writing, not
doubling. But how did these prices compare to those in New York? If, as Colden
noted, the cost of a piece of stroud in Albany was roughly £10 New York currency,
the Canadians were spending roughly the same for the woolen cloth as their New
York neighbors during the years in which the Montreal-Albany trade was prohibited.
When the appropriate conversions are made to correct for differing units of
measurement and currencies, it appears that the French did not pay more than 15
percent extra for strouds in these years, hardly enough to run the Canadian traders out
of business. Colden would also have been dismayed to learn that in 1723,
Montrealers actually paid less for strouds than their Albany counterparts (Fig. 3.1).
Colden’s pride in English manufactures was commendable, but it appears to

30 Lunn, "Economic Development," 159-61.

126
have prevented him from recognizing that France had an equally flourishing woolen
industry, centered in Normandy, Picardy, and Champagne. As it continued to grow
throughout the eighteenth century, the production of wool cloth accounted for fully 20
percent of French industrial output.31 Though their attempts to imitate English
strouds-particularly the popular icarlatines, or scarlet variety—may have met with
mixed results, there was certainly no shortage of other high quality woolens suitable
for export to the colony, including molton, mazamet, and dourgne cloth. There was
clearly a constant Canadian demand for strouds throughout the eighteenth century, yet
certain contemporary observers remained unconvinced that the fur trade would wither
if deprived of Gloucestershire cloth. For their part, La Galissoni&re and Bdgon
supposed that the widespread assumption in Montreal merchant circles that the Indians
of the pays d ’en haut would tolerate only English woolens was perpetuated by
smugglers, who had an obvious interest in boosting sales of the wares they
"imported" from Albany. Furthermore, they added, if good quality and reasonably
priced French textiles were squeezing their English equivalents out of the Levant
market, there was no reason why they could not hold their own in North America as
well.32
Though it is evident from the disgruntled correspondence of New York
merchants that the famed English strouds and other woolens did not always live up to
their inflated reputation, it is unlikely that any definite conclusions concerning the

31 Riley, Seven Years’ War, 18-19.
32 La Galissonifere et Bdgon au ministre, 15 October 1748, AN, 0 lA, 91: 69-70.
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relative merits of English or French woolen cloth can ever be reached.33 Yet, even if
Indian consumers of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley did tend to favor stroud cloth
over French alternatives, it was always possible for Canadians traders to obtain
sufficient quantities of the English cloth at reasonable prices, whether imported from
Europe or smuggled from Albany.34
Dean Anderson’s examination of the ledgers of Montreal merchants reveals
that bulk cloth was the single most significant category of trade goods shipped to the
western Great Lakes, accounting for just over 29 percent of all merchandise
purchased for re-sale by Montreal merchant-outfitters. But stroud cloth, obviously,
accounted for only a portion of this total.35 By analyzing the itemized records of
trade goods exchanged at the French post at Niagara between 1729 and 1738, it is
possible to offer a more detailed picture of Indian expenditure on cloth.36 The
33 The Bakers informed Johnson that it was difficult for them to ensure the quality
of the strouds they shipped to New York: "the Strouds we have bought we hope will
prove as good as those sent you last Spring, but not at all Cheaper," they admitted.
"We cannot be exact as to the quality or price till they come from Dying, which must
be some time. . . . " Samuel and William Baker to Johnson, 22 January 1750. WJP,
1: 259. Johnson had too much experience with substandard English woolens to share
in Colden’s Anglocentric boosterism. Ordering imitations of French blankets,
Johnson advised his agent that he hoped the next shipment would be an improvement
over the last, which had included poorly dyed and woven items. Johnson to William
Baker, 24 December 1752. WJP, 1: 384.
34 Eccles, "A Belated Review," 433-34.
35 Dean Lloyd Anderson, "Documentary and Archaeological Perspectives on
European Trade Goods in the Western Great Lakes Region," (Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University, 1992), Table
30, 143.
36 "Etat des effets vendOs &Niagara depuis le deux May 1729 jusqu'au dernier
Juin 1738," AN, C*lA, 73: 310-12.
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Niagara figures happen to accord almost exactly with Anderson’s findings in terms of
the relative proportion of bulk textiles traded. Approximately 28 percent of the
trading income at Niagara was derived from the sale of linen, cotton, and woolen
fabric. Warm woolens such as molton, mazamet, dourgne, and strouds were clearly
the most popular of these, making up about 77 percent of the value of all textiles and
nearly 22 percent of the total worth of all goods exchanged at the post. In terms of
the sheer volume traded, strouds comprised only a quarter of all bulk textiles, though
they accounted for nearly half (46.5 percent) of the income from cloth due to their
relatively high cost (Fig. 3.2). Overall, the exchange of stroud cloth accounted for
roughly 13 percent of the gross profits at Niagara during the 1730s (Fig. 3.3).37
Selling for upwards of $30 per yard in 1995 U.S. dollars, stroud was a costly
item which would have been traded in relatively small amounts.38 Textiles, including

37 Anderson’s work demonstrates that the proportion of bulk cloth in the total
assortment of trade merchandise could vary significantly from post to post in the
western Great Lakes, depending largely on the needs and demands of the Indian
consumers at various times and in different regions. The relative proportion of bulk
textiles sold at Niagara in the 1730s, however, matches Anderson’s aggregate total so
closely that the sale of stroud cloth at Niagara is probably reflective of overall trends
in consumption throughout the West. Dean Anderson, "Merchandise for the Pays
d ’en Haut: 18th Century Trade Goods and Indian Peoples of the Upper Great Lakes,"
Paper presented at the Canadian Archaeological Association Annual Meeting, April
24th-27th, 1986, Toronto, Ontario. Similarly, Johnson predicted that strouds would
account for about 14 percent of the value of all merchandise sold in his Northern
Indian Department in the mid-1760s. Johnson, "A Scheme for Meeting Expenses of
Trade," WJP, 4: 559.
38 Based on the average cost of stroud cloth sold by Monfere in 1735 (Table 3.1).
The final cost in the pays d ’en haut could have been significantly higher. See John J.
McCusker, How Much Is That in Real Money? A Historical Price Index fo r Use as a
Deflator o f Money Values in the Economy o f the United States (Worcester: American
Antiquarian Society, 1992).
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finished blankets, clothing, and bulk fabrics, were clearly perennial staples of the
Canadian fur trader’s assortment of goods. Though he exaggerated for effect, Colden
was on the right track in claiming that "the most considerable and most valuable Part
of their Cargo consists in Strouds, Duffils, Blankets, and other Woolens."39
Considering the relatively limited profits derived from the sale of strouds alone at
Niagara, however, Colden appears to have vastly overestimated their importance in
the Canadian trade. The French easily supplied the majority of necessary textiles
from their own domestic sources. Even with access to strouds completely restricted—
a feat which the New Yorkers could never achieve-it is unlikely that the French
trading system would have buckled.40 What Colden neglected to mention was that
Indian consumers in the pays d ’en haut craved a wide variety of non-woolen
merchandise as well, including gunpowder, shot, kettles, awls, axes, knives,
vermilion, mirrors, and an array of clothing items. If La Galissoni&re and Bdgon are
to be believed, they would hardly have refused proffered French woolens, particularly
as the snow began to fall.

39 Colden, HFIN, 42.
40 The marchands-voyageurs who purchased smuggled strouds in Montreal may
actually have wielded a certain advantage over New York traders. The duties levied
on all trade goods in New York after 1726 included a tax of either 15 or 30 shillings
per piece of stroud, depending on its destination. "There is reason to think," Colden
acknowledged, "that all the strouds sent to Canada, are exempted from this duty,
whereby the French gain a great advantage over the English fair Traders, for those
goods sold to Frenchmen are not subjected to the duty, whereby the French are
enabled to sell the goods which they buy at Albany cheaper to the Indians, than the
English can do at Oswego." Colden to Governor Clinton, 8 August 1751, NYCD, 6:
740-41.
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"Generally, all the goods used in the Indian trade, except Gun-Powder and a
few trinkets," Colden trumpeted, "are sold at Montreal for twice their Value at
Albany."41 As a result of the New Yorker’s dubious brand of salesmanship, the
assumption of overpriced Canadian trade merchandise has been deeply embedded in
the historiography of Anglo-French fur-trade rivalry. Characteristically, Eccles was
the first to chip away at this shibboleth, arguing that it defied both the facts and
common sense. "That the prices of such goods in both colonies were approximately
the same should occasion no surprise," he quipped. "There is no discernible reason
why they should not be."42 Eccles’s suspicions were, he was the Erst to admit, based
more on qualitative evidence than a rigorous analysis of Canadian and AngloAmerican trade-good prices.43 Yet, given the rough parity of English and French
industrial and manufacturing capacities and an equally risky and expensive
transatlantic passage, it is certainly conceivable that a kettle, a knife, or a pound of
vermilion would have cost roughly as much in Montreal as in Albany or Philadelphia.
It has been tempting for scholars to accept Colden at his word on the relative
cost of English and French merchandise in large part because it is so difficult to
answer this question with absolute certainty. The documentary evidence is slim, with
only a handful of Montreal, Albany, and Philadelphia account books having survived

41 Colden, HFIN, 42.
42 Eccles, "A Belated Review," 435.
43 Nonetheless, Eccles has called repeatedly for a comprehensive analysis of
English and French trade-good prices. See "A Belated Review," 435; France in
America, llOn.
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the ravages of time. Those that do remain offer only a glimpse at market conditions
over brief periods, detailing the prices of only a few of the many types of goods that
exchanged hands in the fur trade. Above all, the proverbial "apples and oranges"
scenario poses the most overwhelming difficulty for credible comparison. Lacking
the physical evidence to compare such intangibles as size, shape, quality, appearance,
durability, and effectiveness--the qualities by which all trade merchandise was
scrupulously judged in the pays d ’en haut—it is impossible to determine precisely
whether individual French or English articles were ultimately the better bargain. An
analysis based solely on price offers some clue, but admittedly not the complete
answer. Certainly cost was often a deciding factor in the continuing process of
exchange and use, but this determination clearly was-as it is today-infinitely variable
by time, location, and the particular needs and tastes of the consumer. A French
blanket may have cost less than its English equivalent, but might also have thinned
and fallen apart more quickly. New York rum that cost half as much French brandy
might have been equally intoxicating, yet could also have been adulterated with riveror trader-water. The true measure of the relative value of the array of English and
French manufactures which traded hands in the eighteenth century fur trade was
subjectively determined by the consumer and thus remains unquantifiable.
Nonetheless, it is still possible to offer some insight into the cost of rival trade goods
at Montreal, Albany, Philadelphia, and points beyond.
Though individual entries in the tattered pages of merchant accounts offer only
snapshots of unseen goods at fixed moments in time, when carefully compared and fit
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into the broader context of qualitative evidence they have the potential to offer some
interesting and often startling implications for the debate over Anglo-American
mercantile superiority. In fact, the bulk of the extant price evidence detailed in the
ledgers and correspondence of Montreal, Albany, and Philadelphia merchants tends to
confirm what Eccles has perennially professed: that during the years of most intense
trade rivalry in North America, trade goods in Montreal cost roughly what they did in
Albany and Philadelphia.

The early months of 1735 proved busy for Alexis Lemoine Monibre of
Montreal and Hendrick Van Rensselaer of Schenectady. England and France were at
peace and both merchants profited from a flourishing trade with the Indians of the
pays d ’en haut. As the days grew longer and the snow began to melt, Monibre
hurried to assemble canoe-loads of merchandise for voyageurs headed west to the
distant post at Michipicoton on the north shore of Lake Superior. Van Rensselaer,
taking advantage of the recently revoked Albany trading monopoly, passed his hectic
spring days haggling with traders over the price of the textiles, hardware, and spirits
they needed for a successful summer of barter in the shadow of the new fort at
Oswego. As they packed and sold bolts of woolen cloth, sets of nested kettles, and
twists of tobacco, both merchants carefully itemized the cost and amount of each
item, duly noting the sum their customers would owe them when they returned, laden
with furs and skins, at the end of the summer, or, in Monfere’s case, the following
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year,44
Of the wide array of trade merchandise sold by Moni&re and Van Rensselaer
in 1735, more than two dozen items can be matched for comparison, from awls to
wine (Table 3.1, Columns I-II). To facilitate this comparison, a mean price based on
the relative quantity of each sub-type was determined for each category of item listed
in Table 1. For instance, Monidre sold a variety of different styles of knives, from
small clasp knives to large butcher knives, duly noting the different price of each.
Van Rensselaer, by contrast, did not always refer so precisely to the type or size of
each item. Thus, the mean price calculated for Monifere’s "couteaux" does not
necessarily reflect the cost of a specific type of knife, but is rather suggestive of a
price range in which most of his knives fell. The same holds true for all other items
variegated by price, size, or style, including axes, blankets, combs, guns, linen,
mirrors, shirts, stockings, and wine.
The prices are also presented in terms of the quantities in which these items
were typically sold by both merchants. The systems of weights and measures
employed by Monidre and Van Rensselaer were parallel, yet not identical. The
appropriate conversions have thus been made, and, for the sake of uniformity, the

44 For Monidre’s 1735 accounts see "Journal #3, Monidre, 1731-1737, Ventes:
crddit et ddbit," M848, vol. 4 [microfilm reel 2], MMR. Van Rensselaer’s ledgers
are also available on microfilm: see the "Account Book of Hendrick (Henry) Van
Rensselaer," in the collection of the New-York Historical Society, Miscellaneous
Manuscripts, reel 63.
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final prices listed have been calculated in terms of the more familiar English units.45
Finally, all prices were converted from French livres and pounds New York currency
to pounds sterling at the rate of exchange current in 1735.4(5
The results of these calculations would undoubtedly have confounded Colden,
for they clearly suggest that, with a few noteworthy exceptions, Monidre sold his
goods for the same, if not lower, price than his counterpart in Schenectady. (Figs.
3.4a,b,c). The Montrealer clearly had an advantage in the sale of awls, gunflints,
gunpowder, trade guns, lead and ready-made shot, shirts, thread, vermilion, wine,
and various essential foodstuffs necessary for provisioning the paddlers, including
bacon, Indian com, and pease. Other items such as blankets, brass kettles, linen,
"Jesuit" rings, glass beads, and tobacco were virtually identical in cost to Van
Rensselaer’s merchandise. In the case of knives, combs, mirrors, and stockings, the
Montreal prices are so much lower than their Schenectady equivalents that the
discrepancy is almost certainly due to a substantial difference in the quality or style of
the items being compared. Monifcre, for example, may have dealt primarily in
smaller, cheaper knives, and Van Rensselaer possibly stocked larger, costlier mirrors
in more elaborate leather frames or cases. Conversely, the same phenomenon may

45 An invaluable and comprehensive source for eighteenth-century weights and
measures is Lester A. Ross, Archaeological Metrology: English, French, American
and Canadian Systems o f Weights and Measures fo r North American Historical
Archaeology, History and Archaeology Series, Number 68 (Ottawa: Parks Canada,
1983).
46 All currency conversions have been calculated at the annual rates of exchange
in John J. McCusker’s, Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1775
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978).
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apply to Van Rensselaer’s apparently cheaper axe blades, which may have been more
modest than Monifcre’s hefty haches de service. For the most part, however, the
Montreal and Schenectady prices are similar enough to suggest that the quality, style,
and size of most of the items were essentially comparable.
Van Rensselaer appears to have had a decisive advantage in the sale of only
two items: rum and strouds. That Albany and Schenectady merchants should have
procured cheap rum is not surprising, considering New York’s burgeoning role in
provisioning the sugar plantations of the Caribbean. Reaping the benefits of
"triangular" trade with the British West Indies, New Yorkers distilled increasingly
large quantities of rum from imported molasses. Though less palatable than the
preferred West Indian potable, domestic American rum possessed the potent
advantage of cheapness.47 Similarly, the fact that stroud cloth cost somewhat more in
Montreal was not so much a testament to British manufacturing prowess as a
reflection of the higher transportation costs involved in shipping strouds to New
France via Europe or smuggling them from Albany in the canoes of Caughnawaga
Mohawks. Interestingly, it appears from the surviving accounts of New Yorkers who
traded with Canada that Montreal smugglers typically restricted their Albany

47 John J. McCusker, Rum and the American Revolution: The Rum Trade and the
Balance o f Payments o f the Thirteen Continental Colonies (New York: Garland
Publishing, 1989), 1: 469-70. John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The
Economy o f British America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1985), 289-90.
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purchases to strouds and wampum.4® In fact, Golden’s perception of the importance
of stroud cloth in the Canadian fur trade may well have been skewed by his
observation that woolens figured so prominently in the shipments of Albany merchants
bound for Montreal. This detail merely confirms, however, what an examination of
the account books of Moni&re and Van Rensselaer suggests: that Montrealers could
readily obtain the vast majority of necessary trade goods at competitive prices from
their own French suppliers.
But if cheaper and arguably superior English strouds had a ready market in
Montreal, why did Canadian merchants pass up the opportunity to smuggle
inexpensive rum from Albany? It would have been no mean feat for Caughnawaga
paddlers to spirit heavy, awkward kegs past vigilant French patrols along Lake
Champlain; yet if Canadians had truly coveted New York rum, the resourceful
contrabandiers would undoubtedly have made the attempt. A likelier explanation for
their forgoing the challenge has to do more with delectation than detection: the

48 The most important extant record of the Albany-Montreal trade is the
Letterbook of Robert Sanders (1752-1758) in the collection of the New-York
Historical Society [Miscellaneous Microfilms, Reel #3], Sanders dispatched a large
amount of wampum and some strouds to Canada, but little else. Similarly, Norton
admits that on the whole, strouds and wampum were essentially the only commodities
smuggled northward. Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 126. For a
discussion of the importance of New York wampum, see Norton, Ibid., 89-91. In a
telling use of synecdoche, Albany merchants habitually referred to the commerce with
Montreal as the "stroud trade." Commenting on the recent restriction of the Canadian
commerce to his father, Philip Livingston speculated that only an oath could prevent
the "Angry Stroud Company" from sending "what strouds they please" to Canada.
Philip Livingston to Robert Livingston, 20 February 1721, quoted in Lawrence H.
Leder, Robert Livingston, 1654-1728, and the Politics o f Colonial New York (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 253.
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French, as well as their Indian trading partners, simply preferred the pricier and more
palatable eau de vie or brandy.
A spirited debate over the relative merits of brandy and rum has raged since
the eighteenth century.49 Canadian officials boasted that the Indians preferred eau de
vie, though this claim may have been at least partly colored by their desire to see the
restrictions on its sale lifted.50 More suggestive, perhaps, is the fact that Hudson’s
Bay Company traders to the north found it difficult to convert their Indian customers
into rum drinkers because they had already cultivated a taste for the costlier brandy
dispensed by rival French traders. The English could never consistently obtain
adequate supplies of the French product which, in 1735, was also more than three

49 Proponents of a disconcerting "drunken Indian" school of interpretation
generally admitted the superiority of French brandy, though failed to agree on the
reason: "It can be doubted that the savage had a sufficiently sophisticated palate to be
influenced by the subtleties of taste," Lunn suggested, "but since he drank to get
drunk he doubtless soon discovered the greater potency and the more rapid effects of
brandy." Lunn, "Economic Development," 170. Conversely, Francis Parkman
admitted that the Indians "liked the taste of French brandy mor& than than of English
rum; yet as their chief object in drinking was to get drunk, and as rum would
supply as much intoxication as brandy at a lower price, it always found favor in their
eyes." Parkman, France and England in North America, 2: 520. Eccles has long
been the champion of eau de vie, however, and has rarely referred to English rum
sans the acid adjectival adjunct "rot-gut." "Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century
Imperialism," 349-50; France in America, llOn. Eccles is, perhaps, the most
reliable modem witness, having had ample opportunity to savor both varieties at first
hand. Personal communication, 14 October 1994.
50 For example, see Vaudreuil et B6gon au ministre, 20 September 1714, AN,
4, 34: 236. Lobbying for the lifting of the ban on the sale of eau de vie at the
posts, the governor and intendant warned that the Indians were increasingly taking
their trade to the English, who provided ample amounts of alcohol. Since the Indians
were well aware of the superiority of the French libation, they claimed, it would be
an easy matter to lure them back should brandy be re-introduced in the trade.
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times as expensive as rum. Despite the marked difference in price, however, the Bay
traders were reduced to fiddling with a dubious gin-like distillation to make it appear
more like brandy.51 That they retained their preference for French spirits, even when
presented with a substantially cheaper alternative, suggests that Indian tipplers could
and did distinguish between cheap hooch and the genuine article. Whether they were
always willing to pay a higher price for the French libation must ultimately have
depended—as did the exchange relationship itself-on the exigencies of personal
preference, availability, local competition, and the irresistibility of any one particular
item in the total complement of goods exchanged. It is worth noting, though, that
while French and American rum was readily available in New France by the middle
years of the eighteenth century, the Canadians consumed most of it themselves,
saving brandy almost exclusively for the Indian trade.52 That the Canadians chose to
"export" a relatively expensive liquor to the pays d'en haut, despite the availability of
other less costly varieties, suggests that there was a perenially eager and wellcultivated market for French brandy in the Great Lakes-Ohio Valley region.
A comparison of the prices of various trade goods drawn from the accounts of
two merchants in a single year does not conclusively disprove the longstanding

51 In 1735, the HBC paid 2s. 3d. per gallon for rum, 7s. 6d. for brandy, and 2s.
for "clove water," a type of raw gin, also known as "English brandy." The Bay
traders first used a tincture, then molasses, to color their "brandy" to ressemble
authentic French version. E. E. Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company,
1670-1870 (New York: Macmillan, 1961), 1: 544-45.
52 Rum from the French West Indies was available as early as the 1680s, and by
the 1740s was consumed in Canada in large quantities. McCusker, Rum and the
American Revolution, 1: 52In.
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assumption that New Yorkers possessed a strong material advantage over their
Montreal rivals throughout the lengthy course of the eighteenth-century fur trade.
Considering the relatively closed and competitive nature of both the Montreal and
Albany fur markets, it is highly unlikely that the prices quoted by Monifere or Van
Rensselaer diverged much from the norm. But did the conditions of price competition
as witnessed in 1735 extend beyond that particular year? Without a more complete
series of prices for a wide variety of goods~an undertaking severely limited by the
uneven nature of the sources-it is only possible to offer some tentative judgments
based on the most readily available evidence.
Data extracted from Monifere* s accounts allow a year-by-year reconstruction of
the movement of the prices of a wide range of trade items through the 1730s and
1740s. The price curves for virtually all items sold by Monifere share a similar
trajectory: holding relatively steady through the 1730s, prices began to rise rapidly
beginning in 1744, before levelling off, and finally dropping again in the late 1740s
(Fig. 3.5). The curves of the handful o f goods illustrated in Figure 3.5 match the
curve of the standard bfenfefice, or retail mark-up rate, charged by Monifere and his
associates during the same period (Chapter 1, Fig. 1.2). This correspondence
suggests that rising bfenfefice levels were largely responsible for the increased cost of
goods sold in Montreal for the western trade. The reason for the sudden hike in
bfenfefice rates is no mystery. Wartime shortages precipitated by the harassment of
French shipping, culminating in the capture of Louisbourg, the bustling Cape Breton
commercial entrepdt, by an Anglo-American force in 1747, severely disrupted the
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normal pattern of French transatlantic shipping to Canada.53 The sudden and acute
dearth of trade merchandise was quickly translated into higher rates of mark-up by
Quebec importers, in turn boosting the prices charged by Montreal merchantoutfitters.
Though the sudden increase in trade-good prices cut deeply into trader profits
during these years, the repercussions of this rapid inflation were relatively limited.54
After the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed in 1748, French shipping quickly
returned to normal pre-war levels, and continued to expand over the next decade.55
With the outbreak of Anglo-French hostilities in the mid-1750s, French merchantmen
once again began to fall prey to the Royal Navy and privateers. The British blockade
of French channel ports and prohibitively high commercial insurance rates compelled
many French merchants to abandon the Canada trade, though the quantity of
merchandise leaving French ports appears to have increased until the final stages of
the Seven Years’ War.55
53 "The war between France and England declared on 15 March 1744," Miquelon
notes, "transformed the orderly trade of the Atlantic into a lottery." Dale Miquelon,
Dugard o f Rouen: French Trade to Canada and the West Indies, 1729-1770 (Montreal
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1978), 119.
54 Michilimackinac’s commander reported in 1749 that the post was so flooded
with trade merchandise that the traders were forced to sell at a loss. Brandy and
tobacco, he noted, were particularly cheap that year. Jonquifere h ministre, 20
September 1749, AN, <f}A, 93: 101-2.
55 See Table 3, "Merchantment Sailing Between La Rochelle and New France,
1748-1759," in Gilles Proulx, Between France and New France: Life Aboard the Tall
Sailing Ships (Toronto and Charlottetown: Dundum Press, 1984), 26.
56 J. F. Bosher, "Success and Failure in Trade to New France, 1660-1760,"
French Historical Studies (1988), 15(3): 447-48.
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Notwithstanding the wartime aberrations of the late 1740s and late 1750s, it
appears that, on the whole, the prices of Canadian trade goods remained relatively
constant throughout the eighteenth century. When the prices of selected goods sold in
Schenectady are compared with their Montreal equivalents during this period, it
appears that New York prices also tended to remain relatively constant, though they,
too, were not immune to the fluctuations associated with normal shifts in the levels of
supply and demand (Figs. 3.6a,b,c,d).57 Over time, as Montreal prices dropped and
New York prices rose, the gap between the prices of various goods might narrow
considerably. Though far from comprehensive, when interpreted in the context of
contemporary accounts of Anglo-French competition, the data suggest that the detailed
1735 price comparisons are at least indicative of general trends in the relative cost of
goods in New York and Montreal, a pattern which was skewed only briefly during the
isolated wartime shortages characteristic of the late 1740s.
Unfortunately, no trading records detailing the rates of exchange of peltry and

"Even if the traffic did remain relatively similar in wartime as in peacetime," Proulx
writes, "the same did not apply to the quantity of merchandise transported." Between
1755 and 1760 the gross volume of trade between France and Canada rose
dramatically. Proulx, Between France and New France, 28. This apparent growth
may not have reflected a boom in private commerce, as much as an increase in
government shipments of materiel. Jacques Mathieu, Le commerce entre la nouvellefrance et les antilles au XVHT stecle (Montreal: Fides, 1981), 148.
57 Sources for New York trade-good prices before the 1750s are frustratingly
scarce and incomplete. The scattered prices (indicated in figs. 3.6a,b,c,d) for the
1730s and 1740s have been culled from the "Account Book of Hendrick Van
Renselaer," New-York Historical Society, Miscellaneous Manuscripts [Microfilm reel
#63]; the Letterbook of Robert and John Sanders, 1742-43, NYHS, Misc. MSS [Reel
#3]; and WJP, 1: passim.
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merchandise at Oswego are presently available. It is only possible to speculate as to
the cost of English goods on Lake Ontario after the fort’s completion in 1727.
Contemporary accounts set the costs of round-trip transportation between Albany and
Oswego at around 15 percent.58 A direct, albeit artificial, comparison between the
known cost of trade items at Niagara in 1735 (Table 3.1, Column III) can be
accomplished by arbitrarily increasing the cost of all merchandise sold by Van
Rensselaer in that year by 15 percent (Table 3.1, Column IV). Even taking into
account the fact that the Niagara prices represent the final retail price of goods traded
to Indian customers, while the Oswego prices represent only estimates o f their base
"wholesale" cost, before the addition of goverment duties or final trader markup, it
appears that certain French goods-including bacon, combs, com, gunpowder, trade
guns, knives, lead and shot, shirts, stockings, stroud, thread, and vermilion-actually
cost less at Niagara than they did at Oswego (Figs. 3.4a,b,c). A variety o f other
items, such as awls, axes, blankets, glass beads, kettles, linen, mirrors, pease,
pepper, rings, tobacco, and wine, cost the same (or only slightly more) retail at
Niagara than they did wholesale at Oswego.
In fact, the only item which was considerably more expensive at Niagara
appears to have been brandy, and much of this difference might have been eroded by
the inevitably exorbitant markup on alcohol at Oswego. Again, some o f the
discrepancies in price may be the result of significant differences in the type or
quality of certain items. The price differential in stroud cloth, however, is

58 See Chapter 2, note 37.
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particularly noteworthy because it suggests the official manipulation of prices at the
King’s post to effectively meet potential Anglo-American competition. The cost of a
piece of stroud at Niagara was substantially lower than in Montreal that year,
indicating that the cloth was being sold, if not at a loss, then without the standard
margin of profit to be expected on the retail sale of this item. This is also the case
with axes and com. The discrepancies between the Montreal cost and sale price at
Niagara suggest that before the post was privately leased in 1742, the Canadian
government subsidized the sale of certain attractive trade essentials, passing the
savings on to the Indian consumer in an effort to preserve their commerce and loyalty
in the face of trade competition from the eastern end of Lake Ontario. Without a
comprehensive set of price data from Oswego during these years, it is impossible to
determine with any certainty whether Niagara prices were competitive across the
board with those at Oswego. It seems likely, however, that given the intervention of
the Canadian government in the sale of merchandise before the early 1740s, the
Oswego traders would have been hard-pressed to consistently beat the prices offered
by their French rivals at Niagara.59

59 A decade after the privatization of the Niagara post, Oswego traders
complained that their business was being siphoned off by the French at the western
end of Lake Ontario. "Your favour I recd. Yesterday together with the Goods Sent
me by Johne," wrote Thomas Butler to William Johnson. "But I fear they are come
to a bad Markett. We have had but one Atowawa Cannoe here this year. What
hinders their Coming I cant lem — but that the new French Fort at Nigra will stop
much of this Trade is Certain. As they have all Sorts of Goods & have orders from
the Govr. o f Cannada to Sell Cheap." Thomas Butler to Johnson, 29 May 1751,
WJP, 1: 338. Similarly, the Iroquois customers who traded regularly at Oswego
remarked to Governor George Clinton in 1744 that "the first Two years after that
Trading House was settled Goods were sold cheap & it was a pleasure to Trade there,

Admittedly, Niagara-not to mention Detroit and Michilimackinac—was
considerably further from Montreal than Oswego was from Albany. Colden was on
firmer factual ground in claiming that the Canadian traders were faced with greater
logistical problems arising from long trade-route distances, but once again he overshot
his mark. In 1724, the English had not yet established a permanent presence on the
Great Lakes, and the vast majority of furs exported from New York came either from
Montreal, the neighboring Iroquois nations, or the occasional ’’far Indians" who came
to Albany to trade. Before the establishment of Oswego, there was no parallel
between the activities of the Canadian traders, who paddled hundreds of miles to the
posts of the western Great Lakes where they effectively avoided all English
competition, and the traders at Albany, who were content to passively gather
whatever peltry drifted down the Mohawk River or Lake Champlain.60 Inevitably, the
expenses incurred by Montreal merchants shipping goods to Detroit, Michilimackinac,
or Green Bay clearly exceeded those of their Albany counterparts, yet the French
were at no such disadvantage when they encountered growing English competition
closer to home. Colden’s contention that it took the Canadians 20 to 40 days to
journey the 180 miles from Montreal to the post at Fort Frontenac (present-day
Kingston) is absurd.61 Canadian paddlers could easily move goods upriver from
but they have since been sold so dear that they do not now think that Place any
Advantage to them." Wraxall, AIA, 234.
60 See Wien’s discussion of the significance of Canadian "monopoly trading
zones," in "Selling Beaver Skins," 316.
61 Colden, HFIN, 41. By contrast, Adair noted that it took the French "anything
from twenty to forty days" (apparently a popular time-frame for French paddlers) to
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Montreal to Frontenac in twelve to fifteen days, and make the return trip in only four
or five.62 And, with a freightage rate of roughly twelve percent of the value of the
merchandise, the cost of transporting goods to Fort Frontenac was comparable, if not
lower, than that incurred by the Oswego traders.63
Colden’s connection between the higher price of French trade goods and the
pattern of transatlantic shipping must also be discounted as his own invention. Noting
that French ships made only a single trip to Quebec during the summer months, while
both a summer and winter voyage was possible from the port of New York, Colden
inexplicably leaped to the conclusion that "it is not in the power of the French to
import any Goods near so cheap to Canada, as they are imported to New-York.1,64
Since it is clear that, barring disruptions to shipping during wartime, New France
received all the supplies and trade merchandise necessary for the entire year in its

travel from Montreal to Niagara, at the opposite end of Lake
Ontario. Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry," 156.
62 Richard A. Preston and Leopold Lamontagne (eds.), Royal Fort Frontenac
(Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1958), 66.
63 During 1725 and 1726, the Canadian government shipped 12,219 livres worth
of supplies from Montreal to Fort Frontenac for the construction of two barques. The
freightage rate between the town and the Cote de Chine was 6 livres per 1,000
pounds of cargo, and 50 livres per 1,000 pounds from the C6te de Chine to Fort
Frontenac. The total cost of tranporting these goods amounted to 1,484 livres, or
12.15 percent of their value. The cost o f supplying trade merchandise and supplies to
the post would undoubtedly have been comparable. See the "Extrait de ce qui a dt6
delivrfe des Magazins du Roy k Montreal et du fort frontenac k l’occasion et pour la
Construction et Armement des deux barques qui ont etfes faittes au d. fort pour Le
Service de sa Majestd depuis le Sept may Mil sept cent vingt Cinq, jusques au dix
aoust 1726," Montreal, 26 January 1730. AN, C"A , 53: 33-37.
64 Colden, HFIN, 21-22.
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summer cargoes, it is unclear how Canadian prices might have been adversely
affected by the colony’s characteristic pattern of shipping. The Canadian fur trade
clearly suffered the ill effects of interrupted transatlantic shipping during the 1740s
and 1750s. Without the harassment of the Royal Navy, however, the French had to
contend only with occasional losses from shipwreck and the tedium of a long, quiet
winter. Colden was correct to note the inherent dangers of the final passage up the
St. Lawrence faced by all merchantmen bound for Canada, but this was just another
of the many difficulies of Canadian life which its colonists resolutely overcame. As
hostile English fleets would discover, the St. Lawrence passage was fraught with
various riverine perils, including reefs, islands, and sand bars. The journey from the
Gulf of St. Lawrence to the cliffs of Quebec typically took ten or twelve days, with
ships dropping anchor each evening. French pilots had, of necessity, become familiar
with the hazards of the route in the seventeenth century, and while Colden penned his
"memorial," the Canadians were undertaking the first systematic exploration of the St.
Lawrence under the authority of the Quebec harbormaster. By this time, French
merchants could rely on professional Canadian pilots to guide their ships safely to
their inland destination. Though shipwrecks were not unknown, the hazards of the St.
Lawrence route were routinely bypassed in the course of trade between France and
the colony. Contrary to Colden’s claim, the river was a lifeline, not an impediment,
to the Canadian fur trade.65
"We now enjoy the most favourable Time, that at any time can be hoped for,

65 Proulx, Between France and New France, 76-80.
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in order to extend the British Commerce in North-America," Colden proposed, "while
the French not only labour under the Difficulties which I have shown to be
inseparable from the Situation of their Colony, but likewise under another
Disadvantage, . . . by the Furr-Trade of Canada being restrained to one Company."66
Of all the evidence he cited to demonstrate the inherent fragility of the Canadian fur
trade, Colden’s assessment of the Canadian fur market was most faithful to the facts.
Because the Compagnie des Indes was required to pay "heavy duties" in France, he
noted, it was in the monopolists’ interest to keep Canadian beaver prices artificially
low. While the merchants of Albany could offer 5 shillings, New York currency or 3
shillings sterling for a pound of beaver, the Canadian company paid only 2 livres, or
18 pence sterling, per pound. "Therefore it plainly follows," he crowed, "that our
Indian traders could undersell the French Traders, tho’ they were to give as great a
Price for European Goods as the French do."67
It is true that, in 1724, the company did pay only 2 livres per pound (or
slightly less, in fact, when the difference in English and French weights is
considered), yet this price applied only to the less valuable castor sec, or parchment
beaver. The company paid double that sum for coat beaver, the castor gras most
prized by French hatters. Coat beaver, in fact, was actually worth slightly more per

66 Colden, HFIN, 54-55.
67 Colden, HFIN, 55.
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pound in Montreal than in New York, according to the price Colden quoted.68 In
1724, albeit an atypical year, significantly more castor gras than sec was imported at
La Rochelle. Over the entire period between 1718 and 1761, approximately 63.7
percent of the value of all beaver received at La Rochelle was comprised of sec,
while 36.3 percent was gras.69 Colden may have been correct in asserting that the
bulk of Canadian beaver was purchased in Canada at a lower rate than was offered in
Albany, though he overemphasized the extent of the difference by ignoring the
significant difference in price between parchment beaver and the more valuable castor
gras. The fact that Albany merchants tended to accept most grades of beaver at a
uniform price would have encouraged Montreal smugglers to dump their less valuable
pelts on the New York market, while dutifully bringing their remaining gras to the
Company. Content with Canadian cast-offs, most New Yorkers, Colden included,
appear not to have fully grasped the complexities of the rival beaver trade nor
understood the limitations of the monopoly company, which had authority only over
the marketing of beaver.
Beaver prices extracted from Montreal and Albany sources for 1735 and 1754

68 For 1724 beaver prices see Lunn, "Economic Development," 459. The price
of 4 livres per French pound in Canada would have been equivalent to 3.7075 livres
per English pound in Albany. At the rate of exchange current in 1724, the price for
one English pound of castor gras was £ 0.1564 sterling (nearly 3s. 2d.),
approximately 4 percent more than Colden’s stated New York price of £ 0.15 sterling
(or 3s.).
69 In 1724, the Archives de la Chambre de commerce in La Rochelle recorded the
arrival of castor sec valued at 77,550 livres, and 97,875 livres worth of castor gras.
The proportion of sec to gras over the whole period was calculated from the import
records in Lunn, "Economic Development," 464-65.
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corroborate Colden’s contention that New Yorkers paid higher prices for beaver than
the monopoly company, but the differences were not necessarily as great as he
claimed (Table 3.2, Fig. 3.7).70 Though the price of parchment beaver in Albany was
twice that in Montreal in 1735, New York merchants paid only about 17 percent more
for coat beaver, a difference hardly worth the cost and risk of sending those pelts
southward. In 1754, when coat and parchment beaver were accepted at the same rate
by the Compagnie des Indes, the price difference favored the New Yorkers by some
40 percent. Though of small consolation, perhaps, to Montreal merchants, the
Canadian beaver company at least offered the assurance of relatively stable beaver
prices, while the New York rates could rise and fall unpredictably in response to
shifting conditions on the local or London fur markets.71 Occasionally, the price of

70 Montreal beaver prices for 1735 are cited in Thomas Wien, "Castor, peaux, et
pelleteries dans le commerce canadien des fourrures, 1720-1790," in "Le Castor Fait
Tout": Selected Papers o f the Fifth North American Fur Trade Conference, 1985,
edited by Bruce Trigger, Toby Morantz, and Louise Dechfine (Montreal: Lake St.
Louis Historical Society, 1987), 91; Schenectady prices are taken from the "Account
Book of Hendrick (Henry) Van Rensselaer," New York Historical Society,
Miscellaneous Manuscripts [Microfilm reel #63]. The source for Montreal beaver
prices in 1754 is H. A. Innis, The Fur-Trade o f Canada (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1927), 153; Albany/Schenectady prices were extracted from the "Letterbook
of Robert Sanders, 1752-58, NYHS, Misc. MSS. [reel #3], and the "Letterbook of
John Sanders, 1749-73," NYHS, Misc. MSS., [reel #3].
71 "Our Markets for Furs we think are like to Continue much as of late," wrote
London factors Samuel and William Baker to Johnson in July 1750. "Now & then
some particular sorts rise & others fall, according as the Quantity of each sort
happens to be more or less on the Importation, sometimes also fashion alters, but in
general Furs find a pretty good Demand— Beavor is by no means so certain a
Commodity, But we dont see any Reason to fear its falling for some time, the last
price was 4/6 per 11. If yours proves good we will try to make more of it, this is
what we reckon here a very good price, & in a Course of great many years we have
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beaver in Albany dwindled so low that it was no longer profitable for Montrealers to
ship any beaver south.72
The intervention of the monopoly Compagnie des Indes probably encouraged
smuggling by maintaining beaver prices at levels that were generally uncompetitive
relative to the New York market. The constant complaints of Montreal merchants
and Canadian officials were generally drowned out by the warnings of the powerful
Parisian hatmakers, though on occasion, declining fur receipts prompted the company
to heed the advice of the colonists and raise beaver prices to counteract the alleged
repercussions of Anglo-American competition. Whether the Indian trading partners of
the French ever suffered from the regulated marketing of beaver in Canada, however,
is doubtful. The low correlation between price and levels of production noted by
Wien suggests that Canadian traders compensated for lower beaver prices, at least in
part, by accepting diminished profits and continued to accept peltry from their Indian
trading partners at established, competitive rates.73
Just as Colden restricted his discussion of fur marketing to the price of castor
sec, there has been a persistent and misleading tendency in the historiography of

seen it much lower, & very seldom higher, but at present Consumption is pretty
quick. Samuel and William Baker to Johnson, 23 July 1750, WJP, 1: 292. See also:
Thomas Armstrong to Johnson, 13 January 1748, WJP, 1: 127-28; Armstrong to
Johnson, 31 August 1748, WJP, 1: 181; Johnson to Captain John B. Van Eps, 6
September 1748, WJP, 1: 183; Samuel and William Baker to Johnson, 22 January
1750, WJP, 1: 250, 259.
72 Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins," 307.
73 Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins," 307-12.
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Anglo-French trade rivalry to equate "beaver" with "fur." Fully half the value of all
peltry exported to France over the course of the eighteenth century came from sources
other than beaver, including deerskins, moose hides, and a variety of other furbearing animals, which the French termed "menues pelleteries”14 Though it has
generally been allowed that the French possessed an inherent advantage in the
marketing of these "other" furs in Europe, Wien has tendered significant evidence to
the contrary. Tracing the re-export of the majority of such furs from Britain and
France to other European nations, he demonstrates that there was a relatively
"unified" European market for North American peltry. Furs originating in Canada,
Hudson Bay, New York, or Pennsylvania thus wound up side by side in the shops of
European furriers. Clearly, then, the French had no inherent "special deal" in selling
their furs abroad. By comparing the selling price of Hudson’s Bay Company furs on
the London market, and Canadian furs at La Rochelle, Wien discovered that—with a

74 Based on the import figures cited by Lunn, 56.95% of the value of all furs
arriving in La Rochelle between 1718 and 1761 was attributable to menues pelleteries.
Lunn, "Economic Development," 464-65. Thomas Wien has suggested that furs and
skins probably amounted to slightly less than half of the value of Canadian fur exports
during the eighteenth century. "Peaux and pelleteries could account for more than
half o f the value of official fur exports from Qufebec," he admits, "but this
predominance was usually illusory, as clandestine shipments of beaver to Albany and
Oswego were not counted in the official totals." Wien later admits, however, that
French customs officials often paid little attention to furs other than beaver, because
most were simply being held in bond for re-export and so were not subject to import
duties. The result, he notes, was substantial and consistent underreporting of menues
pelleteries. Thomas Wien, "Exchange Patterns in the European Market for North
American Furs and Skins, 1720-1760," in The Fur Trade Revisited: Selected Papers
o f the Sixth North American Fur Trade Conference, Mackinac Island, Michigan, 1991,
edited by Jennifer S. H. Brown, W. J. Eccles and Donald P. Heldman (East Lansing:
Michigan State University Press, 1994), 20, 34n., 23.
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few exceptions—English furs consistently fetched a higher price. Wien concludes that
the quality of the pelts rather than their source ultimately determined the final selling
price in Europe. In this case, the Hudson’s Bay Company possessed a material
advantage over its Montreal rivals: "the Canadians, after all, purchased many of their
furs from Indians living and hunting south of the Great Lakes, whose wares were of
lower quality than most of those delivered to the Hudson Bay posts," Wien claims.75
If the Canadians were hampered by the quality of their more "southerly” fur
supply, then by the same reasoning the New Yorkers should have been even worse
off. The Canadians may not have monopolized the source of the best northern peltry,
but at least they had relatively easy access to such furs through their trade in the
northwestern Great Lakes and the hinterland of Hudson and James Bay. At Oswego
and certainly at Albany, however, the New York traders were at the mercy of their
Indian suppliers, whose pelts were arguably of the lowest possible quality.76 The
price data for Montreal and Albany furs in 1735 and 1754, in fact, bear out this
conclusion (Table 3.2, Figs. 3.7-3.8). With virtually no exceptions, the Canadian
traders appear to have sold their menues pelleteries at prices comparable with, and
frequently higher than, those received by their New York counterparts. If Wien is
correct, the French may have had no "special deal" that made their peltry inherently

75 Wien, "Exchange Patterns," 32.
76 Eccles notes that in the early 1750s, the expansionist impulses of the French
military in the Ohio Valley were not shared by Canadian traders, who recognized that
they had little to gain from access to the poor quality peltry of the region. Eccles,
"Eighteenth-Century Imperialism," 356.
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more valuable in Europe. They did, evidently, have access to better quality furs and
skins than their neighbors to the south. Albany merchants and Oswego traders may
have profited more from the marketing o f beaver; but, since approximately 54
percent of the total value of New York peltry consisted of furs and skins other than
beaver during the period 1718 to 1758, in no sense could New York be said to have
cornered the market on gross fur profits.77
The sharp increase in Canadian trade-good prices in the mid-to-late 1740s was
potentially most damaging to the French trade on the western perimeter of the Ohio
country. At precisely the moment when the Canadians were losing their competitive
edge as trade-good prices skyrocketed in response to wartime scarcities, Pennsylvania
traders were beginning to make inroads into the Ohio Valley, for the first time
competing directly for the trade and loyalty of the motley new Indian villages of the
region. When George Croghan arrived laden with English merchandise at Sanduskey
in the mid-1740s, he found Orontony and his fellow Wyandots eager to welcome a
potential trade rival to the French. Only a few years before, the French ministry
leased the posts at Miami, Green Bay, and Ouiatenon to private traders, hoping to
lessen the crown’s diplomatic expenses in the West. As a result, the prices of trade
merchandise had begun to creep upward even before the wartime interruption of

77 This value was calculated from the British Customs Office export figures in
Stephen H. Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy as a Measure of Rising Imperialism:
New York and Pennsylvania, 1700-1755," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine,
64:3 (1981): Table 1, 240-42.
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French shipping began. This trend was exacerbated by the advent of war.78
At the war’s end, however, Canadian officials took various steps to prevent a
recurrence of the severe shortages and price increases that had strained trade and
diplomatic relations with their Indian allies in the pays d ’en haul. Governors La
Galissonifere and La Jonquifere successively sought to curb the most blatant abuses of
the western trade by abandoning the leasing system at several critical posts in the
region. Similarly, they urged the Compagnie des Indes to boost the price of beaver,
encouraged the traders at Detroit, Niagara, and Frontenac to hold prices down to
competitive levels, and made attempts to discourage the cheating of Indian
consumers.79
Yet, just as the French suffered the commercial and diplomatic repercussions
of trade disruptions in the late 1740s, Pennsylvania merchants and traders were
themselves not entirely immune from similar wartime woes. New York’s economy
may have been stimulated by profits from Anglo-American privateering during King
George’s War, but Philadelphia merchants had little stake in raids on French shipping
and may actually have lost more ships than they seized. When war broke out in
1744, Philadelphia merchants predicted that the conflict could only injure their trade.

78 Having watched merchandise prices climb following the privatization of several
western posts, Indian customers were skeptical when the French traders blamed
wartime shortages for increased costs. White proposes that the root of Indian
discontent in the pays d ’en haut involved more than dissatisfaction with higher tradegood costs, but was rooted in a deeper fear that the French were abandoning their
customary role as mediators of the western alliance. White, Middle Ground, 199200.
79 White, Middle Ground, 210.

155
Their fears were soon realized when shipping and insurance rates began to rise the
following year. Merchandise grew increasingly scarce and prices climbed steeply.
The total value of British imports in 1745, in fact, was 40 percent less than in 1741.
Though the threat to Philadelphia’s merchant shipping ceased with the capture of
Louisbourg, the postwar business climate remained remarkably dismal. An economic
slump late in 1749, followed by another "cyclical downturn” in 1753-54, drove a
significant number of Philadelphia mercantile into bankruptcy. Facing aggressive
French and Indian competition in the West and uncertain business prospects in the
East, the Pennsylvania traders who entered the Ohio trade in the 1740s and early
1750s were hardly guaranteed commercial success.80
If the Canadians had not been temporarily handicapped by high wartime
prices, it is doubtful that the Scots-Irish traders who appeared in the Ohio country
would have wielded much commercial advantage over them. Scattered throughout
George Croghan’s business correspondence are several itemized invoices of trade
goods purchased from Philadelphia merchants.81 When the mean prices of a number
of important trade items purchased by Croghan in 1744 are compared with similar

80 Anne Bezanson, Robert D. Gray and Miriam Hussey, Prices in Colonial
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1935), 273-78; Gary
B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins o f the American
Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1986), 110, 111.
81 Several lists of his 1744 purchases can be found among the eight cartons of
Croghan’s papers, in the Croghan Section of the Cadwallader Collection at the
Historical Society of Pennsylvania. See, in particular, invoices for goods "Bott o f
Rebecca Edgell, 23 July 1744 and 25 October 1744; Jeremiah Warder, May-July (?),
1744; and Joseph Shippen, 22 October 1744.
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articles sold by Monifere that same year, the results once again favor the Canadian in
many instances. (Table 3.3, Figs. 3.9a,b,c).82 A variety of goods, including awls,
beads, gunflints, gunpowder, handkerchiefs, hatchets, knives, mirrors, vermilion, and
even stroud cloth, were cheaper in Montreal. Again, it is possible that some of the
discrepancies in cost, particularly in the case of handkerchiefs and knives, may have
been due to variations in quality or materials. But on the whole, it is clear that
similar goods sold at comparable prices in both towns. Not surprisingly, rum and
tobacco appear to have been the only noteworthy items that cost significantly more in
Canada. Like their New York counterparts, Philadelphia merchants had abundant
sources of relatively cheap West Indian, New England, and local rum, as well as
direct access to Maryland and Virginia tobacco via intercolonial trade.83
In contrast to their New York neighbors, Pennsylvanians vying for the Indian
trade of the Ohio Country dealt primarily in deerskins. Though beaver made up
roughly half of New York’s and Canada’s total fur production, beaver was
insignificant to Pennsylvania’s export economy, comprising only about 1 percent of
Pennsylvania’s fur and skin exports, on average, between 1718 and 1758 (Fig.
3.10).84 Deerskins, however, accounted for fully 63 percent of Pennsylvania’s total
profits from the Indian trade, and other furs-the French menues pelleteries—neax\y 36
82 In 1744, Monifere outfitted trading ventures to Green Bay, Rainy Lake, and
Michilimackinac. See "Monifere, Journal No. 4: 1737-1748, Ventes: Crfedit et dfebit,"
MMR, M849, [Microfilm reel 3].
83 Bezanson et al., Prices in Colonial Pennsylvania, 79, 84, 186, 207-8, 210.
84 Calculated from import records in Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," Table 1,
240-42.
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percent.85 Though the Pennsylvanians were clearly most dependent on deerskins,
they appear not to have possessed any appreciable advantage over the Canadians in
the price of this commodity. In fact, price information from the mid-1730s and the
mid-1750s suggests that deerskins may have even brought a slightly higher price in
Montreal than in Philadelphia (Fig. 3.11).86
The only distinct advantage the Pennsylvania traders might have enjoyed was
the potentially shorter distance between Philadelphia and the peripheral regions of
trade. Certainly, while the Pennsylvania trade was focused on the Susquehanna
Valley, transportation costs remained comparatively low. When the traders finally
began to expand their operations into the trans-Allegheny country in hot pursuit of

85 Calculated from data in Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," Table 1, 240-42.
86 Montreal deerskin prices for 1735 are taken from Wien, "Castor, peaux, et
pelleteries," 91. These were compared with the 1732 price of skins in Philadelphia
(the closest available year) cited by William H. Guthman, "Indian Trade Documents,"
Museum o f the Fur Trade Quarterly, 7:2 (1971): 10. Montreal deerskin prices in
1754 are found in Innis, Fur-Trade o f Canada, 153. For accounting and credit
purposes, Croghan used an arbitrary standard value for deerskins of 7s. 6d. (£ 0.375)
Pennsylvania currency, or roughly 4s. 6d. (£ 0.2227) sterling. Croghan Section,
Cadwallader Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Deerskins varied
considerably in weight: Richard White noted that skins traded by the Choctaws
averaged 2.5 lbs., while James McClure posited a lesser weight of 2 lbs. Richard
White, The Roots o f Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change
among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1983), 93; James P. McClure, "The Ohio Valley’s Deerskin Trade: Topics for
Consideration," The Old Northwest, 15:3 (1990): 128n. The average weight of
deerskins purchased by John and Robert Sanders in the early 1740s was
approximately 2.18 lbs. "Letterbook of John and Robert Sanders, 1742-43," NYHS,
Misc. MSS [reel #3]. For the sake of comparison, the average weight of Croghan’s
deerskins was assumed to be 2 lbs., which produced a final price of 2s. 3d. (£0.1135)
sterling per pound.

their Delaware and Shawnee suppliers, however, the expense of shipping goods
increased considerably. Unlike the Canadian voyageurs, who had virtually
uninterrupted canoe routes through the Great Lakes to Detroit and the other posts
south of the Great Lakes, the Pennsylvania traders faced long overland treks into the
pays d ’en haut, hauling their goods less efficiently by pack-horse much of the way.87
The experience of the French in the Ohio Valley in the period following the expulsion
of the Anglo-American traders also gives some indication of the hardships faced by
the English who pursued trade in the region. Even in a newly captive market, the
French still found it difficult to adequately supply the trade in the Ohio country.
Moving large quantities of merchandise in the region proved to be no easy matter.
Forced to abandon their trusty canoes in favor of clumsy pirogues and frustrated by
long, blistering portages, the French soon grasped that the business of supplying trade
merchandise to the Ohio Valley was laboriously slow, as well as financially and
diplomatically costly.88
With an "effective and well-established" supply network in the lower Great
Lakes and a longstanding—if often tenuous-network of alliances with the various

87 The difficulties and expense of overland carriage from Pennsylvania may also
have limited the types of goods brought to the Ohio country. For example, Edmond
Atkin noted that the large amount of lead the Indians needed for shot was not only
difficult to transport but also unprofitable, with "a Horse Load but of small value."
South Carolina traders, he remarked, "naturally consulting their own greatest profitt,
have carried but scanty supplies of that Article, and in a great measure left it to the
French." Edmond Atkin, The Appalachian Indian Frontier: The Edmond Atkin Report
and Plan o f 1755, edited by Wilbur R. Jacobs (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1967), 11.
88 Eccles, "Eighteenth-Century Imperialism," 358; White, Middle Ground, 211.
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Indian groups of the region, the French commercial presence in the western Ohio
country was never seriously jeopardized by the presence of Anglo-American traders.
Very few Indians ever abandoned their trade with the French, even during the worst
periods of wartime price inflation.89 If Croghan and his fellow Pennsylvanians
succeeded briefly in gaining a foothold in the Ohio Valley, it was largely because the
French trade in the pays d ’en haut had been momentarily thrown off balance. In the
absence of any extensive records of Anglo-American trade in the Ohio country in the
late 1740s and early 1750s, it is impossible to determine whether the Canadians or the
Pennsylvanians had any significant advantage in the terms of exchange once French
prices returned to pre-war levels. Given more time and increasingly large shipments
of cheap rum, the Pennsylvanians may well have been able woo more Indian
customers away from the French. This question, however, is merely academic.
Within a few short years, the English-speaking traders had been driven eastward by
an aggressive French-Indian campaign to rid the region of British influence. With
panicked and penniless traders streaming back over the Alleghenies, it was clear who
had won the contest for the trade of the Ohio country.

Despite the fact that virtually all his assertions contain a potent blend of
exaggeration, half-truth, and obvious error, Colden’s statements in the "Report of the
Committee of Council of the Province of New-York," and "A Memorial Concerning

89 Of their Indian allies, only the Mississaugas did not respond favorably to
French post-war concessions. White, Middle Ground, 211.
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the Furr-Trade of New-York," have been accepted, in lock-step, by credulous
scholars. Colden’s analysis has come to assume the weight of historical authority. It
has fundamentally shaped the manner in which the Canadian fur has been interpreted,
and essentially precluded debate over the viability of the Canadian fur trade in the
face of Anglo-American competition.90
As New York’s surveyor-general and a prominent member of the governor’s
council, Colden arguably had better access than most to information concerning the
Anglo-French contest for commerce and empire. But the budding scientist’s
disparaging commentary on the Canadian fur trade was no disinterested treatise,
marred by a few excusable inaccuracies. Rather, it was a masterfully contrived
propoganda piece, carefully crafted to serve a purpose which can only be grasped by
delving into the murky realm of New York politics in the early decades of the
eighteenth century. Colden’s critique of the Canadian fur trade was the product of a
political moment, written with the patent purpose of justifying Governor Burnet’s
legislative efforts to severe trade between Albany and Montreal. The rationale
underpinning the ban on the Canada trade was ostensibly logical. Granted the
assumption that Montreal merchants depended almost wholly on English trade goods
smuggled from New York, it followed that, if this supply route were to be cut off, it

90 For a recent genuflection before Colden’s dogma, see White, Middle Ground,
120-21: "By 1720 New York officials were confident enough of success in securing
direct trade to outlaw the smuggling of furs between Montreal and Albany, thus
striking at the French source for what had become the most important manufactured
good in the western trade- English strouds. The high quality and low price of
English blankets and strouds and the Indian demand for them," he echoes, "gave the
English perhaps their greatest advantage over the French."
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would be only a matter of time before the Canadian fur trade was "starved" into
exhaustion and eventual collapse. In order to argue this case most effectively, Colden
found it necessary to characterize the Canadian trade as inherently weak and
insupportable: hence, his emphasis on the poor quality and exorbitant price of French
goods, the detrimental monopoly of the Compagnie des 1rides, and the resultingly low
price paid for furs, not to mention the manifold difficulties involved in transporting
goods from France to Canada and finally to the pays d ’en haut. In Colden’s scenario,
the Canadian fur trade of the early 1720s was teetering on the brink of collapse and
the ban on the Montreal-Albany trade was the measure perfectly calculated to lay it in
its grave.
But did Colden, or his activist governor, truly believe this to be the case? It is
ultimately impossible to know, but there is significant evidence to suggest that Colden
and his fellow imperialists entertained specific political motives which had little to do
with stemming French expansion in North America but were rooted in ardent local
political antagonisms traceable back as far as the seventeenth century. In April 1730,
only a few months after Burnet’s restrictive legislation had finally been repealed, the
Albany merchant Cornelius Cuyler reflected on the political events of the past decade
in a letter to his London supplier. "I was Very glad to here [sic] that the act
Imposeing Dutyes fines etc. was Repealed," admitted Cuyler, who had been deeply
involved in the Canada trade. "The Making of those unjest acts," he went on to
speculate, "was Done out of Envy and Malice with Self Interest by Some ill
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Designing persons here. "9l Flushed with the recent victory of the Canada traders,
Cuyler might simply have lashed out at some imagined conspiracy concocted to
punish the Albany merchant community. But how could Cuyler and his colleagues
not have recalled the bitter invective New York imperialists with little affection for
the Albany Dutch? Not surprisingly, these same men had been the most enthusiastic
supporters of Burnet’s ban, fully realizing the devastating financial toll it would take
on the Dutch traders whose livelihoods depended on Canadian beaver.
One of the earliest and most persuasive advocates of challenging French
hegemony in the western trade was Robert Livingston, the self-made merchantproprietor who, with an estate of more than 160,000 acres, had risen to become one
of the most influential spokesmen of New York’s "landed" interest.92 Throughout his
long career, Livingston had prospered by his alliance with a series of colonial
governors, and he naturally adopted their imperial and inherently anti-French
perspective.93 Despite his concerns about the influence of Canadian traders among the
Iroquois and the tribes of the western Great Lakes, Livingston was never wholly
averse to treating with his northern rivals. In the late 1690s, he made preparations to
enter into commercial relations with Montreal. He also sent several of his sons to
learn French in the Huguenot community of La Rochelle in the expectation that they,
91 Cornelius Cuyler to Samuel Baker, 11 April 1730, quoted in Norton, Fur Trade
in Colonial New York, 148.
92 Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New
York (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 69; Norton, Fur Trade in
Colonial New York, 155.
93 Bonomi, Factious People, 73; Leder, Robert Livingston, 47.
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too, would one day enter the Canada trade.94 Despite his fur-trade background and
his powerful colonial allies, however, Livingston seems never to have been fully
accepted by the close-knit Albany trading community and was clearly more
comfortable associating with other "upriver" traders, such as the Van Rensselaers,
who operated outside the pale of the Albany monopoly.95
As early as 1699, Livingston had successfully lobbied Governor Bellomont to
support a program of expansion into the Great Lakes country. He recommended the
construction of a chain of forts linking Albany with Detroit and the strengthening of
alliances with the Iroquois and other western Indians. Acknowledging the unqualified
success of the French coureurs de bois in cementing friendly relations with their
Indian trading partners, Livingston recommended that young New Yorkers should also
take to the woods as rival "bushlopers. ',96
94 Leder, Robert Livingston, 126; Cynthia A. Kiemer, "Family Values, Family
Business: Work and Kinship in Colonial New York," Mid-America, 71:2 (1989): 5758. The young Livingstons later profited from their early bilingual education, trading
regularly with Canada. One son, John, tangled with an Admiralty Court after a sloop
o f which he was part-owner ran aground on Long Island on a return trip from
Quebec. The cargo of French goods, including brandy, wines, furs, and textiles, was
confiscated, and the vessel seized for violation of the Navigation Acts. Leder, Ibid.,
175-76.
95 Bonomi, Factious People, 73.
96 "Mr. Robert Livingston’s Report of his Journey to Onondaga" (April 1700),
NYCD, 4: 648-52; Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 155-56. Livingston
inadvertently acknowledged the superiority of French trade goods while
recommending that young New Yorkers be encouraged to live among the tribes of the
western Great Lakes. It was necessary, he counselled, "that our men have passes to
go a hunting and trading towards Corlaers Lake and the eastward, as well as the
French, who trade all the bever and peltry from our river Indians and decoy them to
Canada, lying on every Creek upon the Lake with Brandy and other goods, by which
means they spoyl us of all that trade. But it would not be advisable that they be
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For a number of reasons, the Albany Dutch vigorously opposed Livingston’s
aggressive strategy. They feared that antagonizing the French would lead either to a
renewal of the vicious border raids that they had only recently endured during King
William’s War, or at least the contraction of their lucrative Montreal trade.
Similarly, Livingston’s proposals conspicuously ignored Albany’s 1686 charter, which
granted the town a monopoly over the colony’s fur trade. Though the Albany
merchants could easily comprehend the need for western defense, they shied away
from Livingston’s deliberately provocative policy.97 With the onset of Queen Anne’s
War, however, the attention of the colony was soon diverted from Livingston’s
ambitious and potentially costly program. Not until the arrival of Governor Robert
Hunter in 1710 would Livingston once again receive a sympathetic hearing.
A distinguished veteran of Marlborough’s army, Hunter arrived in New York
with an aggressive anti-French attitude that naturally drew him into association with
like-minded imperialists.98 If Hunter hoped to pursue an expansionist policy in New
York, however, he soon realized that he would be hampered by the quotidian
bickering of an assembly that refused even to grant him the customary revenue for his
salary. Inevitably, perhaps, Hunter immediately came into conflict with prominent
members of New York’s mercantile faction. The new governor unashamedly
permitted to go and trade with the Five Nations; there they lead a lazy life, and sell
their goods dearer than the French do at Cadaracqui [Frontenac] where the goods are
better." NYCD, 4: 651.
97 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 221-23.
98 Mary Lou Lustig, Robert Hunter, 1666-1734: New York’s Augustan Statesman
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1983), 74-75.
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gravitated to the colony’s landed "aristocracy," and it was apparent that he shared
their haughty disdain for the merchant community." Frustrated by the legislative
obstinacy of the merchant-assemblymen, the whiggish Hunter could also not have
failed to note their support for the same Tory party that would soon "betray" Britain
with the "pro-French" Treaty of Utrecht.100 By the time Hunter met Livingston, the
new speaker of the house, the governor was easily persuaded that French expansion in
the West should be stifled and that the allegedly pro-French handlaers, who also
happened to be fervent supporters of his downstate political enemies, could be
simultaneously restrained.101
Considering the initial hostility of the merchant faction, Hunter’s tenure as
governor was remarkably successful; he managed, at least, to preside over an
unseasonable "surface calm" in New York’s perpetually turbulent political
atmosphere.102 Nonetheless, a number of his mercantile opponents, most notably
Peter Schuyler and Adolph Philipse, remained entrenched in the council. By the time

" Hunter believed merchants to be "self-serving boors," Lustig claims, "inimical
to Augustan tastes in manners and morals and to the attitudes of the imperial, landed
ruling class of which Hunter was so prominent an example." Lustig, Robert Hunter,
78.
100 Lustig, Robert Hunter, 114, 139.
101 Michael Kammen has proposed that the "process of anglicization" in
eighteenth-century New York took on "a special Scottish hue." Kammen, Colonial
New York: A History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 179. Bonomi
further suggests that Hunter’s suspicions of the predominantly Dutch merchant faction
were inflamed by the ethnic antipathies he shared with his fellow prominent Scots.
Bonomi, Factious People, 96.
102 Bonomi, Factious People, 87.
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he returned to England in 1719, Hunter had not succeeded in implementing
Livingston’s proposals for western expansion nor in executing his latest strategy of
stifling the Montreal-Albany trade. Hunter did play a significant role in the selection
of William Burnet as his successor, however, and cannily briefed the sympathetic
incumbent administrator on the need to pursue Livingston’s imperial agenda.
In the interim, tensions mounted in New York. As president of the Council,
Peter Schuyler--the powerful Albany merchant, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and
Canada trader—had assumed the post of acting governor in anticipation of Bumet’s
arrival. One of his first official acts was to replace Robert Livingston’s nephew with
one of his own relatives as mayor of Albany. He further exercised Hunter’s
supporters by ignoring the former governor’s designee for mayor of New York City
and by freely granting land to his friends and political supporters.103 The battle lines
in the debate over restricting commercial contact with Montreal were also being
drawn even before Burnet set foot in the colony. Livingston was now the leading
advocate of the ban on the Canadian trade, and Schuyler, his political nemesis, one of
its most vocal opponents. The Hunter-Livingston faction had also found willing
support for their anti-Albany program among the merchants of Schenectady.
Brandishing their forty-year-old charter, the handlaers had made it clear that the
western Indians should, by law and custom, come to trade within city limits. The
Schenectady traders, who were increasingly interested in supplying these same
customers, clearly resented Albany’s stranglehold on the colonial fur trade. They

103 Bonomi, Factious People, 87-88; Leder, Robert Livingston, 249-50.
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were only too eager to join the ranks of the imperialists, who similarly sought to
expand the western trade and demolish the Albany monopoly.104
Burnet’s arrival in 1720 merely heightened the mood of suspicion and
antagonism in the colony. The new governor, already steeped in Hunter’s prejudices,
immediately alienated the merchant faction by refusing to call the traditional assembly
election. He speedily ushered an act to seal off the Montreal-Albany trade through
the legislature and then replaced Peter Schuyler and his ally Adolph Philipse on the
council with the more tractable Cadwallader Colden and James Alexander. In one
stroke, Burnet had delivered a staggering blow to his political opposition, purging the
leading members of the merchant faction from the government while effectively
knocking out the underpinnings of their prosperity.105
With opposition mounting to Burnet’s restrictive trade legislation, the
responsibility for articulating the dubious premise underlying the ban to a confused
Board of Trade devolved to Colden. Though he had only been in New York a short
time, the immigrant Scot was no disinterested observer in this debate. After a brief
stint in Philadelphia, Colden had caught the attention of Governor Hunter, who
promised him the post of surveyor general in New York. When Colden arrived
expectantly in the colony, he was dismayed to discover that Hunter had already set
sail and that Schuyler had bestowed the surveyorship on a political crony. Though
Schuyler’s appointment was later quashed, Colden never forgave this slight. Already

104 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 135.
105 Bonomi, Factious People, 90.
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eager to win his new patron’s favor, Colden’s epistolary assault on the Canada trade
conceivably had a personal edge as well.106
It is certainly possible that New York’s imperial spokesmen may actually have
believed that Albany strouds were the sine qua non of the Canadian fur trade. They
had, admittedly, consistently advocated undercutting French hegemony by promoting
Anglo-American trade in the Great Lakes region. Examined in the light of the
ruthless political battle they waged against the embattled merchant faction through the
1710s and 1720s, however, their rationale for severing the Albany-Montreal trade--as
most eloquently articulated by Colden—appears glaringly disingenuous and selfserving. Perhaps the most damning evidence of the political reality underlying the
imperial rhetoric of the restrictive legislation was the governor’s own ambivalent
actions. At the height of the ban, while accused Albany smugglers were being hauled
into court and forced to swear oaths in their defense, Burnet blithely permitted his
political allies to profit in Canadian pelts.107 Thus, when Cornelius Cuyler and his
associates protested that the restrictive acts were "Done out of Envy and Malice with
Self Interest by some ill Designing persons," they were probably not far from the

106 "Colden neither forgave nor forgot," in the judgment of his biographer, Alice
Mapelsden Keys. "Years after Schuyler’s death he transmitted to his son, in the hope
that it might meet the eye of the future historian, a description of his old enemy full
of unalloyed bitterness, while at the same time he flung himself into an arraignment
of Schuyler’s administration of the Land Office that helped largely to bring about his
suspension from the council." Alice Mapelsden Keys, Cadwallader Colden: A
Representative Eighteenth Century Official (New York: Columbia University Press,
1906), 108.
107 Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 139.
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mark.
The influence of this partisan propaganda campaign on subsequent scholarship
has been vastly out of proportion to its objective historical worth. It was clearly in
Colden’s best interest to convince the Board of Trade that the Canadian fur trade was
so inherently unstable, so utterly dependent on English manufactures smuggled from
New York, that the restriction of the Albany-Montreal commerce would result in
nothing short of the collapse of the French regime in North America. In this context,
the argument of New York imperialists curiously echoed the equally self-interested
claims of their Canadian rivals. Just as Wien has shown that Montreal merchants
benefitted from the appearance of uncompetitiveness in their rivalry with the AngloAmerican traders, so it appears likely that Colden and his fellow imperialists had
much to gain from an identical illusion. If the Canadian fur trade was inherently
weak, then the Albany Dutch were all the more villainous for propping it up. And if
the handlaers’ commerce could be ruined in the name of securing Britain’s North
American empire, neither the imperialists nor the Schenectady traders would mourn
the loss.
"Each party," Colden later wrote of New York politics in these years, "as they
were at different times favoured by several Governors, opposed all the Measures
taken by the other, while each of them were by Turns in Credit with the People or the
Governor, and sometimes even prosecuted each other to Death. The publick
Measures were by these Means perpetually fluctuating, and often one Day
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contradictory to what they were the Day before."108 In an irony that would not have
been lost on the percipient Scot, the greatest legacy of Colden’s rhetorical effort was
not so much political as it was historiographical. Though their efforts to revile and
reduce their Albany rivals ultimately misfired, the imperialists’ greatest success was
the establishment of a myth of Anglo-American superiority in the eighteenth-entury
fur trade, a legacy which has proved far more enduring than the petty colonial
antagonisms which engendered it.

108 Quoted in Kammen, Colonial New York, 127.
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FIGURE 3.1
PRICE OF A "PIECE" OF STROUD CLOTH IN MONTREAL AND ALBANY
(£ STERLING)
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FIGURE 3.2
VALUE OF BULK TEXTILES TRADED AT NIAGARA, 1729-1738, RELATIVE
TO TOTAL SALES
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FIGURE 3.3
VALUE OF ENGLISH STROUDS TRADED AT NIAGARA, 1729-1738,
RELATIVE TO TOTAL SALES
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TABLE 3.1
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL, SCHENECTADY,
NIAGARA, AND OSWEGO, 1735 (£ STERLING)

I
Montreal

II
Albany

111
Niagara

IV
Oswego
[estimated]

0.0195
0.1424
0.0161
0.3463
0.0118
0.0783
0.0651
0.0325
0.0563
0.7803
0.1205
0.0065
0.0181
0.0714
0.0126
0.0783
0.1004
0.0217
0.1985
0.1235
0.1951
0.2795
0.1032
0.0201
0.3565
0.1103

0.0464
0.0909
0.0227
0.3144
0.0303
0.0884
0.053
0.1196
0.0991
0.8578
0.0909
0.0317
0.0354
0.0727
0.0709
0.0909
0.0923
0.0216
0.0765
0.1705
0.3939
0.2147
0.1724
0.0196
0.4848
0.2424

0.065
0.13
0.014
0.4044
0.0163
0.0682
0.0603
0.2167
0.0803
0.9103
0.1205
0.0154
0.0301
0.1
0.0704
0.1565
0.1205
0.0325
0.397
0.15
0.1951
0.1334
0.1205
0.0401
0.4821
0.2646

0.0533
0.1045
0.0261
0.3616
0.0348
0.1017
0.0609
0.1375
0.114
0.9865
0.1045
0.0365
0.0407
0.0836
0.0815
0.1045
0.1061
0.0248
0.088
0.1961
0.453
0.2469
0.1983
0.0225
0.5575
0.2788

ITEM
awls (doz.)
axes (ea.)
bacon (lb.)
blankets (ea.)
com bs (doz.)
corn (bushel)
glass beads (lb.)
gunflints (100)
gunpowder (lb.)
guns (ea.)
kettles (lb.)
knives (ea.)
lead/shot (lb.)
linen (yard)
mirrors (ea.)
pease (bushel)
pepper (lb.)
rings (doz.)
rum/brandy (gallon)
shirts (ea.)
stockings (pair)
stroud (yard)
thread (lb.)
tobacco (lb.)
vermilion (lb.)
wine (gallon)

Sources: “Journal #3, Monifere, 1731-1737, Ventes: credit et d£bit,"
M848, reel 2, vol. 4, MMR\ "Account Book of Hendrick (Henry) Van
Rensselaer," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #63; AN, (*lA, 73: 310-12.
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FIGURE 3.4a
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL, SCHENECTADY,
NIAGARA, AND OSWEGO, 1735 (£ STERLING)
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FIGURE 3.4b
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL, SCHENECTADY,
NIAGARA, AND OSWEGO, 1735 (£ STERLING)
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FIGURE 3.4c
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL, SCHENECTADY,
NIAGARA, AND OSWEGO, 1735 (£ STERLING)
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FIGURE 3.5
PRICE FLUCTUATIONS OF SELECTED GOODS AT MONTREAL (LIVRES)
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FIGURE 3.6a
PRICE OF BLANKETS AT MONTREAL AND SCHENECTADY/ALBANY
(£ STERLING)
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FIGURE 3.6b
PRICE OF KETTLES (PER LB.) AT MONTREAL AND
SCHENECTADY/ALBANY (£ STERLING)
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Ventes: Credit et ddbit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR; "Account Book
of Hendrick (Henry) Van Rensselaer," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #63.
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FIGURE 3.6c
PRICE OF BRANDY/RUM (PER GAL.) AT MONTREAL AND
SCHENECTADY/ALBANY (£ STERLING)
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FIGURE 3.6d
PRICE OF STROUD CLOTH (PER YD.) AT MONTREAL AND
SCHENECTADY/ALBANY (£ STERLING)
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TABLE 3.2
PRICES OF SELECTED PELTRY AT MONTREAL AND
SCHENECTADY/ALBANY (£ STERLING)

1735

bear
beaver, coat (lb.)
beaver, parchment (lb.)
cat
deerskin (lb.)
fisher
fox
marten
mink
muskrat
otter
raccoon
wolf

1754
Montreal

NY

Montreal

0.1818
0.165
0.165
0.0758
0.1215
0.1879

0.1734
0.1406
0.0804
0.0975
0.1205
0.1951

0.1061
0.0515
0.0076
0.1684
0.0627
0.0909

0.1084
0.0433
0.0108
0.1734
0.0607
0.13

0.2833
0.2274
0.2274
0.1109
0.1252
0.2782
0.1245
0.1329
0.0867
0.0203
0.3519
0.0698
0.1013

0.4365
0.1618
0.1618
0.1746
0.1214
0.3274
0.1746
0.1528
0.1091
0.0109
0.4365
0.0917
0.2183

NY

1735 sources: Wien, "Castor, peaux, et pelleteries," 91; "Account
Book of Hendrick (Henry) Van Rensselaer," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel
#63. 1754 sources: Innis, Fur-Trade o f Canada, 153;"Letterbook of
Robert Sanders, 1752-58," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #3; "Letterbook
of John Sanders, 1749-73, NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #3."
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FIGURE 3.7
PRICE OF BEAVER AND DEERSKINS AT MONTREAL AND
SCHENECTADY/ALBANY (£ STERLING)
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MSS., reel #3; "Letterbook of John Sanders, 1749-73, NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel
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FIGURE 3.8
PRICE OF SELECTED PELTRY AT MONTREAL AND
SCHENECTADY/ALBANY (£ STERLING)
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Book of Hendrick (Henry) Van Rensselaer," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel
#63. 1754 sources: Innis, Fur-Trade o f Canada, 153; "Letterbook of
Robert Sanders, 1752-58," NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #3; "Letterbook
of John Sanders, 1749-73, NYHS, Misc. MSS., reel #3."

TABLE 3.3
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL AND
PHILADELPHIA, 1744 (£ STERLING)

I
ITEM
awls (doz.)
b ead s (lb.)
gunflints (100)
gunpow der (lb.)
guns (ea.)
handkerchiefs (ea.)
hatchets (ea.)
kettles (lb.)
knives (doz.)
lead (lb.)
mirrors (ea.)
rings (doz.)
rum/brandy (gal.)
soap (lb.)
stroud (yard)
tobacco (lb.)
vermilion (lb.)

II

Montreal Philadelphia
0.0145
0.0758
0.0254
0.042
0.6973
0.0317
0.0679
0.0994
0.1176
0.0164
0.0217
0.125
0.2421
0.042
0.2408
0.021
0.3084

0.06
0.105
0.075
0.054
0.63
0.12
0.075
0.067
0.255
0.012
0.04
0.06
0.13
0.0144
0.2609
0.007
0.54

Sources: "loumal No. #4, Monifere, 1737-1748, Ventes: Crddit et
d6bit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR; George Croghan Section,
Cadwallader Collection, HSP.
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FIGURE 3.9a
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL AND
PHILADELPHIA, 1744 (£ STERLING)
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Sources: "Journal No. #4, Monifere, 1737-1748, Ventes: Credit et
d£bit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR; George Croghan Section,
Cadwallader Collection, HSP.
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FIGURE 3.9b
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL AND
PHILADELPHIA, 1744 (£ STERLING)
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Sources: "Journal No. #4, Monifere, 1737-1748, Ventes: Crddit et
ddbit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR; George Croghan Section,
Cadwallader Collection, HSP.
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FIGURE 3.9c
PRICES OF SELECTED TRADE GOODS AT MONTREAL AND
PHILADELPHIA, 1744 (£ STERLING)
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d^bit," M849, reel 3, vol. 8, MMR; George Croghan Section,
Cadwallader Collection, HSP.

190

FIGURE 3.10
NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA PELTRY EXPORTS, 1718-58

Legend
beaver
deerskins
other furs
(46%)

(63%)
(25%)
(30%)

(36%)

Source: Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy," Table 1, 240-42.
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F IG U R E 3.il
DEERSKIN PRICES AT MONTREAL AND PHILADELPHIA (£ STERLING)
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Sources: Montreal, 1735: Wien, "Castor, peaux, et pelleteries," 91.
*Philadelphia, 1732: Guthman, "Indian Trade Documents," 10.
Montreal, 1754: Innis, Fur-Trade o f Canada, 153. Philadelphia,
1754: Croghan Section, Cadwallader Collection, HSP.

CHAPTER IV
INDIAN AGENDAS

ACT I
SCENE I
An Indian Trading House.
Enter McDoIe and Murphey, Two Indian Traders,
and their Servants.1

In the drawing rooms and coffee houses of fashionable London, Robert
Rogers’s homespun art breathed new life into the fabled characters of the eighteenthcentury frontier. The noble and vicitimized Indian savage, the shamelessly rapacious
Scots-Irish trader, the recently deposed yet still menacing Frenchman: all eased into
their familiar roles as into a well-worn pair of moccasins, enacting an allegory of the
simmering hatreds and botched relations that culminated in the shedding of real blood
on the fringes of the new Anglo-American empire. For all its suspect fusion of fact
and myth, Rogers’s tale of Pontiac and his failed uprising nonetheless opens a window
onto a swirling scene of perceptions, prejudices, and daily transactions between
Indians and Europeans which, far more than the abstractions of merchant markup or
peltry prices, dictated the ultimate success of the French and English in their rivalry

1 Robert Rogers, Ponteach: Or, The Savages o f America, A Tragedy (London: J.
Millan, 1766).
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for the Great Lakes-Ohio Valley fur trade before 1760.
A seasoned veteran of three ferocious wars for control of the "Old
Northwest," Rogers was no stranger to the fluid and often lethal world of the fur
trade frontier. If he tended to paint his characters with a broad brush, it was perhaps
because his real-life subjects lived so assiduously up-or, more commonly, down—to
type. In Rogers’s fictional world, at least, the lineage of Anglo-Indian conflict was
not difficult to discern. Heading the long list of native grievances were the traders,
frontier confidence men and rogues who, through greed and guile, had poisoned the
Indians against the English long before the first land-hungry settlers broke through the
Alleghenies. If bitter Anglo-Indian conflict for control of the West was inevitable,
Rogers implied, the frauds and deceits of the wily, grasping traders only portended
more insidious usurpations to come.
Rogers’s indictment of the Anglo-American traders is embodied by McDole
and Murphey, their names alone a powerful allusion-in an eighteenth-century ethnic
shorthand-to inevitable fraud. As the curtain rises, the veteran McDole initiates a
naive Murphey into the "secret Arts" of the "Indian Commerce," quickly disabusing
him of any earnest expectations of making "an honest Living." Inspecting the
newcomer’s merchandise, McDole pronounces: "’Tis very well: your Articles are
good:/ But now the Thing’s to make a Profit from them,/ Worth all your Toil and
Pains of coming hither./ Our fundamental Maxim then is this,/" he confides, "That
it’s no Crime to cheat and gull an Indian" [4].

Murphey’s bewildered protest in

defense of the Indians’ "natural rights” raises little sympathy in the hardened dealer.
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"Ah!" McDole counters. "If you boggle here, I say no more,/ This is the very
Quintessence of Trade,/ And ev’ry Hope of Gain depends upon it;/ None who
neglect it ever did grow rich,/" he remarks with finality, "Or ever will, or can by
Indian Commerce" [5].
With the inherent justice of the trade immediately called into question, McDole
proudly relates the sordid details of his practiced deceptions. "A thousand
Opportunities present/ To Take Advantage o f their Ignorance/" he admits;

But the great Engine I employ is Rum,
More pow’rful made by certain strength’ning Drugs.
This I distribute with a lib’ral Hand,
Urge them to drink till they grow mad and valiant;
Which makes them think me generous and just,
And gives full Scope to practice all my Art.
I then begin my Trade with water’d Rum,
The cooling Draught well suits their scorching Throats.
Their Fur and Peltry come in quick Return:
My Scales are honest, but so well contriv’d,
That one small Slip will turn Three Pounds to One;
Which they, poor silly Souls! ignorant of Weights
And Rules of Balancing, do not perceive [5],

When three Indians conveniently arrive on the scene eager to trade their
beaver pelts for rum, McDole demonstrates his dubious skills to his skeptical
companion. The fraudulent transaction comes off without a hitch, with McDole
garnering an astounding ninety pounds of beaver for a mere six quarts of watered
rum.2 A duly impressed Murphey thanks his colleague for the lucrative advice, but

2 The tragicomic nature o f this transaction would have been even more striking to
contemporaries familiar with current rates of exchange. Assuming a generous price
of 5 shillings per pound of beaver and 15 shillings per gallon of rum, the Indians
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ponders the potentially brutal repercussions of this sharp brand of dealing. But to
McDole this is only business. "Can’t you avoid them?" he asks. "Let their Ven
geance light/ On others Heads, no matter whose, if you/ Are but secure, and have
the Gain in Hand," he counsels. With the trader vanished, the Indians will vent their
anger on "a Stranger" or an "honest Peasant." And so the pair take their leave with a
final, premonitory quip from McDole: "Such let them murder, if they will a Score,"
he says. "The Guilt is theirs, while we secure the Gain,/ Nor shall we feel the
bleeding Victims Pain" [8].
Like the violence that threatens to erupt in response to English avarice and
insult, a profound nostalgia for the French presence in the pays d ’en haul, all the
more acute for its freshness, pervades each scene of Rogers’s drama. The context of
Pontiac’s first appearance, in fact, is a telling commentary on the fragility of AngloIndian relations with the French subtracted from the imperial equation. Addressing
the impossibly haughty Colonel Cockum, Pontiac alludes to an ongoing, if one-sided,
dialogue with the newly empowered English. "You give no Answer yet to my
Complaint;/” he charges. "Your men give my Men always too much Rum,/ Then
trade and cheat ’em. What! d’ye think this/ right?" [14]. Cockum’s dismissive

spent the equivalent of £22,5 for rum worth just over £1 at a vastly inflated frontier
cost. For beaver prices, see Yoko Shirai, "The Indian Trade in Colonial
Pennsylvania, 1730-1768: Traders and Land Speculation" (Ph.D. dissertation,
Department of History, University of Pennsylvania, 1985), 116, 145n. The price of
rum in the Ohio country was always variable. Worth about 3 shillings per gallon in
Philadelphia, it sold at Fort Pitt in the mid-1760s for between 15 and 20 shillings per
gallon. "Account with the Crown (Croghan and Cole), 1766" in the microfilm edition
of the Boynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers in the Pennsylvania State Archives
(MG 19), Accounts Current, 1766-1771, Volume 7: 375-425.
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answer provokes another Indian chief to remark: "I thought the English had been
better Men," to which his companion pointedly replies: "Frenchmen would always
hear an Indian! speak,/ And answer fair, and make good Promises." Overhearing this
exchange, Cockum rankles at the comparison. "You may be d— d," the colonel
retorts, "and all your Frenchmen too" [15].
Fortunately, cooler heads prevail when Sharp, a colonial governor who
happens to be present, promises to make Pontiac’s grievances known to the king.
"Your Men make Indians drunk, and then/ they cheat ’em," Pontiac repeats. "I tell
you plainly this will never do," he cautions, "We never thus were treated by the
French." A conciliatory Sharp reminds him that "there’s good and bad, you know, in
every/ Nation. You must not mind the Conduct of a few,/ Nor judge the rest by what
you see of them." Pontiac’s answer is terse: "If you’ve some good," he suggests,
"why don’t you send them here?" [20].
With the English at a safe distance, Pontiac and his cohorts later reflect on the
alteration in their circumstances precipitated by the expulsion of the French from the
pays d ’en haut. "Where are we now?" Pontiac asks.
The French are all subdued,
But who are in their Stead become our Lords?
A proud, imperious, churlish, haughty Band.
The French familiarized themselves with us,
Studied our Tongue, and Manners, wore our Dress,
Married our Daughters, and our Sons their Maids,
Dealt honestly, and well supplied our Wants,
Used no one ill, and treated with Respect
Our Kings, our Captains, and our aged Men;
Call’d us their Friends, nay, what is more, their
Children,
And seem’d like Fathers anxious for our Welfare [32-33].
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These are Rogers’s words, not Pontiac’s, but springing as they do from the
pen of one who had battled his share of Frenchmen, they are essential to
understanding the greater success of his enemies in establishing and perpetuating an
enduring and mutually profitable trade founded on respect and compromise, not greed
and deceit. The importance of Rogers’s dramatic portrait of Pontiac has little to do
with his inventions of plot or dialogue or with his elevation of the Indian leader to the
status of tragic hero. Rogers’s work is remarkable as perhaps the most eloquent
affirmation that the Anglo-American fur trade had essentially failed, not necessarily in
financial terms, for clearly many traders, merchants, and agents had profited
handsomely by their exchange of English manufactured goods for beaver, deerskins,
and other peltry, but rather because English administrators and Americans traders
blindly refused to integrate the purely pecuniary interests of the trade into a broader
imperial program that recognized the fundamental unity of trade and alliance in the
realm of Indian-European relations.
Rogers’s Ponteach was a caustic commentary on the misconduct of English
officers and traders in the period following the expulsion of the French and lent
dramatic color to a specific set of concerns that had plagued colonial officials since
the beginnings of Anglo-Indian trade. The stock characters who inhabited Rogers’s
fictional frontier stood as testament to the extent to which the stereotype of the
unabashedly corrupt Anglo-American trader had already slipped into the colonial
cultural vernacular. In a pattern all-too-familiar to his audience, Rogers’s traders
cheated and stole from the Indians, then blithely ignored the bloody issue of their
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illegitimate dealings. Rogers was hardly the first to recognize the nexus of trade and
alliance in European-Indian relations, nor was he unique in admitting that American
traders had performed abysmally alongside their Canadian rivals. But in portraying
Pontiac and his people as the long-suffering victims of wanton abuse at the hands of
the English, Rogers unabashedly affirmed that the Indian trade, despite its potential
for ensuring a peaceful coexistence, had been perverted into a breeding ground for
hatred and violence.
The full extent to which the English failed to harness the fur trade to greater
imperial purposes can be grasped only in reference to the relationship of commerce
and alliance in the Algonquian societies of the Great Lakes-Ohio Valley region.
Though it is as hazardous to posit generalizations about "Indians"—whether Ojibwas,
Ottawas, Delawares, or M iamis-as to conflate the motives and methods of
"Europeans," it is evident that Indians were on the whole less likely to understand the
exchange of pelts and skins for manufactured goods as an exclusively "economic"
transaction. As Richard White has suggested, the native conception of material
exchange was enmeshed in a web of social, cultural, political, and military
associations that did not allow for easy translation into the traditional European terms
of markets, price, and profit. Trade satisfied far more than the basic material needs
of its Algonquian participants. "The goal of the transaction was not necessarily
profit—securing the maximum material advantage," White suggests. Of greater
importance was the need to "satisfy the besoins, or needs of each party." As such,
the context in which the two parties interacted took on far greater significance than
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what was actually exchanged; if no previous relationship existed between trading
partners, one had to be created. The buyer’s demands thus often overshadowed the
opportunistic advantage of the seller. "The greater the need-provided a social
relationship had been established," White notes, "the greater the claim of the buyer on
the seller." In this sense the Indian conception of exchange was virtually the inverse
of the European: far more than a series of self-interested transactions between virtual
strangers, the fur trade implied a socially and culturally mediated exchange of
material items that manifested a more complex and continuous relationship in which
"buyer" and "seller" were encouraged, indeed required, to sustain a mutual respect
for one another’s welfare.3
The apparent divergence of Indian economic behavior from the ostensibly
"rational," "buy cheap and sell dear" European norm has fueled what most scholars
now consider to be a defunct dispute between a "substantivist" position that argues for
a "culturally relative" approach to understanding the trade in which non-economic
motives take precedence over simple calculations of profit, versus a "formalist" model
in which all humans are assumed to approach the same problems of subsistence and
exchange in a universally "logical" and calculating manner. This rather artificial
dichotomy is not particularly useful in describing Indian-European relations in the fur
trade because it slights the complexity of the ongoing process of contact and
accommodation within various regions and between different groups, as well as

3 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the
Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 9498.
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overlooking the fact that each party could subsequently reformulate or modify its
conception of exchange in order to better serve its own interests. White, for
example, deliberately steers clear of the substantivist-formalist debate by
acknowledging that both the Indians and the French were forced to seek a "middle
ground" that privileged the Indian conception of trade as symbolic of alliance and
mutual responsibility as well as the French desire for profits. The Indians were thus
drawn as much into a new world of transatlantic merchant capitalism as were the
French into the realm of native tradition and practice.4 Similarly, Bruce Trigger blurs
the lines between "rational" and "culturally contingent" conceptions of exchange by
asserting that Indian groups with little or no experience with European technology
nonethless underwent a rapid "cognitive reorganization" that allowed them to
rationally assess the usefulness of European material culture and subsequently to
influence the process of exchange in order to maximize their own advantage.
Fundamentally, Trigger posits a "transcendant" human reason equally operative within
Indian and European modes of exchange.5
Though Indians and Europeans alike may have acted in an similarly rational

4 White, Middle Ground, 95-96.
5 Bruce Trigger, "Early North American Responses to European Contact:
Romantic versus Rationalistic Interpretations," Journal o f American History, 77:4
(1991): 1195-1215. Similarly, Bruce White demonstrates that the Ojibwas and
Dakotas adopted French material culture to suit their own specific needs, regardless
of whether such goods were deemed "utilitarian" or "nonutilitarian" by European
standards. Bruce M. White, "Encounters with Spirits: Ojibwa and Dakota Theories
about the French and Their Merchandise," Ethnohistory, 41:3 (1994): 369-405.
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manner to satisfy their own distinctly different needs, this does not mean that most
Indians ever fully accepted what Europeans considered to be normative economic
behavior. In fact, there is much evidence to suggest the contrary. Though
increasingly implicated in the European mercantile system, the Algonquians of the
pays d'en haut resolutely clung to certain fundamental notions that frequently baffled
English and French observers. The first was a belief in the inherent, fixed value of
goods that has been compared to the earlier European conception of a "just price."
Though the Indians did gradually accede to the idea of "unit prices" for trade goods
as expressed in skins or peltry, they remained generally unwilling to recognize that
such prices might fluctuate in response to the unseen forces of supply and demand.
And just as their conception of inherent value was uncompromising, so too did their
craving for European merchandise remain relatively inelastic as well. The reasons
underlying the unbudging nature of native consumer demand are indistinguishably
cultural and pragmatic. The accumulation of personal property was generally
frowned upon within Algonquian groups; rather, status was measured by generosity
and the redistribution of wealth, a fact which inevitably put a fixed ceiling on
consumption. Indians were also typically less concerned with stockpiling goods
against future wants than their European counterparts and tended to restrict their
purchases solely to those goods necessary to satisfy immediate needs. The static level
of Indian demand was not solely the product of social encouragements or sanctions,
however, for the simple reason that such semi-nomadic peoples were ultimately
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constrained by the limits of what they could efficiently transport.6
In analyzing the eighteenth-century trading accounts of the Hudson’s Bay
Company, Arthur Ray and Donald Freeman have statistically demonstrated the
financial consequences of a characteristically "Indian" economic mentality by plotting
the correlation between fluctuations in the price of beaver and fur receipts. Noting
that price and production levels at the Hudson Bay posts appear to have been
inversely related, they determined that the Indians’s response to improved prices was
best described by a "classical backward sloping supply curve." Quite simply, when
the price the company paid for beaver rose, an individual Indian consumer could
supply his relatively static needs by trading fewer pelts. In so doing, native
consumer-producers did not act according to company expectations. While the
Europeans expected the incentive of greater "profits"—i.e. higher beaver prices-to
spur an increase in fur production, the Indians failed to take advantage of the
beneficial terms of trade by purchasing more goods.7
In attempting to explain to his confused Hudson’s Bay Company superiors why
raising the price offered for beaver would not result in greater fur receipts, the trader
Andrew Graham remarked that

6 White, Middle Ground, 115-16, 129-131; Arthur J. Ray and Donald B.
Freeman, "Give Us Good M e a s u r e A n Economic Analysis o f Relations Between the
Indians and the Hudson’s Bay Company Before 1763 (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1978), 161-62, 222-23.
7 Ray and Freeman, ' Give Us Good M easure," 218-19; E. E. Rich, "Trade
Habits and Economic Motivation Among the Indians of North America," The
Canadian Journal o f Economics and Political Science, 26:1 (1960): 45-49.
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if the trading standard was enlarged in favour of the natives, would
ruin it all; for I am certain if the natives were to get any more for
their furs, they would catch fewer, which I shall make plainly appear
viz. one canoe brings down yearly to the Fort one hundred made
beaver in different kinds of furs, and trades with me seventy of the said
beaver for real necessaries. The other thirty beaver shall so puzzle him
to trade, that he often asks me what he shall buy, and when I make an
answer, Trade some more powder, shot, tobacco and hatchets, etc., his
answer is, I have traded sufficient to serve me and my family until I
see you again next summer; so he will drink one half, and trade the
other with me for baubles.8

Efforts to introduce novel items to the standard assortment of trade
merchandise in hopes of inflating native consumption usually proved futile. Once
their basic needs had been met, the Indians simply refused to trade their excess furs
for items they considered superfluous and would probably bring fewer pelts or skins
to trade the following year. Graham quickly discovered that virtually the only way to
coax Indian consumption upward was to provide ample supplies of tobacco and
particularly alcohol. These two commodities consistently found an eager market,
because of their addictive potential and because both could be consumed in large
quantities on the spot, precluding the need to transport it over long distances. Of
course, the extent to which various Indian groups reacted to the availability of these
products varied greatly. Ample supplies of alcohol, tobacco, or any other
merchandise did not necessarily transform Indians into unrepentant consumers.9

8 Andrew Graham, Andrew Graham’s Observations on Hudson’s Bay, 1767-91,
edited by Glyndwr Williams, Publications of the Hudson’s Bay Record Society, Vol.
27 (London: The Society, 1969), 263.
9 Ray and Freeman, "Give Us Good Measure," 128-35, 225; Rich, "Trade
Habits," 45, 49-50; Arthur J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Hunters,
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Though it has been frequently acknowledged that the Indians of the pays d ’en
haut had a relatively stable and limited demand for European goods, the question of
native "dependency" in the fur trade still pervades the discussion of Indian-European
commercial relations in the eighteenth century. Scholars have for the most part
abandoned the earlier formulation that Indian groups succumbed swiftly and inevitably
to the allure of superior European technology, in so doing becoming irrevocably
dependent for their survival on English or French traders. This position, Toby
Morantz insists, is inherently anachronistic because it reads the social, cultural, and
economic dissolution of twentieth-century Indian societies into a period in which no
such patterns yet existed.10 Morantz further notes that it is impossible to generalize
about Indian dependence in the eighteenth-century fur trade because the rate at which
different Indian groups developed trading relationships with Europeans or integrated
manufactured goods into their own material culture varied considerably. "It is
erroneous to assume that all Indian societies were affected in the same way," Morantz
notes, "or that the fur trade was the single cause of social transformation." Regional
studies have tended to show that each native group developed its own "special social
and cultural accommodations or forms of adaptation" in the trade, and in most cases
the new commercial relationships may simply have reinforced "certain societal

Trappers and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest o f Hudson Bay, 1660-1870 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1974), 142-44; White, Middle Ground, 131.
10 Toby Morantz, "Old Texts, Old Questions: Another Look at the Issue of
Continuity and the Early Fur-Trade Period," Canadian Historical Review, 73:2
(1992): 167, 185-86.
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tendencies already in existence."11
The emphasis that Morantz places on the persistence and continuity of Indian
societies when confronted with the changes wrought by new choices is echoed by
Richard White, who argues that the Indian peoples of the Great Lakes did not become
"dependent" on European goods during the period of Anglo-French rivalry if
dependency implies the "possibility that without European goods and the fur trade the
Algonquians would no longer be able to feed, clothe, or house themselves."12 The
besoins of the Algonquians may indeed have been limited and the demands of
subsistence would always take priority over the acquisition of trade merchandise, but
White feels that perhaps the strongest argument against the possibility of Indian
dependency in this era is the relatively limited extent of the French trade. Given the
cargo capacity of Canadian canoes and the strictly regulated number of congis granted
for trading expeditions to the pays d ’en haul, White concludes that the volume of
trade merchandise entering the Great Lakes region in the first half of the mid
eighteenth century was simply too modest to have triggered an insatiable demand for
European goods. Though he admits that the scale of the fur trade undoubtedly
expanded after the 1720s, it was probably the greater demand for woolens and cloth
that fuelled the increased consumption. Despite their convenience, textiles alone
could not draw Indian consumers helplessly into the snare of commercial capitalism,
and French Canadians were simply not able to supply enough merchandise of any

11 Morantz, "Old Texts," 167-68, 186.
12 White, Middle Ground, 128.
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kind to sustain native dependence. As a result, "a preexisting native technology
survived for a remarkably long time alongside the new technology," White proposes.
"Kettles boiled water, knives cut meat, and guns killed game, but they did not chain
their users inevitably, inexorably, and immediately to the will of the suppliers. A far
less efficient, but still serviceable, native technology remained available if trade goods
were lacking."13
The rate at which an Indian group acquired and assimilated European
merchandise varied in response to a number of conditions, including the frequency of
European trade contact, the amount of goods available, and the degree to which a
particular consumer population developed a need or desire for the new merchandise.
Though it is impossible to describe with any accuracy the precise nature of individual
Indian consumption of trade goods in the eighteenth century, some admittedly limited
generalizations can be drawn on the basis of the few records that document Indian
trading habits. One such source was unwittingly furnished by George Croghan and
his trading associates William Trent, Robert Callender, and Michael Teaffe. Croghan
and his fellow traders lost a considerable amount of trade merchandise and skins to
the French and allied Indians in the chaotic conditions of the early 1750s. Hounded
by creditors demanding payment, Croghan and his agents swore to a series of
affidavits in the spring of 1756 describing the extent o f their losses and noting the
debts that their Indian customers had accrued before the French incursions. These
documents are uniquely revealing because they record the names of individuals

13 White, Middle Ground, 132-33.
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indebted to Croghan along with the sum they owed, expressed both in deerskins
(arbitrarily valued by Croghan at 7 shillings, 6 pence per skin) and Pennsylvania
currency.14
On the basis of these records it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions
concerning the purchasing patterns of Croghan’s Indian customer-suppliers in the
Ohio country.15 The mean debt owed to Croghan and company by the 311 individuals
identified in the lists was approximately 28 deerskins, or £10.67 Pennsylvania
currency (£6.18 sterling). Because the customers are identified by a hodgepodge of
names including anglicized forms ("Delaware George," "Robin Hood"), descriptive
identifiers ("the Pockmarked Fellow," "the Blind Captain"), English renderings of
what were probably Indian titles ("the White Elk," "the Bear"), and attempted
transcriptions of native names ("Bucksenutha," "Porquenish") it is often difficult to
ascertain whether the individual was male or female. That women were indebted to
Croghan and company is clear from these accounts, however. Somewhat less than a

14 These affidavits are filed together in the George Croghan Section of the
Cadwallader Collection at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. The total value of
the traders’ losses, including merchandise, skins, peltry, and Indian debts, was listed
at £6,511 5s. 9d. Pennsylvania currency.
15 Analysis of these records is complicated by the fact that only one of the six lists
was compiled by Croghan himself; the others were drawn up and sworn to by one of
Croghan’s agents, including Thomas Ward, Patrick Mullen, Samuel Chambers, John
Maynard, and David Handpicks. As a result, it was necessary to collate the six lists
to determine whether more than one agent had "trusted out" merchandise to the same
Indian customer, a process which is further confused by the tendency of various
traders to have rendered what appear to be the same Indian names in different, though
phonetically similar, forms (e.g. "Wageleme," "Wegalame," and "Weygelami").
When it seemed warranted, such variants were assumed to refer to the same
individual and the separate debts were collapsed into a single entry.
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quarter of the debtors are referred to not by their own name, but rather in reference
to another individual ("the White Mingo’s brother," "the Big Homini’s friend"). It is
possible that others with ambiguous or Indian names might have been women, but at
least twelve individuals (slightly less than 4 percent of all customers) can be identified
with certainty as female because they are denoted as someone’s mother, sister, or
daughter. The mean debt of these women, 8 skins or £3.1875 (£1.85 sterling), was
significantly less than the overall average. The fact that at least a handful of women
kept their own individual accounts with Croghan, however, is telling in its own right,
particularly since the role of native women in the eighteenth-century fur trade is still
not well understood. White speculates that the amount of time native women spent
making clothing would have been substantially reduced by the availability of European
textiles and finished clothing items, though to what extent this surplus time and
energy would have been channeled into preparing the greater number of skins and
pelts necessary to supply such cloth and woolens is unclear.16 Though the women
trading with Croghan would not have hunted deer, they nonetheless appear to have
wielded at least some degree of personal autonomy in the realm of European-Indian
exchange. Indian women of the western Great Lakes often snared small fur-bearing
animals, the pelts from which they were free to trade themselves. Croghan and his
agents might have credited such peltry to their accounts at a fraction of the rate for
deerskins, which may partly explain why the women’s debts were significantly lower

16 White, Middle Ground, 132.
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than the men’s.17
Certain potential problems of interpretation arise in assessing Croghan’s Indian
debts. Since the debts were compiled in the form of affidavits attested to by several
different traders, it is apparent that a significant number of Indians purchased goods
on credit from more than one of Croghan’s agents. In fact, 46 of the 311 individuals
mentioned in the accounts (almost 15 percent) had commercial ties to at least two of
the traders. This fact underlines the possibility that Croghan’s debt records do not
necessarily offer an entirely accurate picture of individual consumption patterns
because Croghan or his agent may have been only one of several Anglo-American or
French traders with whom an Indian dealt. The Moravian missionary David
Zeisberger estimated that a single Indian hunter in the Ohio country could kill
between 50 and 150 deer each year.18 Given this rate of potential production, the
relatively large number of skins owed to Croghan by certain Indians suggests that
some, at least, must have traded almost exclusively with Croghan and company.
Forty-eight of the 311 debtors (15.4 percent) owed 50 or more skins, while some 20
individuals (6.4 percent) had debts in excess of 100 skins. These comparatively high
figures might suggest that Croghan and his agents allowed certain individuals’ debts to
accrue over a period of several seasons, but this is unlikely since Croghan and his
fellow traders—themselves indebted to Philadelphia merchants—generally expected all

17 Sylvia Van Kirk, "Many Tender Ties": Women in Fur-Trade Society in Western
Canada (Winnipeg: Watson & Dwyer, 1980), 58-59, 71-73.
18 James P. McClure, "The Ohio Valley’s Deerskin Trade: Topics for
Consideration," The Old Northwest, 15:3 (1990): 116.
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advances on merchandise to be repaid immediately after the next hunting season.
Many of the Indians who owed fewer than 50 deerskins might not have concentrated
on hunting or had less desire or need for goods, and so it is possible that they still
may have traded exclusively with Croghan despite their relatively small debts. But it
is ultimately impossible, based on the scant sources detailing Indian purchasing
patterns, to determine whether Croghan’s debt records are representative of broader
patterns of native trade-good acquisition or deerskin production. If, as Croghan’s
accounts suggest, the mean debt of Indian hunters in the Ohio country in the 1750s
was about 28 skins, the level of native consumption was relatively moderate and
would not have entailed significant alterations to the hunting or subsistence patterns of
Indian groups. Evidence submitted by William Johnson in the early 1760s, however,
points to the contrary.
Though Croghan and his agents did not itemize the purchases of individual
consumers in their accounting of Indian debts, it is still possible to offer a suggestive
picture of annual Indian consumption for a slightly later period. In an effort to
determine the value of duties he could collect from the sale of trade goods in his
northern Indian Department, Johnson estimated the amount and value of all trade
merchandise necessary to supply roughly 10,000 Indian hunters, and their wives and
children, for an entire year.19 When Johnson’s suggested quantities of trade goods are
divided by 10,000, the results represent what each hunter and his wife could be
expected to purchase, on average. This included:

19 Johnson, "A Scheme for Meeting Expenses of Trade," WJP, 4: 559.
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2 blankets
3 strouds
4 shirts
4 pairs of stockings
1 lap
3 pieces of gartering
2 pounds of vermilion
2,000 grains of black wampum
500 grains of white wampum
2 knives
6 awls
1 pound of brass wire
0.5 pound of beads
1 looking glass
1 razor
5 gallons of rum
8 pounds of gunpowder
16 pounds of lead
(0.3 trade guns)
(0.5 beaver traps)
1 axe
(1 pound of kettles)
and a small number of miscellaneous items, including hair plates, "silver
trinkets," calicoes and calimancoes, ribbons, and silk handkerchiefs20

Johnson predicted that the wholesale value of the merchandise supplied to the
Indian hunters of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley would amount to £179,594

20 Obviously, no Indian would have purchased one third of a trade gun, half a
beaver trap, or a one-pound kettle. Rather, these fractions represent Johnson’s belief
that Indian hunters would typically purchase a new gun every three years and a beaver
trap biennially. English and French kettles were available in a variety of different
sizes, but the Indians generally preferred them smaller and lighter for ease of
mobility. The median weight of eighteenth-century trade kettles discovered in the
course of underwater archaeological investigations at rapids along canoe routes is in
the range of three pounds, eight ounces. According to Johnson’s figures, it is
reasonable to assume that a kettle might be replaced every three or four years. See
Dean Lloyd Anderson, "Documentary and Archaeological Perspectives on European
Trade Goods in the Western Great Lakes Region," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University, 1992), 130-31.
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sterling. Assuming, as did Johnson, that the traders earned 100 percent profit on the
sale of these goods, the average annual purchase of each Indian "head of household”
would have amounted to £36 sterling, six times more than the mean debt owed to
Croghan a decade before. Using Croghan’s standard of 7 shillings, six pence (£
0.2169 sterling) per deerskin, each hunter would have been required to hunt about
166 deer to supply his family with trade merchandise, somewhat beyond the upper
limit of Zeisberger’s estimate of their annual potential. Johnson may have been
overly optimistic about the purchasing power of the Indians in his northern
department, but if his calculations were accurate they suggest that by the 1760s, at
least, the Indians of the pays d'en haut were necessarily more reliant in the fur/skins
trade than they had been earlier in the century.
Johnson’s assumptions about Indian consumption otherwise hold few surprises.
He reasonably expected that each year an Indian family would need a few articles of
clothing, a couple of blankets, and some new tools. But two items, rum and guns,
warrant greater attention because of their salience in the debate surrounding the issue
of native dependency and the fur trade. Considering the extent to which both English
and French observers in the eighteenth century remarked on the widespread nature of
Indian alcohol abuse, Johnson’s estimates of alcohol consumption seem remarkably
low. If a "family" of two adults together consumed five gallons of alcohol per year,
they drank less than one ounce per day each, hardly enough to sustain rampant or
prolonged alcholism. In fact, the amount of rum Johnson expected to be sold to each
Indian was probably less than the average consumption of their Anglo-Americans
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neighbors.21 Taking into account the litany of abuses that attended the widespread use
of rum in the Indian trade and his own personal desire to carefully regulate its sale,
Johnson almost certainly undervalued the amount of alcohol that ultimately reached
the trading posts of the Northwest. But even had far greater quantities of alcohol
flowed into the pays d ’en haut, it is unlikely that the majority of Indians consumed
more alcohol per capita than their hard-drinking American neighbours.
Native drinking practices, particularly the unrestrained "bingeing" that was
generally thought to be characteristic of Indian groups, has elicited intense scrutiny
from outside observers, whether European colonists and missionaries or modem
ethnohistorians, anthropologists, and sociologists.22 Indian alcoholic behavior has
been variously explained as the mimicking of the traders’ own drinking patterns, a
means to attain heightened spiritual awareness, a response to internal group tensions,
and the expression of the frustration and anxiety associated with the breakdown of
"traditional" native social and cultural life. In his analysis of the journal of Frangois
Victor Malhiot, an early nineteenth-century trader in the western Great Lakes region,
Jack Waddell measured the quantity, frequency, variability, rate, duration, and

21 During the colonial period the annual per capita consumption of hard liquor
(primarily rum) increased gradually to 3.7 gallons just before the Revolution, and
peaked at 5 gallons in the 1820s. These figures do not include significant quantities
of beer, wine, and cider. W. J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic: An American
Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 7-9.
22 Perhaps the most thorough contemporary analysis of Indian alcohol abuse was
offered by the Sulpician missionary Frangois Vachon de Belmont at the end of the
seventeenth century. Belmont’s original text, Histoire de I’Eau-de-Vie en Canada, is
translated in "Belmont’s History of Brandy,” edited by Joseph P. Donnelly, MidAmerica, 34:1 (1952): 42-63.
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context of Chippewa alcohol behavior. Waddell notes that the per capita level of
alcohol consumption is less revealing than the nature of the drinking itself. Alcohol
was more likely to be consumed in several concentrated episodes, not gradually over
an extended period of time. Such binges heightened the potential for social disruption
and violence, but only until the limited supply of liquor was exhausted. Waddell
concludes that the Chippewa, at least, "were no more or no less abusive in their uses
of alcohol, when it was periodically available, than any other population—including
Malhiot’s own workers, under similar circumstances."23 As in the case of the
Chippewa, the prevalence of social disruption and addiction in any other Indian group
would ultimately have hinged on the availability and cost of alcohol, in addition to a
variety of other social, cultural, and practical considerations, not the least of which
involved the potentially negative influence of European traders.
In the popular imagination, at least, the Indians’ craving for guns is believed
to have been nearly as potent as their unquenchable thirst for alcohol. Despite the
fact that guns, gunpowder, lead, flints, and all the peripheral equipment necessary for
the use and maintenance of firearms were perennial staples of the trade, it appears
that even by the early 1760s Indian hunters were hardly helpless in their absence.
According to Johnson’s accounting each native hunter might purchase roughly eight
pounds of gunpowder annually. Firing a single shot with the standard eighteenthcentury British military musket-the lethal, if wildly inaccurate, "Brown Bess"—

23 Jack O. Waddell, "Malhiot’s Journal: An Ethnohistoric Assessment of
Chippewa Alcohol Behavior in the Early Nineteenth Century," Ethnohistory, 32:3
(1985): 246-68.
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expended 100 grams of powder, though trade guns may have required somewhat less
depending on their size and the load used.24 Eight pounds of powder might therefore
have supplied the purchaser with no more than 40 or 50 shots at best. Even if he was
a crack shot, an Indian primarily hunting deer could not have taken more than a third
of the skins necessary to purchase Johnson’s reputed "average" supply of trade goods
using his gun. It is more likely that Indian consumers arrived to trade with a variety
of different furs and skins, many of which had been snared in the beaver and brasswire traps noted in Johnson’s list of essential merchandise. Bow-hunting must also
have continued to supplement guns notoriously prone to misfire and breakage and
which rapidly exhausted costly powder supplies. Indian gun use, it appears, may
have loomed larger in the anxieties of frontier settlers than in the mundane reality of
production for the fur trade.23

24 Operating any type of firearm in the eighteenth century was a potentially costly
proposition, and gunpowder was the most expensive component of the hunter’s
arsenal. Depending on the gauge of the gun and the type of shot, 12 to 18 balls
might be cast from a pound of lead. Gunflints were also essential to the effective
operation of the firearm; though they were relatively inexpensive, they were rapidly
depleted. It has been estimated that in ideal conditions a flintlock user could expect a
misfire rate in the range of 20 to 25 percent if the flint was replaced after 15 shots,
with proportionately better reliability if changed after 10 or fewer firings. See Brian
J. Given, A Most Pernicious Thing; Gun Trading and Native Warfare in the Early
Contact Period (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), 98, 109, 110.
25 'Tt is evident that in terms of accuracy," Given claims, "rate of fire, misfire
rate, availability and repairability, the bow is clearly superior to the musket." An
experienced bowman might get off five to twelve times the number of shots as a
proficient gun user, and the bow itself was easier to obtain, repair, and supply with
ammunition. The bow was lighter, easier to transport, and had the advantage of
"reliability and silence." A Most Pernicious Thing, 109-110. Conversely, Ray
suggests that the gun might have been more efficient in forest hunting because of its
greater "stopping power," which precluded the lengthy pursuit of wounded game.
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Whether purchasing alcohol, the accoutrements necessary to operating a gun,
or the countless other manufactured items supplied by European traders, Indians soon
became critical consumers by even the strictest European standards, carefully noting
the quality, durability, and effectiveness of each item and demanding that they be
given "good measure," or what they understood to be a fair price. When Johnson
ordered blankets from his London supplier William Baker, for example, his niggling
precision echoed the exacting standards of his Indian customers. "Please to observe
the greatest fault of the Blankets formerly sent me," he warned, "was that they were
woven too Cloose, & the Wool too Short & Coarse, besides the letters, and other
marks, Selvage &ca were not exactly the same of the Pattern, nor so neat, all which
the Ind“ . are verry [sic] curious In."2fi With well-defined expectations of both cost
and value, the native consumer, far more than the merchant or trader, dictated the
type and style of goods that were consumed in the trade and to some extent the rates
of exchange. From the Indian perspective, the cessation of trade involved merely the
inconvenience of a resort to less efficient technology, but to the trader or merchant
Indian dissatisfaction spelled financial disaster. This fact was foremost in the minds
of frustrated Canadian and Anglo-American merchants and colonial officials who
lodged regular complaints with their suppliers concerning the minutest stylistic or
technical flaws in their merchandise. Aside from whatever unique cultural and

Regardless, once guns had been incorporated into the hunt, they became increasingly
essential as Indians gradually lost their skill with bows. Ray, Indians in the Fur
Trade, 73.
26 Johnson to William Baker, 24 December 1752. WJP, 1: 384.
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economic assumptions the Indian consumers brought to the fur trade, they acted as
"rationally" as any European consumer in assessing the value o f manufactured goods
in light of their own particular needs and experience.27
Because of the distinctive language or behavior individual Indians were likely
to use in the context of trade, however, an inexperienced observer of such
transactions could easily have overestimated Indian dependence on the trader when the
reverse was actually the case. Though Ray interprets the typical Indian plea in the
Hudson Bay trade to "take pity on us" as mere politeness, Mary Black-Rogers
suggests that the self-deprecating language commonly used by Indians as a precursor
to trade carried more subtly encoded meanings. Noting the frequency of recorded
instances in which Indians referred to themselves as "starving," or asked for "pity"
from traders, Black-Rogers understands such language in the context of a variety of
different linguistic functions. Using similar phraseology, Indians could literally
describe conditions of deprivation with specific reference to the disadvantageous terms
of trade which forced them to neglect subsistence activities in order to produce
sufficient pelts or skins for trade. But in many cases such pleas expressed more than
a literal description of want. In many Indian groups the process of self-humbling was
actively encouraged, while boasting of one’s relative power or prestige was frowned
upon as "ignoble" and, in the context of fur-trade negotiations, imprudent. If IndianEuropean exchange implied the creation of a relationship of mutual support, the
appearance of humility or weakness had a distinct advantage to an Indian "whose

27 Ray and Freeman, "Give Us Good Measure, " 226-27.
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cultural wisdom taught him long ago to appear powerless in order to wield power."
Finally, Black-Rogers does not discount the possibility that such self-deprecatory
remarks may also have been merely examples of native humor misunderstood by
somber Europeans.2®
An individual Indian’s use of a "ritual" humility may have served the
pragmatic purposes of negotiating better terms of trade, but it is also clear that similar
conceptions of dependency and mutual obligation were translated into far broader and
inclusive appeals in the course of Indian-European diplomatic and military relations.
As viewed by White, the alliance of the French and Algonquian peoples and
Europeans in the "middle ground" of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley was
formulated in terms of the relationship between a French "father" or "Onontio" and
his Indian "children." The exchange of material goods thus necessarily become a
crucial component of their mutual responsibility. Because these obligations were met
through a variety of channels besides straightforward trade, including gift-giving and
other diplomatic exercises, the Algonquians conceived of the fur trade not so much as
a discretely commercial relationship, but rather as a thread in the complex fabric of
relations which bound the two parties together in alliance. Thus, when Indians
expected to receive "good measure" or bon marcte, they embedded their own
conception of exchange into the very core of political and diplomatic relations.

28 Arthur J. Ray, "Indians as Consumers in the Eighteenth Century," in Old Trails
and New Directions: Papers o f the Third North American Fur Trade Conference,
edited by Carol M. Judd and Arthur J. Ray (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1980), 253; Mary Black-Rogers, "Varieties of "Starving": Semantics and Survival in
the Subarctic Fur Trade, 1750-1850," Ethnohistory, 33:4 (1986): 353-83.
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"The idea of a bon march# was flexible enough to encompass both a French
profit and the Algonquian notion of a father’s generosity to his children," White
proposes, "but the room to maneuver within it remained limited. To violate the
compromise worked out for exchange on the middle ground and exact excessive
prices threatened the entire structure of relations."29 From the French perspective, the
perpetuation of an equitable and mutually beneficial trade relationship was critical to
the continued profitability of the trade. If traders violated the precepts of bon
march#, they risked both the loss of commerce and the possibility of violence.30 But
the true engine that drove the often tenuous process of accommodation in the fur trade
was not profit but rather the overarching fact of Anglo-French competition for the
allegiance of the Indians of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley. Without a properly
sanctioned trade, there was no possibility of a reliable alliance with the Indians, and
without alliance there was a greatly diminished chance of diplomatic or military
success.
No one recognized this fundamental fact of the "middle ground" more than the
Indians involved in the eighteenth-century trade, who consistently employed the fact
of Anglo-French rivalry to their own advantage. Whether in the hinterlands of the
northwestern Great Lakes or the hunting territories of the Ohio country, Indian groups
consistently exploited the competition between rival European traders both to
ameliorate the terms of trade and to ensure that the quality of manufactured goods

29 White, Middle Ground, 97-119; quotation at 119.
30 White, Middle Ground, 57.

remained high. Those Indians with ready access to both Canadian and AngloAmerican trading centers were best able to profit from competitive conditions, but
usually the mere threat of taking their commerce to the "opposition" had the desired
effect. If Indian consumers told the French that English woolens were superior or
complained to the English that French powder was cheaper and more effective, it was
because such complaints, whether true or not, made good economic sense. As long
as Canadian and Anglo-American traders kept a watchful eye on the quality and price
of their competitors’ merchandise and accordingly strove to improve the quality of
their own goods, Indian consumers gladly reaped the ultimate reward.31

31 Ray, "Indians as Consumers," 267.

CHAPTER V
FURS AND SKINS, HEARTS AND MINDS

The most inveterate enemies of Anglo-American officials in the eighteenth
century did not speak French. In fact, far more imperialist ink was spilled decrying
the misdeeds of New York and Pennsylvania traders than damning their foreign
rivals. Even at the height of the European contest for trade and empire in the Great
Lakes and Ohio country, the most rabidly anti-French Americans grudgingly admitted
that the French Canadians had enjoyed significantly more success in reaping the
benefits of an "enlightened" trade: a coherent and well-regulated enterprise directed
to serve a greater diplomatic end that was notably free of the sabotaging effects of
fraud and abuse so familiar in the context of the English commerce.
Those Anglo-American officials most steeped in Indian affairs-William
Johnson, Cadwallader Colden, Edmond Atkin, and Peter Wraxall, among others—
recognized that the French had always enjoyed every possible advantage over them in
the conduct of the trade and would continue to do so after the Conquest. These men
had long been suspicious of the motives and means of the French enterprise in North
America but had learned to respect its results. "Far from approving all the inhuman,
mean & infamous Methods they have taken to establish their present extensive
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Influence in these parts of the World," Wraxall allowed, "it is however to be wished
that we had looked forwards as much as they have done & been as industrious to lay
a foundation for our future Security and Commerce."1 It was apparent to American
imperialists that, in the words of the Pennsylvanian Charles Thomson, "the English
might easily have engrossed the Trade, and secured the Affections, of many of the
Indian nations; whereas, by neglecting this, and suffering a Parcel of Banditti, under
the character of Traders, to run up and down from one Indian Town to another,
cheating and debauching the Indians, we have given them an ill Opinion of our
Religion and Manners, and lost their Esteem and Friendship."2
The reasons underlying French superiority seemed obvious to those who had
any experience in the conduct of Indian relations. For all their boasts of superior
manufactured goods, shorter trade routes, and higher peltry prices, the colonial
Americans themselves offered the most exacting and damning account of their failure
to effectively challenge the French for the western trade. Even after the creation of
the Indian superintendencies in 1756, the seaboard provinces patently failed to
effectively regulate either their trade or their traders. In this vacuum of authority, too
many self-interested and unlicensed agents had ruthlessly pursued profits at the
expense of their Indian customers, flooded the frontier with rum, and brazenly
ignoring the inevitable political fallout of their misconduct. Even when they did

1 Peter Wraxall, AIA, 180n.
2 Charles Thomson, An Enquiry Into the Causes and Alienation o f the Delaware
and Shawanese Indians from the British Interest, and Into the Measures Taken fo r
Recovering Their Friendship (London: J. Wilkie, 1759), 75.
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occasionally acknowledge the intertwined nature of commerce and alliance, the traders
showed a disturbing tendency to take diplomatic matters into their own hands and act
at cross-purposes to their disheartened governments. Too often the trade was
relinquished, by default or design, to ill-educated and overzealous underlings with
little to lose and much to gain from illegitimate business practices. When not
tampering with fraudulent weights and measures or championing the cause of Indian
intoxication, some reckless traders used the liberal extension of credit to draw Indian
customers into a web of perpetual debt before stepping casually aside when native
resentment flared.
The French, meanwhile, appeared to have overcome their "inherent" economic
liabilities by efficiently employing the trade to ensure the loyalty of their Indian
trading partners. "We must look . . . into the Conduct and Management of the
French," warned Edmond Atkin, the southern Superintendent of Indian Affairs, in his
1755 report to the Board of Trade. Only by practicing analogous "Arts," he
professed, could the English hope to gain any measurable competitive advantage.
"Under a Commerce clogged with a most hazardous Navigation & expensive
Transportation of Goods, with the additional load of paying all the Charges of their
Government, and under a total inability at any rate of supplying all the wants of the
Indians," Atkin allowed, "they [the French] have still gain’d their Affections, and
consequently that surprising Influence which we have felt."3 Atkin may have

3 Edmond Atkin, The Appalachian Indian Frontier: The Edward Atkin Report and
the Plan o f 1 755, edited by Wilbur R. Jacobs (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1967), 9.
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exaggerated the handicaps facing the French, but he certainly did not overestimate
their successes. Even if the New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians could somehow
consistently supply better goods at cheaper rates--an unlikely supposition in itself—this
ability alone hardly guaranteed the continuing commerce or ardent allegiance of native
customers who were perennialy cheated and scorned by unscrupulous vendors.
Unwilling to forsake the hoary doctrine that New Yorkers possessed "many
natural and constitutional advantages over the French," Wraxall determined that only
the "Base and Artful Measures" of the French could have enabled them to sustain a
stranglehold on the trade of the western Great Lakes. "More honesty & Generosity
on our side," he granted, "would have in great measure defeated the whole System of
French Policy, but on the contrary we have aided their Views by our Dishonesty &
Oppression with regard to our Trade with the Indians. "4 Atkin similarly concluded
that the fraudulent dealings of English traders probably obliterated any potential
commercial advantage they might have wielded over the French. Though the South
Carolinian accepted the dubious premise that his New York brethren could easily
furnish goods "at near half the price that the French can from Montreal," whether any
savings were actually passed on to the Indians, Atkins allowed, remained "a
Question."5
Years after the French had been "subdued" on paper, Anglo-American
merchants and officials remained haunted by the specter of French success in the

4 Wraxall, A1A, 205n.
5 Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 14.
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West. Describing the Illinois trade in 1765, Johnson lamented that the Indians
persisted in dealing almost exclusively with French-speaking traders. This dogged
commercial loyalty, he speculated, was compounded by the failure of the new
American traders to earn the trust of the local Indians. "His Majesties Subjects in
this Country," he noted,
seem very ill Calculated to Cultivate a good understanding with the
Indians, and this a Notorious proof of it, for notwithstanding the
Expence of transporting Goods from New Orleans to the llinois is
greater than by the Lakes, and Consequently French Goods are in
general dearer than ours, yet such is the Conduct of all persons under
the Crown of France whether Officers, Agents, or Traders that the
Indians will go much farther to buy their goods and pay a much higher
price for them. This all persons acquainted with the Nature of the
Commerce to the Westward can fully Evidence.6

Just as the wily McDoIe and Muiphey took center stage in Rogers’s dramatic
portrayal of Pontiac’s uprising, the notoriously unreliable trader figured prominently
in the imagination of frustrated officials grappling with the manifold challenges of
Anglo-Indian relations. Those few well-connected traders such as Croghan with
considerable investments in the frontier trade were probably more scrupulous in their
treatment of Indian customers. The frequency and acrimony with which American
officials complained of their behavior, however, suggests that the myth of the

6 Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 16 November 1765,1HC, 11: 117-18.

226
dishonest trader was unfortunately grounded more in fact than fiction.7 In Johnson’s
opinion, the men who gravitated to the trade were those sufficiently fluent in Indian
languages but uncertain enough in their financial prospects to be attracted by cheap
credit and the promise of quick and easy profits. Unfortunately, they also tended to
be, in Atkins’s description, "the loosest kind of People" and were accordingly
"despis’d and held in great Contempt by the Indians as Liars, and Persons regarding
nothing but their own Gain."8
English traders had not always been so universally unsavory. Johnson dated
the precipitous decline of collective commercial character from the later 1740s, since
few experienced traders had returned to the business after the disruptions of King
George’s War. Since that time, however, "the profits made by a few" in the trade
had "induced such Numbers to embark in it, amongst Whom were the very Dregs of
the people, such as discharged Provincial Soldiers, Batteaumen &ca."9 But most of

7 "That Croghan followed honest trading methods did not necessarily connote an
innate streak of nobility in his character," Wainwright allows. "If for no other
reasons, he preferred legitimate trading because it would not have paid him to indulge
in sharp practices." But, if Croghan was as well-loved by the Indians as Wainwright
suggests, his popularity merely underlines the unattractiveness of his fellow traders.
Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 67. Jacobs agrees that most established
traders were less aggressively opportunistic than their employees or unlicensed
competitors, but even the most respected traders were not always above suspicion.
“Most traders seemed to have accepted the premise," he suggests, "that the Indian
trade permitted ethical standards other than those used in transactions with whites."
Wilbur R. Jacobs, Dispossessing the American Indian; Indians and Whites on the
Colonial Frontier (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972), 32, 33-34.
8 Johnson, "Review of the Trade and Affairs in the Northern District in
America," 22 September 1767,1HC, 16: 25; Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 8.

227
the problem of personnel predated this period; Johnson and others pointed to the fact
that it had always been a relatively easy matter to obtain trade merchandise on credit
and set up shop as an Indian trader, regardless of attitude or aptitude. In many
instances, Atkin noted, even the established, trustworthy traders habitually left their
affairs in the hands of ill-qualified servants and even "Pack horse Men," whose
unsupervised behavior was easier "conceived than described."10
Most disparaging Anglo-American observers (with the emphasis on "Anglo")
implied that the ethnicity of the traders was tantamount to fraud. They never failed to
note that the Dutch, rivaled only by the Scots-Irish, had been among the worst
offenders in the trade and were accordingly responsible for any lingering native
resentment of the English. Notoriously hostile to the Albany Dutch, Wraxall
peppered his abridgment of the minutes of New York’s commissioners of Indian
affairs with scathing rebukes of his neighbors, blaming their characteristically sharp
trading practices for New York’s checkered history of Indian relations.11 From the
earliest days of the trade, when the Iroquois and "western" tribes travelled to Albany
with their furs, the handlaers had taken every possible advantage of their native

9 Johnson, IHC, 16: 38; Thomas Elliot Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New
York, 1686-1776 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 214.
10 Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 22.
11 "The Complaints of the Indians upon the dearness of Goods & the unfair
treatment they meet with from the Traders," Wraxall reported, "are so very frequent
thro-ought the whole Records that tho I have several times noted ’em in these
Abstracts I have more frequently omitted them." For all his self-professed restraint,
however, Wraxall’s anti-Dutch editorial remarks border on the pathological. Wraxall,
AIA, 205n.
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customers, he alleged. The Dutch preyed upon unwitting Indians, luring them into
their houses to trade, then inciting them to drunkenness before spiriting away their
furs for a pittance. In some cases, Wraxall claimed, greedy Dutchmen sank so low as
to buy goods distributed as official presents to the Indians, only to sell them back
within a few days at greatly advanced prices. "Our Dutch reptiles," he hissed,
"considered nothing but their present profit, & were animated by no Views to
Posterity, wch is the genuine Character of true Dutchmen." Since the Indians "have
often laid it down as a fundamental Maxim that their Connexions with us arose from
& depended on trade," Wraxall contended, Dutch commercial abuses ultimately paved
the way for the "Progress of the French."12
Though none could match Wraxall for ferocity of invective, it is clear that his
fellow New York imperialists shared similar ethnic prejudices. Johnson did not go so
far as to accuse New York’s traders of complicity with the French, but he made it
clear that being the "posterity of the Low Dutch," they were naturally frugal and so
had no interest in "extending the trade" but were content merely to barter enough to
maintain themselves "in idleness" for the rest of the year.13 Though his criticism was
more subtle than Wraxall’s, Johnson’s message was essentially the same. The New
York fur trade had never reached its full potential as a diplomatic tool because the
traders had been more interested in their own petty profits than in greater imperial
transactions.

12 Wraxall, AIA, 132n., 180n. 205n.
13 Johnson, 1HC, 3: 25-26.
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If the Dutch were the great villains of the New York fur trade, the Scots-Irish
were similarly the scapegoats of Pennsylvania’s equally dysfunctional frontier
commerce. Described uncharitably as "a sett of the most debased banditti that ever
infested a government, the greater part gaol gleaning and the refuse of Ireland,” the
Ohio Valley deerskin traders soon earned the derision of Philadelphia legislators
driven to despair by the endless complaints of disgruntled Delaware and Shawnee
emissaries.14 The colonial assembly, showing increasing concern for Indian relations
in the days preceding the outbreak of full-fledged war with the French, lamented "the
miserable situation of our Indian trade carried on (some few excepted) by the vilest of
our own Inhabitants and Convicts imported from Great-Britain and Ireland, by which
means the English Nation is unhappily represented among our Indian Allies in the
most disagreeable Manner."15 It was easy, in retrospect, for prim Pennsylvanians to
foist blame for the decrepit state of Anglo-Indian relations on Scots-Irish "convicts"
and troublemakers. But whatever their pedigree, many deerskin traders admittedly
used remarkably poor judgment--and equally remarkable quantities of liquor~in their
dealings with the Indians of the Ohio Valley.16

14 John Baynton and Samuel Wharton to Richard Neave, 1 July 1760, quoted in
Wainwright, George Croghan, 67.
15 Thomson, An Enquiry, 76.
16 Jennings suggests that as a result of their peculiar historical experience, the
Scots-Irish more than any group in Pennsylvania’s backcountry were "accustomed to
the invader’s role and practices" and carried with them a "hatred of both overlords
and natives." Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant
Chain Confederation o f Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its beginnings to the
Lancaster Treat o f1744 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1984), 348-50.
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Most New Yorkers believed, justifiably, that the handlaers had been guilty of
their fair share of fraudulent dealings when the Indians had come directly to trade at
Albany. They hoped, however, that the new post at Oswego could be better governed
to prevent any further alienation of the colony’s Indian allies and trading partners.
Despite the presence of a commissioner charged with overseeing the day-to-day
conditions of the trade, it soon became clear that the Oswego traders were no less
likely to cheat the Indians than their much maligned Albany counterparts.17 Peter
Kalm, the peripatetic Swede, came away from a brief visit to the lakeside post
convinced that the Indians were "frequently cheated in disposing of their goods,
especially when they are in liquor" and that "sometimes they do not get one half of
the value of their goods."18 On a similar visit, Pennsylvania naturalist John Bartram
optimistically detailed the measures recently taken at Oswego to prevent such
violations, though his description of the alleged reforms reads less like a paean to the
improved character of the trade than a commentary on past abuses. Bartram noted
that the town consisted of about 70 houses in two opposing rows. Indians arriving for
trade were lodged in their own dwellings, where all exchanges were to be conducted.
"This is surely an excellent regulation for preventing the traders from imposing on the
Indians," Bartram opined, "a practice which they have been formerly too guilty of,
and which has frequently involved the English colonies in difficulties, and constantly

17 Governor Montgomerie to the Lords of Trade, 29 August 1729, NYCD, 5: 896;
Montgomerie to the Lords of Trade, 21 December 1730, NYCD, 5: 907.
18 Peter Kalm, Travels Into North America, translated by John Reinhold Forster
(Barre, Massachusetts: The Imprint Society, 1972), 331-32.
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tended to depreciate us in the esteem of the natives." Bartram further noted that the
post’s "chief officer" kept a watchful eye for Indians arriving by water, sending out a
canoe to guide them safely to the fort to prevent any overambitious traders from
offering the traditional Oswego welcome: "inciting them with spiritous liquors" and
relieving them of their peltry. The commander was also vigilant to prevent the
eruption of violence, ensuring that "all quarelling [sic], and even the least
misunderstanding, when any happens, be quickly made up in an amicable manner,"
thus precluding the "disagreeable consequences of an Indians endeavouring to right
himself by force."19
Bartram’s claim that the Oswego trade had been remedied proved optimistic.
While concerned New York officials agonized over how to curb continuing abuses at
the only Anglo-American post on the Great Lakes, the Indians continued to suffer at
the hands of ruthless traders. As filtered through English records, the Iroquois and
western Indians who traded with the New Yorkers recounted an embarrassingly
familiar narrative of victimization and mistreatment. To illustrate the ease with which
his painstaking diplomatic efforts could be ruined by a single reckless trader, Johnson
graphically recounted the most alarming instances of fraud. Drawing from a "Variety

19 Bartram seems implicitly to have grasped the interrelatedness of trade and
diplomacy and the danger of ignoring this fact. The Indians "can scarcely be blamed
for judging of a nation, by the behaviour of those with whom they have the most
intercourse," Bartram suggested, "a judgment I am sorry to confess that has (till
lately) tended much to the making them in favour rather of the French, than English."
John Bartram, Observations on the Inhabitants, Climate, Soil, Rivers, Productions,
Animals, and other matters worthy o f notice, Made By Mr. John Bartram, In his
Travels from Pensilvania to Onondago, Oswego and the Lake Ontario, in Canada
(London: J. Whiston and B. White, 1751), 48-50.
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of unheard of frauds," he recounted the tale of an influential Ottawa chief who
brought his packs of peltry to an Oswego trader in order to "try the Market."
The Trader after the usual practice of deceiving him in the Weight
hurried the peltry into a private room telling the Indian that all
Merchandise was very dear, owing to the Severity of dutys (a Stale, but
dangerous Artifice still practised) desired him to choose out what goods
he wanted, the Indian having made a Choice was astonished to find that
his Skins produced not one third of what he had been Accustomed to
receive for the like Quantity (for the Trader had besides his Extortion
on the goods reckoned the peltry at only one Third of its real weight)
went away discontented but returning Said he was Ashamed to go back
with Such Small returns begged for a small keg of rum which the
Trader gave him as he said as a high favor but on opening the keg soon
after his departure it proved to be Water.20
This incident, among others, resulted in the loss of "the Trade and Affections"
of the Ottawas he had long labored to attract to Oswego. Yet another Ottawa chief,
Johnson recalled, had purchased thirty small kegs of rum for a "General feast."
Claiming that he would be punished for allowing them too much alcohol, the
scheming trader cautioned his customers not to open them until they had returned
home. When the Ottawas thirstily opened the kegs before reaching Niagara,
however, they too tasted Lake Ontario’s waters. "This has been often acknowledged
by these Traders," Johnson claimed, "and on its coming to the knowledge of the

20 Johnson, IHC, 16: 28-29. Fraudulent use of weights and measures was
characteristic of the Anglo-American trade. Kennedy called for "proper Regulations
for the Trade" that would prevent the Indians from being "so unmercifully imposed
upon, both in Weight and Measure, as well as in Quality and Prices, which has
almost alienated their Hearts from us." Archibald Kennedy, Serious Considerations
on the Present State o f the Affairs o f the Northern Colonies (New York, 1754), 11;
see also Johnson, IHC, 16: 26; Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 22; Peter
Wraxall, "Some Thoughts Upon the British Interest in North America, More
Particularly as it Relates to the Northern Confederacy Commonly Called the Six
Nations," 9 January 1756, NYCD, 7: 27.
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French, they made so good a Use of it, that these People and all their friends were
ever after our most implacable enemys."21
Johnson’s last woeful yam concerned a Seneca warrior whose "influence and
abilities" were legendary and who was only reluctantly won into alliance with the
English. In a gesture of good will, Johnson issued a passport for the Seneca and his
war party to travel to Schenectady to seek a market for their peltry. Johnson made
arrangements in advance for a local fur merchant there to "use them kindly and do
them the Strictest Justice," but his carefully laid plans soon went awry. The trader
later confessed that "as they were Strangers he had doubled the prices of his goods
and allowed them but half the Weight of their peltry." The Senecas were not amused.
On their way home the chief sent Johnson a wampum belt to notify him of the
treacherous transaction, the details of which were also marked on an axe handle. The
chief assured Johnson that he would always have a "personal regard" for him but
emphasized that he had no more patience for the English who had too often "served
him so." The Seneca leader was so angered by the Schenectady incident, Johnson
noted glumly, that he soon pledged his allegiance to the French "who knew how to
treat them." In a few days, in fact, the Seneca chief "cut off a large Settlement" and
henceforth continued to be "the most Violent Enemy" of the English.22
Examples of abuse were hardly limited to the New York trade. In fact, some
of the worst examples of flagrant mistreatment were recounted by the Delawares,

21 Johnson, IHC, 16: 29.
22 Johnson, IHC, 16: 29-30.
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Shawnees, and Susquehannas who dealt with Pennsylvania deerskin traders. In the
Ohio country as on the Great Lakes, most incidents of fraud involved the liberal and
often illegal distribution of alcohol. Whenever rum traded hands, the potential for
abuse increased markedly. Because it typically bore such a high trader markup,
alcohol was virtually the only European product that enjoyed an elastic demand with
notoriously tight-fisted Indian customers, and could easily be watered to increase
stocks, unscrupulous traders inevitably used alcohol in their commerce.23 That they
frequently succeeded is evident from the Indians’ appeals at virtually every colonial
Indian conference. Representatives of the Cayugas and other Iroquois nations who
met with Governor Patrick Gordon in Philadelphia in the summer of 1727 claimed
that "there come many sorts of Traders among them . . . who all Cheat them, and
tho’ they get their Skins they give them very little in Pay." What the Indians wanted
was more gunpowder and shot for hunting; what they received was rum sold for "at
least 3 or 4 times more than it is worth. "?4
Fifteen years later, conditions had only worsened. Speaking through Conrad
Weiser, the chiefs of the Six Nations and Delawares addressed Pennsylvania Governor
George Thomas:

23 "Yet so great is the profit resulting from that Article," Johnson remarked, "and
such oppertunitys were thereby furnished for Imposition, that a Great Number of the
Traders used every Artifice to induce the Indians to Apply for a Toleration for that
Article." Johnson, IHC, 16: 37. See also Ray and Freeman, Give Us Good Measure,
129-41.
24 Minutes o f the Provincial Council o f Pennsylvania, From the Organization to
the Termination o f the Proprietary Government, edited by Samuel Hazard (Harrisburg:
Theophilus Fenn, 1852), 3: 274.
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It is always our Way, at the Conclusion of a Treaty, to desire you will
use your Endeavours with the Traders, that they may sell their Goods
cheaper, and give us a better Price for our Deer-Skins. Whenever any
particular Sort of Indian Goods is scarce, they constantly make us pay
the dearer on that Account. We must now use the same Argument with
them: Our Deer are killed in such Quantities, and our HuntingCountries grown less every Day by the Settlement of white People, that
Game is now difficult to find, and we must go a great Way in quest of
it; they therefore ought to give us a better Price for our Skins; and we
desire you would speak to them to do so.25
For all his evident concern, Thomas had made little progress in restraining the
Ohio traders. He admitted that the Indians frequently made allegations concerning
"divers gross irregularities and abuses" in the trade. Alcohol was consistently at the
root of these problems. "I cannot but be apprehensive that the Indian trade as it is
now carry’d on will involve us in some fatal Quarrel with the Indians," Thompson
admitted.
Our Traders in Defiance of the Law carry Spiritous Liquors amongst
them, and take the Advantage of their inordinate Appetite for it to cheat
them of their Skins and their Wampum, which is their Money, and
often to debauch their Wives into the Bargain. Is it to be wondered at
then, if when they Recover from the Drunken fit they should take
severe Revenges.

Though he promised to encourage more rigid enforcement of licensing laws
and to renew the longstanding Pennsylvania prohibition of the transportation of
alcohol to the tribes of the Ohio country, Thomas realized that these measures would
"avail but little, the ill practices of these people being carry’d on in the Woods, and at
such a Distance from the Seat of Government that it will be very difficult to get

25 Cadwallader Colden, HF1N, 2: 109-10.
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Evidences to Convict them."26
From his vantage point in South Carolina, Atkin was similarly distressed by
the destructive influence of rum trafficking in the Ohio country, noting its pernicious
influence in weakening the fabric of native society. The "greatest disorders, and the
most pernicious Consequences of all, have been introduced by the many Traders
licensed and unlicensed, who have made a constant practice of carrying very little
Goods, but chiefly, and for the most part intirely R u m ” Atkin claimed. In fact, the
traders made a practice of placing themselves and large liquid stocks directly in the
path of Indian hunters as they returned home with their deerskins. "The poor Indians
in a manner fascinated," he remarked,
are unable to resist the Bait; and when Drunk are easily cheated.
After parting with the fruit of three or four Months Toil, they find
themselves at home, without the means of buying the necessary
Clothing for themselves or their Families. Their Domestick and inward
Quiet being broke, Reflection sours them, and disposes them for
mischief.27

If the Anglo-American traders were a uniformly miserable lot, ill-suited to
advancing the diplomatic ends of fretting imperialists, the Canadian traders appeared
infinitely better suited to winning and keeping the friendship of their Indian trading
partners. In the period shortly after the conquest of Canada, Johnson came to realize
that the Americans were at a profound disadvantage in competing with the French for
the Illinois trade. Proposing that "there is little reason to Expect that our People in

26 PA Council Minutes, 4: 760-61, 740.
27 Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 35.
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general will ever treat the Indians with the like kindness and Civility," Johnson
conceded that the French traders were more adept in the nuances of Indian trade.
"By their Superior Adress and knowledge of the different Languages," Johnson noted,
"they maintain their Influence, enjoy the Major part of the Trade, whilst our Traders
are considered as Interlopers, and have it not in their power to acquire the good
Opinion, or even a proper Acquaintance with Indians.1,28
Having lived and traded among the Indians, Croghan was equally familiar with
the unparalleled success of the Canadians. In the wake of Pontiac’s failed uprising,
the veteran trader was not surprised by the allegations of French influence in
encouraging the revolt. "They have been bred up Together like Children in that
Country," Croghan remarked, "& the French have always adopted the Indians
Customs and manners, Treated them Civily & supplyed their wants generously, by
which means they gained the Hearts of the Indians & commanded their Services, &
injoyed the Benefit of a very large Furr Trade."29 Croghan implicitly recognized a
fundamental fact underlying French superiority in the eighteenth-century fur trade:
Canadian traders were generally more adept than their Anglo-American rivals at
maneuvering within the alien context of Indian society. Through language, habit, and
marriage, the Canadians had earned the respect and alliance of their Indian partners
and were accordingly less prone to view the trade as simply an economic opportunity
to be exploited. No wonder, then, that the Indians preferred to trade with the French,

28 Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 16 November 1765, IHC, 11: 118.
29 Croghan to Johnson, November 1765, IHC, 11: 53-54.
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regardless of the supposed superiority or cheapness of English goods.30
But just as certain honest and far-seeing English traders were careful to foster
Indian confidence, there were also admittedly some Canadian traders who abused and
cheated their native customers. In fact, admiring Anglo-American officials
undoubtedly exaggerated the harmonious nature of French-Indian relations in their
effort to understand the overwhelming success of their commercial and military rivals.
"There is no need to romanticize this relationship," White claims. "Indians and
French abused and killed each other; they cheated each other as well as supplying
each other’s wants." But, he adds, the often intimate familiarity of the French and
Indians "had no equivalent among the British." Though the British may have
reluctantly accepted the relationship between trade and alliance on the "middle
ground," this grudging compromise could not make up for the lack of the intimate
day-to-day experience of living side by side on native terms.31
Though it is not necessary to laud the French for any inherently "enlightened"
cultural superiority—the g4nie coloniale extolled by nineteenth-century chauvinists-it
is still worth recognizing that certain peculiarities of their colonial situation
encouraged the Canadians to inculcate a more accepting and often admiring attitude

30 Johnson suspected that the French must have been engaged in some form of
intrigue in the Illinois country because they were buying up English trade goods at
high prices and then selling them to the Indians at little or no profit. This was a clear
example of what Johnson referred to as the "Indians’ partiality and blindness in
dealing with the French," for they evidently preferred to purchase the same
goods at higher prices from the French than deal with English traders. Johnson to the
Lords of Trade, 16 November 1765, IHC, 11: 119.
31 White, Middle Ground, 316-17.
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toward the Indians that prompted them to privilege, or at least tolerate, the "non
economic" aspects of Indian exchange. In his examination of the development of
French cultural attitudes toward native North Americans, Cornelius Jaenen posits that
the essential structure of the Canadian experience prescribed the limits of FrenchIndian perceptions. The paramount importance of the fur trade in Canadian economic
and social life, combined with the notable absence of an encroaching settlement
frontier, had "far-reaching results," Jaenen suggests, in the formulation of both
French and Indian attitudes. In fact, "the relationship between behavior and attitude
was so marked in this case," he notes, that "ethnic stereotyping" resulted. While the
Indians came to regard the French primarily as "trader/soldiers" who dispensed
valuable manufactured merchandise but who had little interest in acquiring new
territory, the French were similarly prone to imagining the Indians as "skilful
hunters/wary warriors," and not the "forest fiends" who blocked the preordained
expansion of settlement.32
Broad theoretical constructs aside, it is evident that the French were motivated
at least as much by pragmatic considerations in acceding to native conceptions of
trade and alliance. Whatever supposed intellectual tolerance the French may have
exhibited relative to the Indian societies they encountered in North America, they
ultimately found it necessary to "adapt and accommodate" to Indian notions of trade,

32 Cornelius Jaenen, "French Attitudes towards Native Society," in Old Trails and
New Directions: Papers o f the Third North American Fur Trade Coitference, edited by
Carol M. Judd and Arthur J. Ray (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 5963, 70.
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diplomacy, and warfare in pursuit of their own self-interested economic and imperial
ambitions.33 Just as French officials recognized the need to fuse trade and diplomacy
in their dealings with their Indian allies, so too did the Canadian traders and
voyageurs shrewdly oblige the demands of their Indian customer-suppliers. At times,
this "enlightened" approach was all that stood between a trader and his scalp. Having
passed far beyond the protective reach of French authority, Canadian traders arrived
in the pays d ’en haut as "wealthy," defenseless strangers with no social standing in
Algonquian villages. Though they never abandoned their original desire to make a
profit through the trade, the Canadians quickly found that to successfully conduct
their business, indeed to survive the experience, it was essential to establish some
form of social and personal connection with their native hosts. And many of them
invariably did, by the most convenient and gratifying means at hand.34
The intimate relations between Canadian men and native women in the pays
d ’en haut, perhaps more than any other mode of European-Indian intercourse, formed
"the basis of fur trade society."35 Such unions served as far more than a sexual outlet
for traders and voyageurs in the absence of French women; marriage native-style—d

33 Olive Patricia Dickason, The Myth o f the Savage, and the Beginnings o f French
Colonialism in the Americas (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984), 277-78;
White, Middle Ground, 33, 115.
34 White, Middle Ground, 57, 109.
35 Sylvia Van Kirk, "Fur Trade Social History: Some Recent Trends," in Carol
M. Judd and Arthur J. Ray (eds.), Old Trails and New Directions: Papers o f the
Third North American Fur Trade Conference, edited by Carol M. Judd and Arthur J.
Ray (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 165.
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la fagon du pays--offered more extensive benefits to French and Indians alike. The
"all-encompassing" work role of Indian women attracted traders who needed a
helpmate to cook, sew moccasins, make clothes, scrape pelts, stitch and caulk canoe
seams, gather firewood, string snowshoes, and perform a variety o f other essential
domestic tasks. Native women further facilitated trade relations by informally
introducing their French partners to the language and customs of a particular Indian
group. Beyond its obvious practical advantages, however, marriage symbolized the
formation of reciprocal and mutually beneficial bonds that integrated Europeans into
familial relations with potential Indian consumer-suppliers. Traders who married
Indian women gained ready-made social and trade contacts in the pays d ’en haut,
while the Indians in turn secured guaranteed access to European goods and
protection.36
Post commanders and Canadian officials were quick to grasp the fact that
interracial marriages bolstered otherwise tenuous trade and military alliances and they
enthusiastically encouraged their subordinates to form these intimate alliances.37 Their
English counterparts, acknowledging the immeasurable advantages their rivals had
gained through extensive intermarriage, promoted similar Anglo-Indian liaisons but
with admittedly dismal results. In his 1755 report to the Board of Trade, Atkin

36 White, Middle Ground, 64-69; Van Kirk, "Fur Trade Social History," 165;
Van Kirk suggests that later in the eighteenth century the Montreal-based Nor’Westers
possessed a distinct advantage over their Hudson’s Bay Company rivals primarily
because of the marriage alliances they had made with the Indian groups of the
interior. Sylvia Van Kirk, "Many Tender Ties”, 28-31, 45, 53.
37 White, Middle Ground, 69.
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proposed that it would be prudent to imitate French marital practices, both to facilitate
better Indian relations as well as to subdue the notoriously rambunctious traders.
Anglo-Indian intermarriage would insure that the two groups did not remain "intirely
Strangers to each others Persons & manners," he suggested, but that "their
Knowledge and Acquaintance therewith may be introduced, preserv’d, and transferred
imperceptibly." Atkin also stipulated that only those men who had taken Indian wives
should be allowed to remain in the West for longer than two years, assuming that
their treatment of native customers who also happened to be relatives might naturally
be more circumspect.38
The following year Wraxall recommended to Johnson that in order to improve
New York’s trade relations with the Six Nations, traders should be encouraged to live
among their Indian customers, suggesting as well that garrison soldiers might be
persuaded "by some gratuitys & advantages" to marry Protestant native women.39 But
even if the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel had managed to convert enough
Iroquois women to supply suitable mates for New York soldiers and traders, it was
unlikely that such officially sanctioned unions would ever take place. As Johnson had
noted, by the 1750s the Anglo-American trade had lost its most experienced traders,
the very men most likely to have adapted to Indian practices or taken native wives.
The "very dregs of the people" who increasingly populated the Anglo-American
trading frontier stood little chance of duplicating the marital success of the Canadian

38 Atkins, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 80.
39 Wraxall, NYCD, 7: 27.
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traders and voyageurs. The French may have been just as eager for profits as their
New York and Pennsylvania counterparts, but their economic ambitions were
generally tempered by a necessary respect for the Indians with whom they lived,
traded, and married. Having failed to develop similarly intimate ties, the English
found their largely unregulated trade perennially in danger of lapsing into mutual
distrust and violence.40
Despite the apparent ease with which Canadian traders and voyageurs
assimilated themselves into Indian groups, the French could not have enjoyed such
overwhelming success in the fur trade without a coherent imperial policy that
presupposed a well-regulated commercial system. In 1701, while the French fur trade
languished in the face of a crippling glut, Louis XIV embarked on an aggressive
policy to contain the Anglo-American colonies east of the Appalachians. It is
impossible to understand the eighteenth-century French trade merely as a commercial
endeavor after this date, Eccles argues, because the fur trade had been "definitely
subordinated to a political end." By recognizing that a mutually profitable and closely
monitored trade would best preserve the Indian alliances that were crucial to French

40 White, Middle Ground, 317; Eccles suggests that the familiarity of the French
with Indian languages, material culture, and customs eased their relations with the
tribes of the pays d ’en haut. Visitors frequently commented that Canadians were "in
constant association" with the Indians and had adopted their foods, dress, and habits.
Both secular and clerical officials, in fact, decried the frequency with which their
young men took to the woods, and the ease with which they were assimilated socially,
sexually, and psychologically into Indian groups. It was because the Canadians had
been "trained from infancy" to imitate native ways that their relations with the Indians
were usually better than those of the Anglo-Americans. W. J. Eccles, The Canadian
Frontier, 1534-1760 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1969), 89-92.
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imperial aims in North America, the French were able "maintain its claim to more
than half a continent" with only a small number of traders and troops.41
No one recognized the French ability to win Indian allies through commercial
means better than their English rivals. "That we have lost, in great Measure, all that
sincere Friendship and Attachment which did once subsist between us and our
Indians," wrote New York legislator Archibald Kennedy, was inevitable considering
the "injurious and villainous Treatment" they received at the hands of Ango-American
traders, while they were always "honestly and justly" dealt with by the French.42 But
if French traders were better able to win the allegiance of the Indians, it was largely
due to the fact that they were not followed into the pays d ’en haut by land-hungry
settlers. "The French did not alarm them much on the Score of Lands," Johnson
conceded, in striking contrast to their Anglo-American competitors. "Whilst the
Traders on the Frontiers were disgusting and Defrauding the Indians," he recalled,
"the Inhabitants were over-reaching them and Availing themselves of their Ignorance
and passion for Liquor, daily Stealing away their Land as the Indians emphatically
express it.1,43 If the Indians saw Anglo-American traders as the harbingers of

41 W. J. Eccles, "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century Imperialism," William &
Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 40:3 (1983): 341-49; "The efficiency and unity of
French organization were completely victorious," Adair claimed. "And the English
were not going to do anything about it that would be likely to produce results." E. R.
Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry in the Fur Trade during the 18th Century," Culture, 8
(1947), reprinted in Canadian History Before Confederation: Essays and
Interpretation, J. M. Bumsted (Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin-Dorsey, 1972), 162.
42 Kennedy, Serious Considerations, 8-9.
43 Johnson, IHC, 16: 26, 30.
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encroaching settlement, they also understood that French trading posts served a less
ominous purpose. Thomson commented at length on the "different Manner" in which
the English and French had treated the Indians in pursuing their divergent aims in the
West. "The English," he noted,
in order to get their Lands, drive them as far from them as possible,
nor seem to care what becomes of them, provided they can get them
removed out of the Way of their present Settlements; whereas the
French, considering that they can never want Land in America, who
enjoy the Friendship of the Indians, use all the Means in their Power to
draw as many into their Alliance as possible; and, to secure their
Affections, invite as many as can to come and live near them, and to
make their Towns as near the French Settlements as they can.44

The true genius of the French trade was its unique fusion of private initiative,
government regulation, and military supervision. It was unwise, French officials
realized, to allow Canadians to flood freely into the pays d ’en haut’, no matter how
prone the traders were to becoming "Indianized," an unmonitored trade could easily
breed misconduct and exploitation. Dissatisfied customers, they had learned, made
poor allies. Once the congi system was permanently reinstated in the mid-1720s, it
proved remarkably effective in financing the cost of garrisoning the trading posts of
the pays d ’en haut, as well as preventing the excesses and abuses characteristic of the
Anglo-American trade.

44 Thomson, An Enquiry, 48. Eccles notes that the presence of a French post in
the pays d ’en haut in no way implied "sovereignty" over the Indian lands, and was
tolerated only so long as it served native interests. Eccles, "Eighteenth-Century
Imperialism," 349. Indians could also distinguish between a French blockhouse that
"secured the trade against occasional raids" and an English fort designed to "secure
its garrison against the tribe in whose territory it stood." Jennings, Ambiguous
Iroquois Empire, 299.
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Barring a brief flirtation in the 1740s with the leasing of posts to private
traders, the Canadian fur trade was dominated by what has been described as a
"military-commercial complex." Within the framework of this system, military
officers who were granted trading monopolies at individual posts formed partnerships
with Canadian merchants who possessed the capital resources and credit necessary to
finance trading expeditions to the West. Though Canadian civil officials persisted in
their opposition to the military dominance of the post system, its defenders countered
i

that merchants were more interested in potential eamings-and liberal brandy salesthan the exigencies of Indian diplomacy. Military officers alone, they asserted, had
the prestige and authority necessary to ensure that imperial policy, not private profit,
dictated the conduct of the trade.45
While the Canadians argued over who should exercise ultimate control over
trade in the pays d ’en haut, envious English observers concluded that the military
regulation of the posts had given their rivals a decided advantage. The French, Atkin
decleard, "employed Men of the greatest Knowledge and Experience" to oversee the
trade, specifically officers "who are supported out of the Trade with the Indians, who
rest their hopes of Preferment on their own Behaviour, and who on all Occasions
support the Honour and Dignity of the French Nation, and watch all opportunities to
turn every Occurrence to their own Advantage." He concluded that "it is no small
addition to the influence of the French, that their Officers allways on the Spot, both

45 Dale Miquelon, New France, 1701-1744: A Supplement to Europe (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1987), 159-62.
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prevent Abuses being offer’d to the Indians by particular Persons, and also never fail
to demand immediate Satisfaction for any Injuries or Insults offer’d by them; which
is the more readily complied with.1,46 Johnson agreed that the French had enjoyed
greater success in the trade because they had committed Indian affairs to experienced
officers. Post commanders enjoyed substantial authority over the local traders: if an
Indian complained o f mistreatment, the offending trader was "with (at least an
appearance of) great resentment put in Irons and sent away (as they were told) to
suffer death."47
In contrast, native customers who had been wronged by Anglo-American
traders could rarely expect even a token show of justice. "The Cries of injured
Indians against the Lesser Traders," Johnson grimly noted, "could not reach the
Capitals."48 The problem stemmed mainly from the fact that the Indians trading with
the English had no reliable local authority figure to appeal to for restitution. In the
absence of disinterested officials-Oswego’s commissariat was notoriously venal--there
was little chance that Indian concerns would even be heard, let alone redressed.
Recognizing that "the greatest discouragment, in the management of the Indian
Affairs, is by the Indians being constantly cheated by them with what they deal,"

46 Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 7-8, 12. "If a French commander violated
the standards of chieftainship," White alleges, "he risked the loss of his command."
White, Middle Ground, 177. Similarly, Eccles notes that complaints by the Indians
might "jeopardize promotion or the granting of commissions to sons." Eccles,
"Eighteenth-Century Imperialism," 345.
47 Johnson, IHC, 16: 27, 54.
48 Johnson, IHC, 16: 28.
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Colden struggled with the ramifications of a colonial legal system that refused to
recognize Indian concerns. In order to obtain redress for any alleged fraud, Colden
noted, an Indian had to take out a writ, file a declaration, then wait as long as a year
for a decision. In addition, Indian plaintiffs were also responsible for all the charges
of the suit. The courts were often hundreds of miles away, but making an appearance
at Albany or Philadelphia would have served little purpose anyway, Colden conceded,
since Indian testimony could not legally be admitted as evidence.49
Even during formal conferences, the context in which Indian concerns about
trader fraud were traditionally voiced, the native complainants were more likely to
obtain promises than results. Having traveled to Philadelphia in the summer of 1727,
the Cayuga and other Iroquois sachems found their pleas for less rum and cheaper
goods sternly rebuffed by Pennsylvania’s Governor Gordon. The governor justified
his refusal to intervene in commercial matters by reminding them of the "laws" of
supply and demand. "As to Trade," he contended, "they know ’tis the Method of all
that follow it to buy as Cheap and sell as dear as they can, and every man must make
the best Bargain he can; the Indians cheat the Indians & the English cheat the
English, & every Men must be on his Guard." As for the large quantities of rum
flooding the Susquehanna Valley, Gordon merely maintained that "we have made
divers Laws to prohibit it, & made it lawfull for an Indian to stave all the Rum that is
brought to them." If problems with alcohol continued to plague their tribes, Gordon
believed, it was because "the Indians are too fond of it themselves" and would not

49 Colden to Governor Clinton, 8 August 1751, NYCD, 6: 741.
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destroy the traders’ illegal stocks.50 It is unlikely that Gordon’s cynical lecture on the
workings of capitalist exchange or his assertion that the Indians themselves were to
blame for their own trading woes fell on sympathetic ears. "Can these people who
are treated in this manner be supposed to be treated like friends, or like rational or
human creatures?" Colden justifiably asked. "It is but too obvious what the
consequences of this treatment must be."51
Though Gordon and his fellow colonial capitalists would have contended that
economic competition between independent traders ultimately benefitted the Indians by
keeping prices low and merchandise plentiful, it is evident that native consumers were
easily alienated by the unbridled commercial rivalries that characterized the AngloAmerican trade. Benjamin Stoddert, one o f Johnson’s agents at Oswego, admitted to
his employer that he envisioned a time when a monopoly company would oversee all
trade at the post. Stoddert believed that a strictly regulated commerce could still be
profitable, and because it would sanction only a few trustworthy agents, such a
reform could only improve the tenor of Anglo-Indian relations. "I am certain that if
some such Scheme does not go on," Stoddert warned, "the Trade of this Place will
soon be ruined, for their is such a Number o f Traders here and such Vile Steps taken
to undermine each other in his trade that it consequently cant hold Long." The
veteran trader further recognized that "the little low means used in the Trade to hurt

50 PA Council Minutes, 3: 274-75.
51 Colden to Governor Clinton, 8 August 1751, NYCD, 6: 741; see also Johnson,
IHC, 3 : 56, 63.
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each other must give even the Savages a Damn’d mean Opinion of us; especially our
Honesty &c."52
When Stoddert broached his idea for an Oswego monopoly, the reaction of the
local traders was predictably hostile, with some even threatening rebellion. New
York legislators were equally skeptical. No plan to reorganize the Oswego trade was
seriously contemplated before the Seven Years’ War, but by the unsettled mid-1760s
Johnson acknowledged the wisdom in Stoddert’s earlier assessment of the detrimental
influence of overzealous English competition. "In Short," Johnson proposed,
the Mixed Multitude of persons trading at the posts, and in the Indian
Country, many of whom have survived their Credit, and dare not come
down the Country, act such a part by endeavoring to draw the Trade
from one another, by selling some Articles below the first Cost, and
Extorting upon others, that the Merchants who Supply the Goods must
Suffer, Numbers of the Traders be ruined, and the Indians universally
discontented- The little Artifices usually practised by Low People in
dealings with one another, are much more general and attended with
infinitely greater circumstances of fraud in dealings with the Indians,—
The Low character of the people, their Necessity, and the Extravagance
in which many of them live set them on the practice of every fraud to
Support themselves, . . . and the latter not only Endeavor to force a
Trade by Slandering each other, publishing and enlarging on the frauds
committed by their Neighbors, but forge Stories dangerous to the
publick to Account for their prices, the badness of Goods, or any other
purposes of Gain."53

52 Benjamin Stoddert to Johnson, 16 July 1749, WJP, 1: 236-37.
53 Johnson, IHC, 16: 44. In assessing the effects of Anglo-French rivalry for the
fur trade of the Hudson Bay region, Ray concludes that as economic competition
increased, so did the potential for Indian dependence. "Because the Indians could
satisfy their needs for other trade goods with less effort due to the falling prices
demanded for them, they spent much more of the free time which they gained at the
local trading posts drinking and smoking and leading what the traders termed the
"indolent life." In this way," he concludes, "competitive conditions further
strengthened the tendency toward greater addiction." Ray, Indians and the Fur
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If Indian consumers were the ultimate victims of the ruthless competitiveness
that prevailed in the unregulated Anglo-American trade, the more tightly-knit French
system of posts and congis promised rock-solid trade relations, if not rock-bottom
prices. Thomas Wien has suggested that the greatest enemies of the Canadian fur
traders were not the English but other Canadian fur traders. French officials
understood that trader profits and subsequently revenues from the sale of permits and
post leases would be significantly reduced should French-speaking traders flood into
the pays d ’en haut en masse. By restricting the number of canoes that left Montreal
and assigning traders to distinct trading regions, the state was largely successful in
precluding a "bidding war" among Canadians in the West. This practice of "zoning"
did not entirely prevent either licensed or unlicensed traders from commercial
"trespassing," but in general the system was remarkably successful in keeping "the
Canadians and their merchandise thinly strewn, and goods prices high."54 Wien
suggests that this policy of buffering internal competition may have ensured that
French merchandise was never cheap. But considering the pitiful state of AngloIndian relations occasioned by full-blown trader competition, it is apparent that
Colden, Johnson, and their few fellow imperialists would rather have paid the
economic costs of commercial regulation than the significantly higher price of native

Trade, 142. With the ample supplies of rum and low prices that attended fierce
competition between Anglo-American traders, it is possible that a similar pattern of
increased addiction might have also have prevailed among the Ohio Indians.
54 Thomas Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 17201760: The Uses of Fur-Trade Imperialism," Journal o f the Canadian Historical
Association, 1 (1990): 316-17.
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resentment and defection.
For all their concern w ith economic competition, legal reform, and commercial
regulation, the most perceptive English commentators intuitively grasped that the
rivalry for the trade and allegiance of the Indians had an overarching spiritual
dimension. This was one battle, they conceded, that the French had won long ago.
Canadian traders may have triarried their women and post commanders heeded their
complaints, but it was the Jesuit missionaries who ultimately won the trust, faith, and
commerce of the Indians. Though characteristically suspicious of their motives and
means, observers such as Atkin could not help but envy the Jesuits’ unrivalled
successs. "All the World knows," he remarked, "the great share the French
missionaries have in influencing the Indians, by means of their superstition; whose
service is such, that they have been esteemed almost of as much Consequence as
Garrisons. They have been the means o f gaining as much respect from the Indians to
the French," Atkin conceded, "as our Traders have caused disrespect to us, by their
dissolute Lives and Manners. *'55 No one offered a more eloquent testament to the
importance o f French missionary efforts in securing the affections of Indian trading
partners than Johnson. "The Indians are fond of pomp and Ceremonys," he declared,
and that Religion in which they most abound is most likely to Succeed
amongst them, but the French to that advantage Gained a Still more
Material one in the Choice they Generally Made of Men of Spirit,
Abilities, and a knowledge of the World, who lived amongst them,
became Masters of their Language, acquired a thorough knowledge of
their Manners, and disposition, and at length obtained a vast influence
which they improved to such Advantage (without attempting to alter

55 Atkins, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 12-13.
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established forms of no ill consequence, or to Wean them from
hunting, in which they are usefully employed for the public) as to
convince us from a View of Some Tribes under their peculiar care, that
the Dutys of Religion are not incompatible with those of a Warrior, or
Hunter, and that they need not cease to be the Latter in order to
become to all appearances better Christians, than Numbers of their
White Neighbours.5®

Shining Jesuit altar silver and tinkling communion bells aside, a far greater
attraction o f the "Blackrobes" to many Indian customers was their resolute opposition
to the sale of alcohol. When the Oswego traders first laid out their wares in the late
1720s, Canadian officials who had long opposed the clerical ban on the sale of
alcohol raised the panicked-and profitable-cry that the French trade was doomed
unless they could compete dram-for-dram with the rival rum-sellers. This argument
may have swayed the ministry, but the Church remained steadfast in opposition to the
brandy trade until the Conquest, knowing full well the pernicious effects of alcohol
abuse within Indian groups.57 Like the French, the Indians who participated in the
trade were of two minds when it came to alcohol. Some claimed that they could not
get it cheaply or plentifully enough. But more often than not, the Indians—
particularly the older, and presumably wiser, men-pleaded with the colonial

56 Johnson, IHC, 16: 52. For a similar summary o f the advantages enjoyed by
French Jesuits in winning Indian converts see James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The
Contest o f Cultures in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press,
1985), esp. 277-79.
57 For the origins of Jesuit opposition to the brandy trade in the seventeenth
century, see Jean Delanglez, Frontenac and the Jesuits (Chicago: Institute of Jesuit
History, 1939), 69-129.
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authorities to stem the flood of alcohol into their villages.38 Cheap rum may have
enticed some to trade at Oswego or with the peripatetic merchants of the Ohio
country, but those Indians who accurately gauged the proportions of the looming
social and cultural crisis undoubtedly embraced the steadfast moral stance of the
Jesuits in opposition to those who would profit by alcoholic means.39
The Protestant counterparts of the Jesuits, by contrast, seemed distinctly illsuited to the challenge of luring Indians to chapel or trading post. Having already

38 "We have been stinted in the Article of Rum in Town," claimed the Iroquois
and Delaware representatives who conferred with Governor Thomas in Philadelphia in
1742. "We desire you will open the Rum-Bottle, and give it to us in greater
Abundance on the Road." Colden, HFIN, 2: 110. In contrast, Thomson declared
that the Indians of the Ohio Valley "were sensible of their own Weakness, and
immoderate desire of strong Drink, by which they exposed themselves to many
Abuses and Inconveniencies. They had frequently complained to the English
Governments, and desired that some Measures might be taken to prevent Liquors
being carried among them in such Quantities, but nothing was done to Purpose."
Thomson, An Enquiry, 74, 75-76. See also Wraxall, AIA, 86, 139, 174-75; Atkin,
Appalachian Indian Frontier, 25-26, 36; Johnson, IHC, 16: 37.
39 By some accounts, Indian groups split into pro and anti-alcohol factions along
generational lines. "The Chiefs of every Nation finding the Evil daily encreasing,"
Atkin remarked, "and their Young Men growing untractable in their National
Concerns, have at times requested the Govemours of our several Colonies to restrain
the Indian Traders from carrying either too much Rum, or any at all among them."
He further noted that "a licentiousness hath crept in among the young men, beyond
the Power of the Head Men to Remedy," to the extent that "the discreet Old men
Censure alike their own Young Men and us." Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier,
26, 36; see also Johnson, IHC, 16: 37; Frangois Vachon de Belmont, "Belmont’s
History of Brandy," edited by Joseph P. Donnelly, Mid-America, 34:1 (1952): 49.
Unlike the English traders who only showed concern for the younger hunters, the
French shrewdly courted the favor of older, more influential members of the tribe.
Atkin noted that the French would often give small gifts to the old men who could no
longer hunt for themselves, who then would "repay the French largely for those
Trifles, in their Harangues at the round Houses, by great Encomiums on their
kindness, and recommendations of them to favour." Atkin, Ibid., 10-11, 29.
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"conceived such invincible Prejudices against English "Manners and Religion" by
abusive traders, Thomson noted, the Shawnees on the Susquehanna quickly rebuffed
the earnest proselytizing efforts of a young minister named Sergeant. Why should
they accept his teachings, asked his hostile hosts, when his fellow colonists would
"lie, cheat, and debauch their Women, and even their Wives, if their Husbands were
not at home."60 Johnson expressed a similar skepticism as to the heavy-handed
missionary methods of Sergeant and his coreligionists. "The Steps taken by many
probably well meaning but Gloomy people among us," he judged,
to abolish at once their most innocent Customs, Dances, Rejoycings at
Marriages &ca and their premature proposals for bringing familys
amongst them to instruct them in Agriculture &ca as well as their
Arguments against Hunting alarm all Indians who hear of them with the
Apprehension that it is done with design to wean them from their way
of Living purely that they may be the readier induced to part with their
Lands to the white people.61

A few Mohawks might have succumbed to the reasoned arguments of the Society of
the Propagation of the Gospel and some Delawares to the gentle teachings of the
Moravians, but on the whole the Protestant performance in winning Indian hearts and
minds has been aptly described as "lacklustre."62
In the contest for souls and skins, the French by all accounts emerged the
victors. Those who prayed together, traded together. But Jesuit accomplishments
alone were not all that Anglo-Americans hoped to emulate. Most imperialists, from
60 Thomson, An Enquiry, 56.
61 Johnson, IHC, 16: 52-53.
62 Axtell, Invasion Within, 275-76.
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New York to South Carolina, agreed with Wraxall that the French had succeeded in
winning the greater part of the North American fur trade because they acted upon "a
Uniform Plan," while the American colonies floundered as a result of their "divided
Interests & temporary Expedients."63 In the absence of any effective regulation, the
Indian trade had become a diplomatic liability for the English while the French
continued to harness commercial means to imperial ends. The creation of two
colonial Indian superintendencies in 1756 and the subsequent appointment of Johnson
and Atkin to the respective posts signaled at least some recognition that the trade and
the conduct of Indian relations in general was greatly in need of "one uniform
Regulation.1,64 Though it arrived in London too late to have much effect on the
shaping of colonial policy, Atkin’s report to the Board of Trade outlined some of the
changes he believed necessary to set the Indian commerce back on track. The prices
of trade merchandise should be fixed at acceptable rates, Atkin proposed, and officers
instructed to visit the posts to monitor the behavior of the traders, give a hearing to
Indian complaints, and mete out justice where required. He further recommended
that the Indians be provided with their own scales and weights to discourage fraud and
that the traders be annually licensed and held to stringent standards of conduct by the
seaboard governments.65

63 Wraxall, AlA, 190n.
64 Stephen H. Cutcliffe, "Colonial Indian Policy as a Measure of Rising
Imperialism: New York and Pennsylvania, 1700-1755," Western Pennsylvania
Historical Magazine, 64:3 (1981): 239, 266-68.
65 Atkin, Appalachian Indian Frontier, 78-86.
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By the 1750s, critics of the current state of the Anglo-Indian commerce were
unanimous in their calls for "some good and sufficient Laws for the Regulation of
their Trade, and for summary and severe Justice in case of Abuses."66 But countless
laws and ordinances had been enacted in the past by various colonial governments
with little visible result. Without the support of the traders themselves, cheating and
fraud would continue unabated. In the absence of reliable officers to oversee the dayto-day conduct of the trade, all legislative efforts at reform, no matter how well
intentioned, were doomed to fail. New York’s Governor Montgomerie had hoped to
create an effective role for Oswego’s chief officer at the post’s inception in the 1720s
but, by the beginnings of the Seven Years’ War, Wraxall was still complaining that
the post desperately required the supervision of a salaried "intendant of trade" who
would refrain from all commercial activity and inspect all weights and measures,
prevent all "Frauds & Impositions," and bring all offenders to trial."67 Colden also
noted that the officers could not fully enforce justice at Oswego or anywhere else on
the trading frontier unless the colonial legal system was reformed "whereby the
Indians, on their complaints, may get Justice done them speedily, by summary
process, and that in all dealings, between Indians & Christians, Indian evidence be
allowed."68
These optimistic plans for the reform of a notoriously unorganized and unjust
66 Kennedy, Serious Considerations, 9; see also Johnson, IHC, 16: 4-50;
Wraxall, AIA, 11 In.
67 Wraxall, NYCD, 7: 27.
68 Colden to Governor Clinton, 8 August 1751, NYCD, 6: 744.
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commerce were bom of one inescapable conclusion: if the Anglo-Americans were to
succeed in directing the traffic in furs and skins to serve broader diplomatic and
military aims, they would simply have to emulate their French rivals in virtually
every aspect of the trade. In fact, in the aftermath of French defeat, the Indians of
the Ohio Valley demanded as much. But with equal measures of arrogance and
parsimony, the British conquerors ultimately balked at the daunting price of empire.
Though its roots ran deep, to the earliest days of Anglo-French rivalry in North
America, the reluctance of the British to wed trade to diplomacy would henceforth
become increasingly lethal.69

3d Warrior. These are the Scalps o f those two fa
mous Cheats
Who bought our Furs for Rum, and sold us Water.
[holding out the Scalps, which Ponteach takes.
Our Men are loaded with their Furs again,
And other Plunder from the Villains Stores.
Ponteach. All this is brave! [tossing up the Scalps,
which others catch, and toss and throw them about.
This Way we’ll serve them all.70

69 White, Middle Ground, 248, 315-17.
70 Robert Rogers, Ponteach: Or, The Savages o f America, A Tragedy (London: J.
Millan, 1766), 78.

EPILOGUE
AFTER THE CONQUEST

In the summer of 1761, less than a year after the conquest of New France, the
Canadian fur trade was still in disarray. Even so, the young American Alexander
Henry, arriving with the invading forces and seduced by the promise of fortune and
adventure, was determined to penetrate the pays d ’en haut. Trade merchandise was
scarce in occupied Montreal and General Thomas Gage, the new British commander,
sternly warned against a premature expedition into potentially hostile territory. But
the enthusiastic youth could not be deterred. Stepping gingerly aboard a canoe
crammed with trade goods from Albany, Henry gave the word and his crew of
French-Canadian voyageurs dipped their paddles and pushed off for distant
Michilimackinac.
Only a handful of Americans had ever made this westward journey. As he
traveled up the Ottawa River, Henry was struck by the beauty of the northern
country-the misting falls of the Rideau River and the roiling Chaudibre rapids-but
his reveries were soon invaded by a creeping sense of foreboding. The first Indians
he encountered were Algonquins returning to their village from winter hunting.
Henry amicably bought their maple sugar and a few beaver pelts, but before they
parted ways the Indians were curious to know the motives of this stranger in their
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midst. The English must be mad to risk their lives for beaver, they ominously
remarked. Did he not realize that the "Upper Indians" would certainly have his
scalp?
Henry’s initial enthusiasm dissipated as he drew nearer his destination.
Having been warned repeatedly that he would meet his end at Michilimackinac, he
was tempted to abandon his ill-considered venture. But supplies were dwindling and
return to Montreal now seemed impossible. Despite their hostile attitude toward the
English, the Indians they met welcomed the Canadians with "cordial good will," and
Henry realized that his only hope of survival lay in disguising his identity. Stripping
off his "English" clothes, he donned the traditional attire of his Canadian companions:
a breech-cloth, loose-fitting shirt, blanket coat, and large, red, worsted cap.
Smearing his face with dirt and grease, and wielding a paddle as best he could, the
American completed his transformation. His desperate ruse succeeded, and Henry
finally arrived at Michilimakinac unscathed, though hardly the conquering adventurer
of his earlier imagining.1

As Henry precipitously pursued his fortunes in the pays d ’en haut, the course
of the Canadian fur trade remained uncharted. Though now subject to British
authority, local traders were not arbitrarily barred from their traditional commerce in
furs. In fact, merchants who elected to remain in the country were granted all the

1 Alexander Henry, Travels and Adventures in Canada and the Indian Territories
Between the Years 1760 and 1776 (originally published New York: I. Riley, 1809;
Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1966), 1-37.
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rights and privileges accorded to the "Old Subjects" of Great Britain. The formal
articles of the 1760 capitulation expressly safeguarded their stores of furs and trade
merchandise, authorized the Compagnie des Indes to transport all remaining beaver to
France, and allowed the traders up to two years to retrieve any assets that remained in
the West. In no sense was the French-speaking merchant community deliberately
"decapitated" from the Canadian body politic after the Conquest.2
The relatively benevolent terms dictated by the British occupiers, however, did
not leave the traders altogether free to conduct business as usual. Over their protests,
Canadian merchants were prohibited from importing merchandise from their former
suppliers in France and so were forced to seek new commercial connections in
Britain. Cautious British officials also tended to discriminate against Canadians when
it came to granting military contracts or trading permits to the West, But in the face
of these initial setbacks, those marchands of Montreal who were determined to persist
in the fur trade proved remarkably resilient. Before long, they had established
profitable ties with London agents and neutralized opposition to their participation in
the western trade by striking partnerships with newly-arrived English-speaking

2 Marjorie Gordon Jackson, "The Beginning of British Trade at Michilimackinac,"
Minnesota History, 11:3 (1930): 231-32. For a discussion of the "decapitation"
hypothesis that attributed the ascendancy of an Anglo-Canadian mercantile elite to the
post-conquest flight of a nascent French-speaking bourgeoisie, see S. Dale Standen,
"The Debate on the Social and Economic Consequences of the Conquest: A
Summary," Proceedings o f the Annual Meeting o f the French Colonial Historical
Society, 10 (1984): 179-80.
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traders.3
Left to their own devices, it is likely that the Canadian fur merchants would
have successfully continued their commerce, having made the necessary adjustments
to unfamiliar merchandise and foreign suppliers. But the Canadian commercial
climate was rapidly evolving beyond their control. General Gage had immediately
recognized the importance of the Canadian fur trade but was intent on reforming what
he viewed as an overly authoritarian structure of monopolies and permits. With a nod
to enthusiastic British manufacturers, the newcomers hoped to remodel the trade after
that of the American colonies, where open markets, easy credit, and competitive
conditions prevailed. Despite the encouragement of British officials, relatively few
prospective English or American traders arrived in Montreal before the American
Revolution. Those who did venture north, however, quickly came to dominate the
Montreal market.4
If a flood of British and American entrepreneurs did not engulf Canadian
commerce after the Conquest, the gradual decline of investment by French-stock
merchants was due rather to the advent of the cut-throat commercial conditions they
had so scrupulously avoided in the past. The fur trade, though crucial to the

3 Josd Igartua, "The Merchants of Montreal at the Conquest: Socio-Economic
Profile," Histoire sociale/Social History, 8:16 (1975): 279-81; Igartua, "A Change in
Climate: The Conquest and the Marchands of Montreal," Historical
Papers/Communications historiques, Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical
Association (1974): 116; Standen, "Consequence*of the Conquest," 184.
4 Jackson, "Beginning of British Trade," 233-36; Igartua, "Change in Climate,"
115-16.
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Canadian economy, had made few Montrealers wealthy in the eighteenth century.
The rigid demands of Indian consumer-suppliers, a cramped local market, and the
regulatory oversight of colonial officials had dampened the potential for spectacular
profits. But the Montreal merchant community had persisted for decades under these
ultimately salutary constraints. The majority of French-speaking merchants, many of
whom were now approaching the end of their trading careers, were reluctant to wade
into the treacherous current of competition ushered in by their former rivals.
Gradually, inconspicuously, the Canadians relinquished their traditional trade to the
conquerors.5
As they took the reins of the Canadian fur trade, the neophyte AngloAmericans soon perceived the advantages wielded by their French predecessors. Like
their colleagues in New York and Pennsylvania, the English-speaking Montreal
merchants soon found themselves floundering in a commerce geared more toward the
ruthless pursuit of profits than the encouragement of stable relations with the Indians
upon whom their fortunes ultimately rested. In fact, the formation of the famed
North West Company in the 1780s signaled the belated recognition of the new
merchants that the French "oligopolistic" system had been ideally suited to the
peculiar exigencies of the fur trade. In a few years, the organization of Canadian
commerce had come full circle, though the language of its masters was now English

5 Igartua, "Change in Climate," 118-22; Igartua, "Merchants of Montreal," 291;
Standen, "Consequences of the Conquest," 184.
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rather than French.6
Old loyalties, the British learned, could not be erased by the stroke of a pen.
The military defeat of New France did not signal the death of the unique culture of
the Canadian fur trade any more than it did the abandonment of the Catholic faith or
the French tongue. After decades of intense rivalry for the Great Lakes fur trades,
the Anglo-Americans finally beat their Canadian competitors, not by force of arms or
cheapness of goods, but merely by joining them. Their victory in wresting the
Canadian trade from local hands, however, ultimately proved hollow. Just as
Alexander Henry survived his fateful journey to the West by shedding his English
clothes, his fellow traders found themselves forced to adopt the manners and means of
their erstwhile rivals. There was no better tribute, perhaps, to the hard-won success
of the French-Canadian trade, the memory of which yet endured in dusty ledgers,
lusty paddling songs, and the aching bones of ancient voyageurs.

6 Igartua, "Change in Climate," 122-23.
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APPENDIX
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
source: Ross, Archaeological Metrology.

ENGLISH

FRENCH

Liquid capacity
gallon = 4.3985 1.

p o t = 1.86 1.

Dry capacity
bushel = 35.2371 1.

minot = 39.03 1.
Dry weight

pound = 453.6 g.

livre = 489.41 g.

Linear measure
yard = .9144 m.
ell = 1 .1 4 3 m.

aune = 1.1884 m.
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